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Abstract 
 
Many fisheries challenges are closely linked to the choice of governance style, with the 
typical top-down, hierarchical mode unable to effectively cope with ever more diverse, 
complex, dynamic, and multi-scalar fisheries reality. Subsequently, transition towards a 
co-management type has been a popular trend in many coastal fisheries around the world. 
Although this initiative has shown potential in bringing positive outcomes to local fishery 
and communities, in many cases the transition process has proved to be a ‘wicked’ 
undertaking with multiple intricate issues emerging to complicate the efforts and to 
frustrate community members, practitioners and researchers alike. Recognizing the need 
for alternate insights into these implementation challenges, this thesis argues for a 
thorough understanding of governance change by highlighting the importance of ‘meta-
order governance’ elements, such as values, images and principles, of various fisheries 
stakeholders in shaping its outcomes. Further, it calls for an investigation of the 
institutional aspect of governance to underscore the structural elements being promoted in 
the transition and to elucidate its fit with the meta-level notions of governance actors, 
including the local fishers affected by them. These two areas of inquiry are inspired by 
the interactive governance theory and the governability concept, which emphasizes the 
need to examine all aspects of a governance system and their interconnectivity in order to 
solve problems and create societal opportunities. A government-initiated fisheries co-
management program currently underway in South Korea, called ‘Jayul’, forms the 
context in which this new focus is applied. The main research question this thesis aims to 
explore is “how does the governance change instituted by the central government align 
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with what fishers fundamentally conceive to be important and desirable for the fishery?” 
In addition to theoretical conceptualization, the research has a strong emphasis on method 
development, given the knowledge gap in the elicitation of values, images and principles 
in empirical settings. The approach advanced here can be extended to examine the 
implementation of other fisheries governance initiatives, such as marine protected areas, 
individual transferable quotas and seafood certification schemes, to provide a useful way 
of understanding their standings and prospects. In the process, new insights may surface, 
challenging and improving the core ideas raised in this research.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Fisheries governance has been a subject of research for several decades. Yet, while 
successful cases of fisheries that are moving towards sustainability have been 
documented (Hilborn et al. 2005; Hilborn 2007), a general decline of the resources at the 
macro-scale observed around the world (Pauly et al. 2002; Myers and Worm 2003; Allan 
et al. 2005; FAO 2012a) suggests that fisheries governance faces many challenges 
(Cochrane 2000; Beddington et al. 2007; Berkes et al. 2007; Mora et al. 2009). 
Unsustainable fishery outcomes bring real as well as serious consequences on several 
fronts. About 200 million full-time jobs provided by global fisheries (Teh and Sumaila 
2013) could be put in a vulnerable position, for instance. Such a scenario was observed in 
the collapse of a Newfoundland cod fishery, which resulted in soaring unemployment in 
the traditionally fishing-heavy regions (Hamilton and Butler 2001; Schrank 2005). Poorly 
governed fishery also creates grave concerns in securing animal protein supply for the 
world’s population, especially for the poor (Kent 1997; Béné et al. 2007; Jentoft and Eide 
2011). Further, fisheries hold cultural meanings and significance to local communities, 
which may face abrupt erosion with a fisheries collapse (McGoodwin 2001; Close et al. 
2002; Foale et al. 2011). The need for a global effort on rebuilding marine resources is 
being called upon in moving forward, with consideration of a diverse set of governance 
options congruent with local context (Worm et al. 2009; Khan and Neis 2010).  
One of the key developments in addressing the fisheries challenges has been an 
effort towards governance transition. Broadly meaning changes in the mode of 
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governance, which involves hierarchical, co- and self-governance (Gray 2005; Kooiman 
et al. 2005), many jurisdictions in various parts of the world have begun to experiment 
with governance reforms, particularly those embodying a process of transition (e.g., Hall-
Arber 2005; Olsson et al. 2008; Armitage et al. 2011; Cinner et al. 2012). Appearing 
under the rubric of fisheries co-governance (more commonly referred to as ‘co-
management’) or self-governance (see Wilson et al. 2003; Townsend et al. 2008), such 
transition typically involves a move from a long-established top-down, hierarchical 
governing structure to a more decentralized and collaborative one, based on the premise 
that greater fisher participation and responsibility in managing a local fishery could lead 
to better governance. Co-management is built on partnership between various actors to 
create an arrangement for joint, trust-based and democratic governance (see Jentoft 2005; 
Frangoudes et al. 2008; Berkes 2009). Self-governance in fisheries relies on elements 
such as customary tenure, group norms, social taboos, and informal rules. While this form 
of arrangement has persisted in certain parts of the world, particularly in the South, a 
renewed interest in instituting it in developed countries context is also being observed 
(Johannes 2002; Basurto 2008; Townsend et al. 2008). Overall, the change in the 
governance mode involves a shift in the relative weights of the main actors (e.g., state, 
market, civil society and community) with regard to the role and power dynamics 
(Meuleman 2008; Foley 2013) in order to produce a setup more conducive to resolving 
issues and creating opportunities.  
Despite decades of thinking and experience in governance transition, which have 
resulted in numerous case studies and a large quantity of research material, its progress 
has not been without significant challenges and failures. For instance, co-management 
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can be path-dependent, meaning that outcomes may have already been largely determined 
by the time it was conceived and initiated (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2007). There are also 
social and political concerns such as the participation paradox (Suárez de Vivero et al. 
2008), elite capture (Platteau and Abraham 2002), and the lack of capacity of resource 
user communities (Fabricius et al. 2007). Other less fruitful attempts have been observed 
around the world (e.g., Scholtz et al. 1998; Pinkerton 1999; Cheong 2005; Blaikie 2006; 
Gelcich et al. 2006; Njaya 2007; Béné et al. 2009; Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009). As 
such, transition to a new governance mode is never a straightforward affair, further 
contributing to the ‘wickedness’ in the governing of world’s fisheries (Ludwig et al. 
1993; Dietz et al. 2003; Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). In this backdrop, there appears a 
need for a sustained research attention and alternative outlooks on the issues of 
governance transition to examine it in a new light and also to stimulate further discussion 
on the topic.  
Affiliated with interactive governance theory, an emerging perspective called 
governability has come to the fore in recent years offering a novel way of approaching 
fisheries governance and therefore studying governance transition (Kooiman et al. 2005; 
Kooiman 2008; Bavinck et al. 2013). With an emphasis on understanding an inherent and 
constructed quality of a fisheries arrangement, a governability-inspired inquiry would 
seek whether a system (e.g., an inshore fishery) or a process in question (e.g., governance 
transition) is a governable one, capable of dealing with the multiple problems and issues 
facing the sector. Subsequently, it searches for ways to make it more governable, 
recognizing also limits to governability.  
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The purview of governability is wide-ranging and raises various possibilities for a 
potentially innovative analytical direction in which fisheries research can be undertaken. 
Among them is an interest in the meta-order of governance. Representing one of the 
understudied areas of governance, this aspect focuses on people’s normative ideas and 
underlying convictions that form the basis of governing decisions and actions (Kooiman 
and Jentoft 2009). The assertion is that all those involved in fisheries governance hold 
certain deeply-held notions about the fishery, policies and also about themselves, and they 
can inspire, guide, and shape the process and outcome of governance. Likewise, the meta-
order is also posited to influence governability of governance transition. Yet, studies that 
fully examine this concept are rare. The elements that constitute the meta-order, such as 
values and principles, thus, remain hidden under the radar and the potential to spark 
alternative insights go unnoticed.  
An example of this is a concept framed as the ‘mindset’. We often hear a call such 
as “ultimately, change in mindset (or a new mindset) is necessary” when attempting to 
effectuate lasting positive changes in natural resource policy (e.g., fisheries– Mace and 
Gabriel 1999; Francis et al. 2007; Korda et al. 2008; water management– Sadler 1998; 
Postel 2003; Biswas 2009; agriculture– Wall 2007; Ahnström et al. 2008), and climate 
change adaptation– Capili et al. 2005). In this sense, people’s mindset is regarded as a 
crucial link in initiating or maintaining successful governance outcomes. Despite a 
common usage of the term, both what a new mindset specifically refers to and how to 
bring about a new mindset is not well accounted for in many cases. Furthermore, who 
initiates, who it targets and how widespread it may occur is rarely discussed, leaving this 
sweeping generalization hollow in its projection. Thus, there is a need for a study that 
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firmly engages with the meta-order aspect of governance to generate potentially useful 
discoveries.  
In deepening the understanding of meta-order mechanisms, this study relies on 
another order of governance, which deals with institutions and complements the 
governance actors’ normative notions.  According to the interactive governance, 
designing and caring for institutions is the second order matter. Institutions are identified 
as a structural frame that gives substance to governance transition as well as provides 
stability and continuity to people’s underlying thoughts (Kooiman et al. 2005). How 
institutions constrain normative notions and how they in return strengthen or weaken 
institutions are the types of insights that can be sought. Uncovering such interactions 
between the two orders of governance is expected to enrich the overall analysis and also 
illuminate their influence on governability (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2013). 
In summary, this dissertation research is interested in studying the changes in 
governance mode, especially one that undergoes a transition from hierarchical to co-, or 
self-governance. It aims to enhance the existing body of knowledge by engaging in the 
under-explored theoretical angles of meta- and second order of governance inspired by 
the governability perspective. Since these topics are under-researched, the dissertation 
also intends to contribute to the methodological development of governance research 
through an innovative design.  
The introduction chapter resumes with a description of interactive governance 
theory which forms an overarching theoretical framework for this dissertation research. 
This is followed by an explanation of the governability concept, a useful analytics that 
guides the formulation of the research questions. Drawing from a co-management process 
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taking place in South Korean coastal fisheries, together with the theoretical inspirations, 
the research aims and objectives are presented. Next, an outline of the thesis is provided, 
together with a summary of the chapters, which is followed by a detailed description of 
the South Korean fisheries. Finally, the chapter offers a discussion on methods, and ends 
with the co-authorship statement.  
 
Theoretical foundation and analytical concepts 
 
Interactive governance theory 
This research stems from the ideas raised in interactive governance theory, whose 
interdisciplinary deliberation was grounded in Kooiman’s concept of governance 
(Kooiman 1993; Kooiman 2003) and later refined by others in the context of fisheries and 
aquaculture (Kooiman et al. 2005; Chuenpagdee 2011; Bavinck et al. 2013). Its general 
premise lies in the view that interactions are the fundamental conditions for the existence 
and functioning of social-ecological systems (Kooiman 2008). In this sense, any fisheries 
or human-in-nature system can be characterized and evaluated by the concept of 
interaction, whether through the presence or the absence of interactions, or the types and 
the nature of interactions, or the actors involved in them, or finally the speed at which 
interactions happen and hindrances that exist to impede its vigour. Kooiman et al. (2005, 
p.17) define interactive governance as: 
the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and 
create societal opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of principles 
guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them. 
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One of the key aspects it brings forward is the mode of governance (see Fig. 1). The 
governance mode sets an overarching perimeter within which the formation and 
execution of governing activities unfold. With hierarchical, co- and self-governance as 
the three most prevalent modes, it has a far-reaching effect in how a fishery operates. The 
interest in the mode has arisen from observing the limitations of centrally-coordinated 
hierarchical governance, in which problems in goal-setting, garnering legitimacy, and 
maintaining responsiveness may reduce its effectiveness (Jentoft et al. 2005). The 
attention on the mode also stems from the common property research (Ostrom 1990; 
Young 2001; Ostrom et al. 2002), which argues that the collective action problem, 
visualized as the “tragedy of the commons”, can be alleviated by an alternate mode 
involving community-based initiatives beyond the usual prescriptions of stronger 
government direction or privatization. 
Governing modes operate in tandem with other aspects of the governance system. 
Interactive governance specifies three orders of governance at which the governing 
modes are constructed (see Fig. 1). The first order deals with day-to-day activities 
required to solve societal problems and create societal opportunities. This is the domain 
of governance that mostly resembles management, i.e., technical and mundane decisions 
and actions related to performing tasks and solving operational problems (Chuenpagdee 
2011). Governance implies more, however, involving two extra outer layers. Captured in 
the definition of interactive governance above and also shown in Fig. 1, the second order 
refers to the institutional aspect – a structural arrangement and mechanism that houses 
and enables the first order activities. The third, or meta-order, is about the ideas and 
processes that “govern the governance”. The stipulation of the meta-order is a firm 
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recognition that fisheries governance is grounded in certain underlying normative 
concepts of governance actors, such as values, principles, and images, referred to as the 
‘meta-order’ elements. It is these elements, more so than those at the other orders such as 
actions (1
st
) and instruments (2
nd
), that can have a far-reaching effect in how fisheries is 
shaped and implemented (Kooiman and Jentoft 2009). Its articulation has been identified 
as the most distinguishing and innovative facet about interactive governance theory 
(Symes 2006; McGoodwin 2007). 
 
                      
Fig. 1 Conceptualization of interactive governance theory (source: Chuenpagdee 2011) 
 
Lastly, interactive governance theory recognizes a broadening purview of governing 
actors to comprise direct resource users, as well as to see a role for community groups as 
bona fide participants in the evolving and expanding sphere of resource governance (Fig. 
1). With the inclusive array of actor groups, multiple forms of interactions also need to be 
accounted for and facilitated. This would include, but not limited to, communication 
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among various groups at different positions, partnership building to foster collaboration, 
and societal learning through reflection and self-examination. 
 
Governability 
The emerging analytical approach this research uses to generate research questions is 
called governability. It is seen as a synthesizing construct in the scheme of interactive 
governance, which enables connecting and utilizing the various components described in 
the earlier section and also shown in Fig. 1. Defined as the integrated quality of 
governance in a societal system (Bavinck et al. 2013), governability is distinct in the 
sense that emphasis is less on attaining governance performance or specific outcomes per 
se but on fostering the overall capacity of the system which would then lend itself to 
attaining whatever outcomes one finds necessary. Higher governability implies being 
more apt to deal with any societal problems that may arise and also being more conducive 
to creating societal opportunities. In this sense, Bavinck et al. (2013) argues that the act of 
governance is basically about influencing and improving governability.  
From the governability perspective, then, the question shifts from what must be 
done to rebuild a depleted fishery to what inherent and constructed characteristics of the 
fishery system (including the governing system and the governing interactions) that may 
lower or enhance the possibility of a fish stock to recover. Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 
(2013) introduce a systematic assessment framework as a guideline to explore factors that 
may determine governability. As they explain, governability may be influenced by the 
degree of ‘wickedness’ of fisheries problems which arises from various stakeholder 
concerns, trade-offs and hard choices. How well the institutions of a governing system 
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match the demanding requests and characteristics of systems-to-be-governed brought 
about by their diversity, complexity, dynamics and scale is described as another aspect 
that could contribute to the level of governability. In addition, presence and quality of 
governing interactions among fisheries sub-systems with consideration of power 
relationships is theorized to also impact governability. As such, governability is grounded 
in the recognition that various features may affect governance, and that there are likely no 
easy solutions and quick fixes for improving governance effectiveness. Overall, the 
governability lens opens up a comprehensive and sensible viewpoint to understand 
fisheries governance, offering a promising avenue with which to conduct a study of 
fisheries governance.  
 
Meta- and second order of governance 
From the governability perspective, the meta-order and the second order of governance 
represent important aspects of governance that may intricately influence governability. 
First, as meta-order elements, values, images and principles highlight agents’ capacity to 
imagine and inspire, and are viewed as the fundamental building blocks of governance. 
They are something that governors’ speeches are framed in and specific management 
measures are built on, as well as where the reactions of those-being-governed are rested 
upon. This would imply that these normative elements of governance actors have a 
bearing on how policy decisions are to be acted out or neglected, promoted or resisted.  
In addition, agreement or compatibility in these underlying notions between 
governors and those-being-governed is theorized as a variable that affects the quality of a 
governance system (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2013). The system would be considered 
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more governable when the meta-order elements of various actors are first made known 
and explicit, and when general agreements appear between them. On the other hand, 
obscureness and/or disagreements in these elements would intensify ‘wickedness’ in the 
system likely lowering governability. Following from this similarities or dissimilarities in 
the values, images and principles of stakeholders would be expected to influence the 
course of governance transition as well. A similar value system may increase synergy and 
efficacy in moving towards a shared goal. On the other hand, value disparity and 
incompatibility may impede the progress by creating dissent or trade-offs and enlarging 
social-political complexity (see Song and Chuenpagdee 2011; Almerigi et al. 2013 for 
early examples of examining convergence and differences in the meta-order elements). 
Thus, in order to understand why governance transition unfolds the way it does and to 
anticipate where fisheries governance is headed, an examination into the meta-
governance aspect may prove useful. 
The governability perspective also identifies institution as a crucial feature that can 
affect the level of governability of a system. This research, therefore, draws from the 
second order of governance and connects with the institutional component. Generally 
speaking, institutions are structural guidance that provide continuity, reduce uncertainty 
and shape people’s interactions (North 1990; Peters 1999; Scott 2008). They provide an 
overarching environment which enables or controls governing decisions and actions. As 
such, an institution transcends individual actors to involve larger groups of people in 
patterned interactions that are somewhat predictable and stable, and that creates some 
sense of shared values and meanings among the members of the institutions (Peters 
1999).  
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While institutions can work to resist change and reinforce the status quo, they can 
also serve as a catalyst in bringing changes to the system (Scott 2008). In this sense, 
governance transition is often approached institutionally, meaning that co-management or 
community-based management schemes are treated as institutional arrangements to 
facilitate governance change (e.g., Ostrom 1990; Pomeroy 1995; Jentoft et al. 1998; 
Acheson 2006; Berkes 2009). A co-management program would represent a bundle of 
rules, norms, and organizational structures that are arranged together to sustain or foster 
certain behaviors and mindsets of involved groups. As governance transition is 
conceptualized to take place via an alteration or introduction of an institutional 
arrangement, understanding what the institution embodies and how it works becomes a 
crucial inquiry. If the behaviors or ideas that an institution aims to promote happen to be 
far-fetched from the mindsets of affected people, for instance, it may face immense 
difficulty in bringing intended changes. Thus, an institutional analysis can also explore 
the extent of institutional match between co-management and governance actors, which 
governability hinges upon. The postulation is that the greater the match, the higher the 
governability, and the greater propensity to produce successful governance transition.   
 
Thesis scope, research questions and paper outline  
 
This dissertation research aims to contribute to the understanding of governance 
transition, from the perspectives of meta- and second order governance. These two areas 
are worthy of research attention as they are key parts of what determines governability. 
Examining the meta-order aspect would be about revealing the degree of social 
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complexity, or ‘wickedness’, of the governance system through the similarity or 
disagreement in people’ underlying notions, such as values, images, and principles, as 
they pertain to governance transition. The second order governance inquiry centers on 
assessing institutional aims and mechanisms, and comparing them with the normative 
notions of stakeholders to understand institutional match and to draw implications for 
governability. 
This research is applied to small-scale coastal fisheries of South Korea, in which a 
fisheries co-management program has been undergoing in the past decade. Although this 
co-management setup is an installation of the central government and thus being 
implemented in a top-down manner, government managers and academic researchers 
generally agree that a true, enduring shift into co-governance (or even self-governance) 
can be ultimately achieved if and when a ‘change in mindset’ of fishers takes place. Here, 
a change in mindset is about affecting the fundamentals of people, such that they 
appreciate a new way of doing things and have a genuine interest in upholding it. In the 
context of the case study (i.e., the transition towards a more collaborative mode of 
governance), it would mean that fishers develop a sense of ownership and responsibilities 
for the coastal fishery. More specifically, they would have acquired a robust inclination 
and justifying reasons for embracing active and sustained participation in the 
management of local fishery, even when the incentives to do so disappear or when the 
grip of regulative measures or social norms weakens. 
Given the emphasis on the change in mindset in the governance process of the 
South Korean fisheries, together with the theoretical motivations explained earlier (see 
Fig. 2), this research poses the following questions: What are the ‘mindsets’ of fishery 
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stakeholders, as represented by, and studied through, their values, images, and principles? 
Do their values, images and principles agree or differ among fishery stakeholder groups, 
and to what extent? What does the co-management program as an institutional 
arrangement aim to promote, and how do they compare with the ‘mindsets’ of fishery 
stakeholders? The findings of this research aim to generate insights into whether the 
implementation of the Jayul co-management program (and thereby governance transition) 
through a change in mindset is a feasible venture in South Korea and what hinders its 
progress. 
 
Following the research questions, eight specific objectives are pursued. They are: 
1. To develop a conceptualization of the meta-order governance to comprise 
values, principles, and images, and review them as they have been discussed in 
fisheries research 
2. To review and understand institutional theory as it corresponds to the second 
order of governance and pertains to fisheries resources 
3. To develop a method for eliciting values, principles, and images of stakeholder 
groups 
4. To examine the convergence and disparity of values and principles among 
coastal fishery groups in South Korea and also the dominant images across the 
groups  
5. To understand the institutional aims of the co-management program in South 
Korea and explore its fit with respect to the values, principles, and images of 
fishery stakeholder groups 
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6. To generate policy implications based on the findings of the study towards the 
change in mindset and the future implementation of the co-management program 
in Korea 
7. To reflect on interactive governance theory and the governability concept and 
share insights 
 
 
Fig. 2 Study context, thesis structure and paper outline 
 
Meta-order governance 
People’s mindset  
(e.g. values, images, and principle): 
 
 
Second-order governance 
Institution  
(e.g. institutional aims): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Governance transition 
Hierarchical  Collaborative mode 
Through co-management as an 
institutional arrangement 
But top-down installment 
 
Need ‘change in mindset’ of 
fishery stakeholders, especially 
fishing community members, 
towards the institutional aims 
for widespread implementation 
Conceptual development and review 
Empirical application:  
method design and result 
Synthesis 
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 (values & principles) 
Chapter 5 (images) 
Chapter 6 (institutional aims) 
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16 
 
The thesis contains five papers in addition to the introduction and conclusion chapters 
(Fig. 2). The five papers (Chapters 2 to 6) form the main body and are organized as 
follows. Chapter 2 and 3 initiates the research by providing a conceptual development 
and review of the two main theoretical perspectives – the meta-order and the second order 
of governance. Chapter 2 reviews the meta-governance theory and connects it with a set 
of operational concepts that can be used and studied in the context of fisheries 
governance. Values, images, and principles are conceptualized as the appropriate meta-
governance elements, and their standalone meanings as well as inter-linkages among 
them are elucidated. This is followed by a literature scan to examine how frequently the 
values, images, and principles have been featured and discussed in fisheries governance 
research so far.  
Connecting with the second order of governance, the purpose of Chapter 3 is to 
review institutional theory and highlight an emerging institutional perspective appearing 
within fisheries research in the last decade. Based on this, it also identifies and explains a 
holistic scheme (i.e., three “pillars” of institution by Scott (2008)), with which to study 
fisheries institutions. Embodying a broadening purview of an institution that encompasses 
normative and cultural-cognitive dimensions as well as a regulative aspect (Scott 2008; 
Jentoft 2004), a growing body of fisheries literature is calling for a more inclusive 
consideration of different institutional elements such as cultural preferences, social 
taboos, and rule systems. Adopting this inclusive approach is expected to help governance 
actors to be more fully aware of and utilize the various institutional mechanisms in 
achieving a governing goal (e.g., changes in the mode of governance). 
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Chapter 4 and 5 illustrate the methods and results of an empirical application of 
the meta-governance aspect. Together, they focus on examining the ‘mindsets’ of fishery 
stakeholders in the context of the Korean example. Chapter 4 focuses on the design and 
testing of an alternative survey method for eliciting stakeholder values and principles. 
The method developed here is called ‘P+ sort’, and it incorporates sorting techniques to 
generate both quantitative and qualitative data. The method is also designed to offer 
simplicity and interactivity in data collection, for the reason that values and principles can 
be something that people may have difficulty in verbalizing. This exploratory design is 
then applied to the case of South Korean coastal fisheries to examine the values and 
principles considered important by two main fishery stakeholder groups: fishers/resource-
dependent community members and government managers/researchers. Comparisons are 
made between the two groups to identify their convergence or disagreement and draw 
implications towards the Jayul program. 
Chapter 5 documents a study of images that South Korean fishery groups have 
about the fishery and fishing life. Concise but open-ended questions are formulated to 
elicit the content and the general characteristics of images. These questions form a part of 
the survey instrument package used to target values and principles (Chapter 4). This 
exploratory design is applied to elicit a range of images held by two main fishery 
stakeholder groups: fishers/resource-dependent community members and government 
managers/researchers. Representing the respondents’ central aspirations or concerns 
linked to the fishery, images are examined and discussed to inform the co-management 
implementation. 
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Finally, in order to deepen the understanding of governance transition in Korean 
fisheries, Chapter 6 complements the meta-order study by conducting an institutional 
analysis of the Jayul program. Acknowledging the critical role of ‘mindset change’ in 
facilitating nationwide Jayul implementation, it examines the institutional aims of the 
program and draws comparison with the ‘mindsets’ of fishery stakeholders 
(fishers/community members in particular who represent the target group). More 
specifically, the analysis identifies the mismatches between the aims, organized according 
to the scheme of three pillars (introduced in Chapter 3), and with the result of the value-
image-principle survey (Chapters 4 and 5). 
The conclusion chapter summarizes the main points of the thesis, discusses future 
research needs, and offers reflection. Each paper is formatted in a style that meets the 
requirements of a target journal. 
 
Case study: The Jayul Fisheries Community Management in South Korean coastal 
fishery 
 
This dissertation research examines a case of governance transition taking place in the 
coastal fisheries in South Korea. First, an overview of the fisheries is presented, followed 
by a description of its management history and setup. The process of governance change 
is then explained to further introduce the empirical context.  
 
Overview of the fisheries 
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South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea) is located in the southern part of the 
Korean Peninsula in a temperate climate zone of the Northwest Pacific region (Fig. 3). Its 
geographical configuration displays a great biophysical variability in its coastal 
environment. The west coast faces the Yellow Sea which is set in an epicontinental shelf 
with relatively flat bathymetry and a generally shallow depth of less than 100m 
(Alexander et al 1991; Liu et al. 2004). The Yellow sea receives a large amount of fine-
grained sediment from the Yellow River and Yangtze River in China as well as a number 
of smaller rivers in the Korean peninsula, which contributes to high turbidity in the 
nearshore water column (Lee and Chough 1989). The west coast also features a very low 
gradient (< l m/km) and contains numerous embayments and islands, as well as extensive 
wetlands and tidal flats (Lim and Park 2003). On the contrary, the east coast follows a 
mountain range and steeply connects to deep water basins of the East Sea (also known as 
the Sea of Japan) which has a maximum depth of roughly 3,500m. Its deep water is 
replenished every winter by deep convection, and it also contains well-defined subpolar 
fronts in the surface layer between warm and cold water masses, suggesting the East Sea 
to be a model of the large global ocean (Ichiye 1984; Yamada et al. 2004; Zhang et al. 
2004).  
Waters around Korea experience comparably high annual primary production (over 
150 g Chl m
-2
 y
-1
) as estimated from upper ocean chlorophyll concentration (Antoine et 
al. 1996). Other large-scale phylogeographic and oceanographic processes, such as 
Pleistocene glacial oscillations, associated tectonic sea-level changes, and the dominant 
warm surface Kuroshio Current, have fundamentally influenced the distribution and 
genetic diversity of marine coastal species, creating a region of productive fishing 
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grounds in all three adjacent seas – the Yellow Sea, the East Sea, and the Korea Strait 
which joins onto the East China Sea (Kang 2006; Hu et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2012; Lee et 
al. 2012). In 2010, South Korea produced 2,208,489 metric tons of fish, crustaceans, and 
molluscs, of which 1,732,928 tons are from capture fisheries (FAO 2012b). With 
additional 914,715 tons of aquatic plant production (e.g., laver and wakame), South 
Korea ranks among the top fish producing nations in the world. 
 
            
Fig. 3 Map of South Korea and the distribution of Jayul fisher organizations (number in 
parenthesis indicates the number of organizations in each jurisdiction) 
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From ancient times, fishing has naturally taken place in Korea, and helped satisfy much 
of the domestic fish consumption demands over the years (Hong 1995). Fish occupies an 
integral part of Koreans’ dietary life and intimately connected to their culture even to this 
date. According to data recorded since 1960s, fish has consistently contributed over 40-
50% of the animal protein intake per capita per day (Han 2009). Moreover, in 2007, 
South Korea was the 4
th
 biggest consumer in the world in the annual per capita 
consumption of fish, shellfish and seaweed at 65.5kg, only to be surpassed by the island 
nations of Maldives, Iceland and Kiribati (FAO 2010). In the coastal fishery, there are 
nearly 150 target species of commercial significance, which include anchovy, squid, 
mackerel, hairtail, swimming crab, Pacific herring, snow crab, and yellow croaker (in the 
decreasing order of landed volume), as well as a wide variety of shellfish and seaweeds 
(Kang 2006; KMI 2010). Also, with over 28 licensed fishing gear types permitted in the 
coastal fishery, it has the strong character of multi-gear/multi-species (Han 2009). There 
were 71,046 fishing households nationwide in 2008, which marked 11.1% decrease from 
2005. The number of full-time fishing households and those who engage in capture 
fisheries decreased by greater margins than the part-time and the aquaculture households, 
respectively, for the same period (KMI 2010). A similar downward trend is observed in 
the number of coastal fishing vessels (defined as under 8 tons generally), showing a 
steady decline from 60,892 in 2005 to 53,792 in 2008 (KMI 2010). 
 
Management history and setup 
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In the pre-modern period, many inshore fishing grounds were privatized by clans and 
village authorities. With the beginning of the Japanese occupation of Korea in 1911, the 
colonial government took over and restructured Korean fisheries by introducing fishing 
rights and laws and also founded fisheries cooperatives at the village level (known as 
uchon-gye). This shift endowed the government with an exclusive power to grant and 
manage licenses and effectively placed the colonial state in charge of overall fisheries 
management (Cheong 2004). Following independence in 1945, post-colonial government 
inherited much of the colonial setup, and the fishery has been chiefly operated under the 
overarching direction of the central government who sets the regulations, issues licenses, 
enforces the rules, and provides benefits and subsidies to communities (Hong 1995; 
Cheong 2004). A simple scheme depicting the present-day organizational structure of the 
South Korean coastal fishery is displayed in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 4 General organizational structure of South Korean coastal fishery showing main 
organizations and their mainly hierarchical relationships (double-lined boxes denote 
government organizations; thick-single-lined boxes represent community-level fishing 
organizations or industry group; and thin-single-lined boxes represent non-governmental 
support organizations) 
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The centrally coordinated fisheries management regime is currently composed of three 
main elements – a license system, technical regulations (e.g. mesh size, catch size, and 
closed seasons), and the Total Allowable Catch (TAC). The TAC system is a recently 
introduced measure first taking effect in 1999. It came about in response to the limitations 
of the input control and technical restrictions alone to curb overexploitation of 
economically important species, such as yellow croaker and hairtail (Nam 2007). A need 
to construct scientific and efficient management system in the era of Economic Exclusive 
Zone sovereignty also contributed to the development of the TAC (OECD 2011). Quotas 
are allocated to individual vessels based on the recommendations of local governments 
taking historical catches and vessel sizes into consideration. It thus resembles individual 
quota system without transferability, although the introduction of quota trade is 
reasonably expected in the future (Nam 2007). As of 2013, there are 11 species of high 
volume and high value managed under the TAC system including mackerel, squid, 
sardine, snow crab, swimming crab, and pen shell. Early results, however, indicate 
several issues related to quota allocation, reporting of catch, and bycatch (Nam 2007; 
OECD 2011).  
Limited entry through the license system has been the primary means of regulating 
fishery since the beginning of the modern day management (Cheong 2004). A common 
classification specifies three types of fishing, i.e., license-, permit-, and report-based. 
First, license-based fisheries include those taking place in intertidal and nearshore areas 
such as shellfish and seaweed gleaning, fixed gear operation, and aquaculture. The 
harvesting privileges are licensed to lawful holders allowing them to maintain exclusive 
management and fishing rights to a designated area. While license can be granted to 
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individuals or private enterprises, much of the areas covered by licenses are ‘village-
owned’ fishing grounds governed by fishing village cooperatives (i.e., uchon-gyes). This 
makes uchon-gyes an important local resource manager. In this sense, community-based 
management of local fisheries has been a conspicuous part of the seascape in Korea, 
which also receives support from two other levels of cooperative organizations: national- 
and regional fisheries cooperatives, as shown in Fig. 4. As the main economic and social 
organization of the fishing community, uchon-gyes play a key role in maintaining order 
with community-set rules, fostering cooperation among members, and representing local 
fishery interests vis-à-vis the central and municipal government and the regional fisheries 
cooperative. In recent years, however, a dwindling fisher population, continuing fisheries 
resource decline, and an increasing scale of production and capital investment in 
aquaculture activities have weakened the cooperative-based local fishing operation 
(Cheong 2003a). Less prevalent are collective harvest and equal distribution of fishing 
grounds and earnings. Instead, privatizing tendencies and individualistic modes of 
operation such as leasing out the village fishing ground to individual households or hiring 
outside labor to harvest fishes have become a more common occurrence. 
The second type of fishery involves fishing using vessels and gears in the inshore 
and offshore waters. Regulated through issuance and withdrawal of quinquennial fishing 
permits by the county and city governments, the permits are held by individual fishers, 
who may be members of uchon-gyes and/or sector-specific fishing gear associations. This 
permit-based boat fishery is a significant sector in coastal fishery in terms of both catch 
volume and value. According to 2001 data, this fishery recorded 213,003 metric tons of 
catch with the landed value of 766,623,987,000 won (approx. 766 million dollars US) 
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(Han 2009). This is compared to 49,470 metric tons and 88,011,422,000 won (approx. 88 
million dollars US) of license-based community  fishery, and 655,827 metric tons and 
717,162,507,000 won (approx. 717 million dollars US) of license-based aquaculture 
fishery (Han 2009).  
The third type is called ‘report’ fishery. Although it has the highest number of 
certificate holders (121,453 in 2009) among the three types, it forms a minor part, as it 
allows fishers to carry out smaller-scale, rudimentary type of fishing operations on an 
individual basis. City or county government responds to the request of each fisher by 
issuing a certificate which is valid for five years (MIFAFF, 2012). 
 
‘Jayul Community Fisheries Management’ Program 
Building on the tradition of uchon-gye-based fishery management, the ‘Jayul Community 
Fisheries Management’ program was initiated by the central government in 2001 
(hereafter referred to as the ‘Jayul’ program). It attempts a nationwide shift from the 
hierarchical, unilateral governing of the central government buttressed by the regulation 
and enforcement regime to consensus, trust, and collaboration-based governance mode, 
entailing more direct involvement of multiple actors and resource user groups. Under this 
scheme, government sets out policy guidelines and provides financial and technical 
assistance, while local fisher organizations (e.g. uchon-gyes and gear associations, see 
Fig. 4) draft and carry out a management plan for their fishery. As an alternate direction 
for resolving various environmental and social challenges such as stock depletion, illegal 
fishing, rising operational costs, and decline of coastal villages (Cheong 2003b; Han 
2009), as well as reducing fishers’ over-reliance on government support (Lee 2010; 
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OECD 2011), its overall aim is to raise the level of community participation in managing 
local fisheries through reinvigoration of uchon-gyes and fisher associations, and to 
ultimately instill a sense of ownership (MOMAF 2003; Lee et al. 2006). 
Since its inception a decade ago, the number of community fisher organizations 
participating in the program has reached 893 in 2011, whose distribution is shown in Fig. 
3, and there have been several exemplary cases in which fishing income has increased 
and illegal fishing have subsided through this process (MOMAF 2005; Uchida et al. 
2010, 2012). The general view is that the Jayul program has been helpful in instituting 
fisher involvement and/or revitalizing uchon-gye-based management in many 
communities (OECD 2011). Yet, doubts are also raised as to whether fishers’ activities 
are really self-regulatory and voluntary, or they are simply responding to external 
incentives, i.e., whether the change in mindset of fishers to embrace this governance 
mode is genuinely taking root. Many Jayul communities simply exist only on paper with 
no substantial follow-up activities, or they have quit the program altogether (Seo and 
Byeon 2006). Moreover, a financial reward system that the central government has set up 
to entice fishing community organizations to join and keep up with the activities could be 
promoting further reliance on government, negating thus its original intention. For 
instance, there is a worry that a discontinuation of the funding or facing low prospect of 
receiving financial benefits may arouse negative sentiments towards further participation. 
As a result, communities may be induced to lapse back into inaction (Lee 2010). 
The central government has expressed the ambition of broadening its participation 
and benefits to 1,400 fisher organizations by 2014 and to nearly all 2,000 coastal 
communities nationwide in a foreseeable future (PPACP 2008; Lee 2010). Lee and Shin 
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(2004) also submits that achieving this new mode of governance represents the only 
viable option available in improving the fisheries situation in Korea. Corresponding to 
these high expectations, an examination of the normative and institutional elements of the 
Jayul program would serve a useful and timely inquiry into understanding its impeded 
progress and identifying areas of (re-)consideration.   
 
Methodology 
 
This research employs mixed methods (Axinn and Pearce 2006; Creswell and Plano Clark 
2007) and includes both quantitative and qualitative techniques for data collection and 
analysis. The three main data collection methods are (1) literature and document review; 
(2) a questionnaire survey that combines a sorting exercise and a series of open-ended 
questions; and (3) participant observation and informal discussions. The method(s) used 
for each of the five papers (Chapters 2 to 6) are listed in Table 1. Review of relevant 
documents includes both published and grey literature, and those written in Korean as 
well as in the English language, and is conducted by the candidate who holds proficiency 
in both languages. This has allowed making use of government reports and research 
articles that are only available in the Korean language, which can contribute towards 
gaining in-depth information about the domestic fishery situation. A questionnaire survey 
is chosen as the main method of primary data collection for its flexibility to produce both 
quantitative and qualitative data while targeting potentially a large number of respondents 
(Hines 1993). A sorting technique called “P+ sort” is also developed as part of the survey, 
building on the methodological foundation of both pile sort (P) and Q sort. “P+ sort” aims 
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to achieve an ‘intermediate’ level of sophistication by offering a more structured format 
than the pile sort while remaining simple with fewer assumptions and constraints than the 
Q sort, for the reason that ‘mindset’ can be something that people may have difficulty in 
verbalizing. The survey method is thus designed to offer simplicity and user-
approachability in data collection. Two versions of the questionnaire are used, which 
feature slight variations in the sections seeking personal opinions and demographic 
information – one intended for the resource-dependent community members and the other 
for the researchers/managers (See Appendix I and II). The design and application of the 
survey method employed in this research is described in Chapter 4 and 5. Lastly, 
informal chats with additional key informants and direct observation during 1 to 2 week 
long visits to each of the surveyed fishing communities are used to triangulate the data, 
thereby complementing the survey process. 
A meta-analysis of fisheries governance literature forms a significant mode of 
analysis for Chapter 2 and 3 (see Zhao 1991; Paterson et al. 2001). The numerical data 
obtained from the survey questionnaire based on the sorting technique is analyzed using 
frequency analysis and non-parametric statistical procedures, such as the Kendall 
coefficient of concordance W and the chi-square test through an assignment of weighted 
scores to sorted patterns (see Chapter 4). An analysis of the transcribed and coded 
qualitative data utilizes ‘thematic analysis’ to identify appropriate categories and 
prevalent themes in people’s responses (Braun and Clarke 2006). This is employed as the 
primary method for understanding stakeholder images, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Finally, Chapter 6 applies a generic form of document analysis, which offers a 
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systematic way of reviewing various forms of documents, usually those found in the 
public domain (Bowen 2009). 
 
Table 1 List of data collection and analysis methods used in the research organized by 
paper 
Paper number and the main 
topic 
Data collection methods Analysis 
methods 
Chapter 2: Conceptualization 
of meta-governance and 
review of values, images, and 
principles 
Literature review Meta-analysis 
Chapter 3: Review of 
institutional thinking 
Literature review Meta-analysis 
Chapter 4: Value and principle 
survey 
Questionnaire survey (a sorting 
exercise and open-ended 
questions); informal chats; 
participant observation 
Non-parametric 
statistical tests; 
Thematic 
analysis  
Chapter 5: Content and 
characteristics of stakeholder 
images 
Questionnaire survey (open-ended 
questions); informal discussions 
with key informants, participation 
observation 
Thematic 
analysis 
Chapter 6: Institutional 
analysis 
Literature review, informal 
discussions with key informants, 
participation observation 
Document 
analysis 
 
The research process is outlined as follows. The first phase of data collection coincided 
with the initial fieldwork period that span from September 2009 to June 2010. Through 
activities such as informal discussions with key informants, reconnaissance visits to 
fishing villages, and establishing contacts with a domestic fishery research community, 
this initial groundwork has helped the candidate to develop an adequate sense of the 
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salient fisheries issues in South Korea and subsequently build research ideas around the 
local context. After a year spent on campus in St. John’s, Canada, during which a 
research plan was formulated, an ethics approval granted, and the initial drafts of the two 
review papers prepared, the second phase of fieldwork took place from September 2011 
to July 2012. In this period, the survey design was finalized through incorporating input 
from domestic experts and pre-tests, and the survey was conducted together with informal 
chats and participant observation. Also, data verification and preliminary analyses were 
carried out during this phase involving re-visits to the communities and management 
offices to discuss the findings and seek explanations for the attained results. Full analysis 
and the write up of the results were followed occupying the main activities in the 
subsequent year in St. John’s.   
 
Co-authorship statement 
 
Chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5 share co-authorship with the supervisor and/or supervisory 
committee members with Chapter 6 having single-authorship. The candidate is the 
principal author of Chapter 2, 4 and 5, for which the candidate formulated research 
questions, conceived study design, collected and analyzed primary and secondary data, 
and prepared initial drafts. All these steps were guided by the supervisor, and supported 
by  the committee members. The preparation of final manuscripts incorporated critical 
input and editorial suggestions of the supervisor and the committee members. The 
candidate is the second author of Chapter 3. Here, the supervisor took a lead role in 
formulating research ideas and study design. Writing of the manuscript took a 
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collaborative effort, while the candidate was mainly responsible for literature review and 
revision of the manuscript in response to reviewers’ comments.    
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Abstract 
Natural resource governance is expected to respond effectively and timely to dynamic 
environmental conditions, also in a manner that reflects social and political complexity of 
the system that it aims to govern. Values, images and principles that resource users and 
governing actors hold about how the world works represent a fundamental part of that 
complexity. These elements have indefinite form and meaning, may be incommensurable, 
competing and incompatible, and they often go unnoticed in governance discourse. This 
paper examines how values, images and principles are represented in a fisheries setting, 
and explores their diversity and ubiquity as well as the potential differences in the way 
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they are conceived by various stakeholders. These characteristics are shown to give rise to 
the difficulties in policy planning and implementation, and create implications to power 
relations and overall governability of a fisheries system. The paper posits that governance 
challenges could be lessened if stakeholders’ values, images, and principles are made 
explicit, understood, and articulated into policy and decision-making process. It 
concludes with suggestions about future research steps. 
 
Keywords: value; image; principle; fisheries; interactive governance; governability 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The complexity, dynamics and multi-scaled interactions between humans and the 
environment make governance of natural resource industries such as fisheries among the 
most challenging systems to govern [1-3]. Conventional and popular policy initiatives 
that resemble ‘panaceas’ [4] or ‘technical fixes’ [5], even if well-implemented, often 
remain ineffective and produce disappointing results [6]. Recently, some researchers have 
begun drawing parallel to the dilemmas confronting planning theory [7] in characterizing 
resource governance issues as ‘wicked problems’ [8-13]. Here, defining a problem itself 
is a problem, and the problems are never solved, but re-solved for the time being. This 
conundrum stems from the inherent nature of social problems, or any problems that have 
social implications, in which diverse groups of individuals express their interests, 
judgments and worldviews [7,9]. 
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According to the interactive governance perspective [14], dealing with ‘wicked 
problems’ may start with an examination of fishery systems in order to understand their 
social and ecological limits [15], as well as potential and opportunities embedded within 
[16]. This includes a study of fisheries institutions, how they are created and what are 
expected of their functions [17]. Ultimately, a thorough investigation of what underlies 
people’s behaviors, actions and decisions is required to make these problems more 
comprehensible. As posited by Kooiman and Jentoft [18], this understanding is 
fundamentally what governors should strive for. 
Studies illustrating how stakeholders vary in their interests and motivation include 
those emphasizing users’ attitude (e.g., [19,20]) and perception (e.g., [21,22]). Though 
they provide a useful way of understanding people’s sentiment about specific objects, 
situations or issues, these attributes are based on other mental constructs, particularly 
values, images and principles which are slow-changing, few in number and deeply 
ingrained [23-25]. It is these latter elements that create ‘hard choices’ in resource 
governance, requiring decisions about incommensurable trade-offs that a simple opinion 
poll or attitudinal survey is ill-suited to resolve [26,27]. There have been numerous 
studies to understand these fundamental concepts, as well as other related notions, such as 
beliefs, norms and worldviews (e.g., [23,28,29]). While they endeavour to distinguish 
these constructs from each other, they also acknowledge that there is a great amount of 
overlap. In fact, they may be best used in conjunction with each other as suggested in 
studies of values, theories of planning, and governance [27,30-32].  
In this paper, the benefit of understanding ‘meta-level’ governance elements, i.e., 
values, images and principles, of those involved in governance in resolving fisheries 
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problems is examined. It does so by exploring the diversity in these elements, how they 
have informed and dominated the fisheries discourse, as well as revealing the elements 
that have been seldom discussed. The paper posits that an enhanced understanding of 
what these meta-elements are and how they might be differently conceived by various 
stakeholders may contribute to lessening the complexity and making fisheries a less 
wicked affair.  
In the following, a description of these elements according to the interactive 
governance perspective is presented. A literature review is then conducted to examine 
what values, images and principles entail and how they have been approached in the 
fisheries context. The paper reflects on the findings by discussing their implications to 
governability, and concludes with suggestions on future research direction. 
 
2. Meta-level governance elements 
 
The interactive governance perspective shares many key ideas promoted by other 
governance approaches [16], but has its own emphasis on interactions as the fundamental 
conditions for the existence of social-ecological systems [14,33]. It is within these 
interactions, especially between the systems that are being governed (whether natural or 
social) and the governing system, where problems and opportunities for governance lie. 
In its deliberation, meta-level governance, which deals with elements such as values, 
images, and principles, is identified as the most distinguishing and innovative facet about 
the interactive governance [34,35]. Symes [34, p. 116] notes, for instance, that the “firm 
foundations in ethical values and carefully articulated governing principles” on which 
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interactive governance bases its focus is a pioneering notion that could lead fisheries 
governance to a new height. The explicit attention on meta-level governance stems from 
the acknowledgement that governance is value-ridden from top to bottom [36]. In other 
words, the normative and cognitive concerns of fishery stakeholders are what underpin 
the overall governance process, guiding, shaping and inspiring decisions and actions. 
Kooiman [36, p. 170] explains that meta-level governing is like “an imaginary governor, 
teleported to a point ‘outside’ and holding the whole governance experience against a 
normative light.” This imaginary governor can be envisaged as having a set of values, 
images and principles, by which his/her decision is evaluated and judged.    
According to Rokeach [23, p. 5], values are “enduring beliefs that a specific mode 
of conduct is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct 
or end-state of existence.” Hence, they are ultimately about what is desirable. They 
transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour, and are ordered 
by relative importance [37]. Despite being abstract and ideal [38], the essence of 
governance lies in the determination and allocation of values [39], the process in which 
power dynamics are embedded. Images are “a way of thinking and a way of seeing that 
pervade how we understand our world generally” [40, p. 4]. Cognitive in nature and tied 
to real practices, they are neither easily recognized nor often questioned, and mostly 
remain unverbalized and implicit [41]. Boulding [42] maintains that images are what one 
believes to be true; one’s subjective knowledge that largely governs his/her behaviour. 
Principles are codes of conduct, operating guidelines, or yardsticks to internally refer to 
when decisions and actions are made, evaluated, criticized and when changes are 
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proposed. Principles are the most applied notion in the sense that they have a more direct 
bearing on real-life choices and practices than values and images [18].  
Two properties of values, images and principles give rise to difficulties in 
resource governance. They often differ between stakeholders, especially those with 
different interests, and they are subjected to change. In addition to their diverse and 
dynamic nature, they tend to interact in ways that are not easy to explain. As implied by 
several theories, such as those of Planned Behavior [30] and the value-belief-norm model 
[31], they may be best understood together. Biggs et al. [29] also explain how values and 
beliefs interact with mental models (i.e., images) in multi-loop learning processes. These 
studies suggest that one can expect lively interplay among these elements, requiring 
therefore joint consideration when attempting to understand how they influence resource 
governance decisions.  
The difficulties observed through the meta-level elements also highlight 
governability challenges, which need to be addressed for improving governance. 
Governability is a concept loosely defined as the capacity to govern, given the real and 
foreseeable demands of those being governed [33,43,44]. Incommensurable values 
between fisheries stakeholders, for example, may act as a limit to how governable a 
fishery can be [15]. But in another case where people’s images appear consistent with 
their value priorities, the system would be deemed more governable. Focusing on 
stakeholders’ values, images, and principles would present one way of permitting 
recognition of different degrees of governability that exists in a fisheries system. 
 
3. Values, images, and principles in fisheries governance 
49 
 
 
3.1. Values 
 
Generally speaking, values are discussed in a number of different ways with varying foci. 
A broad range of disciplines, such as philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
ecological economics, and resource management, all contribute to value literature. This 
section outlines salient values being evoked in fisheries and by the same token identifies 
values that have received less attention by fisheries stakeholders. Because value can be a 
bewildering concept whose meanings may vary depending on one’s disciplinary frame, an 
introduction of the general value literature is first presented to illustrate the diverse array 
of existing value discourses. 
Satterfield and Kalof [45] refer to two dominant traditions in categorizing values – 
axiomatic and relativistic. An axiomatic approach operates on the premise that certain 
values are better, more important, and intellectually defensible than others. Values under 
this tradition are formulated based on argument (e.g., [46,47]) and/or measurement (e.g., 
[48]), and are typically expert-driven from the field of ethics, philosophy and ecological 
economics. The relativistic approach, on the other hand, assumes that there are no right or 
wrong values, only different ones. Abiding by the principle of ‘value-neutrality’, this 
tradition is well-accepted by practitioners and applied researchers, who rely on expressed 
preferences to elicit or monitor public beliefs and conduct survey exercises for policy and 
management purposes [45].  
Another way to organize values is by the distinction of held and assigned values 
[49]. Held values refer to underlying values or ideals that prioritize modes of conduct or 
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desirable qualities. Mainly advocated through sociology and psychology, this perspective 
sees values as fundamental beliefs, which are typically subject to ordering of relative 
importance (e.g., ranking). On the other hand, assigned values refer to a benefit, worth, or 
merit that is given to an object, most often assessed through valuation techniques. Here, 
value is “not a characteristic of the object per se but the importance of which is derived, 
at least partially, from held values” [45, p. xxv].   
The approach taken in this paper to study values in fisheries governance was 
through developing a set of common value types. Dietz et al. [28] mentions that the 
Rokeach/Schwartz tradition of conceiving human values, for example, needs an 
expansion to capture altruism in order to better link with environmental concerns and be 
more useful for the study of environmentalism. Supported by such ideas that combining 
different ways of seeing values can be a value-added activity, this study consolidated 
eight well-established value schemes (i.e., [23,37,46,50-54]) that are judged collectively 
to reflect the diverse traditions that exist in the value literature. A considerable overlap 
among the examined value schemes was observed, and these commonalities allowed for 
the forming of 24 value types, as listed in Table 1. Though not a universal list, it 
reasonably captures the broad value discourse offering a comprehensive scope in a 
concise fashion. These 24 value types provide the basis for the search words used to 
conduct literature scan that identifies the values frequently or seldom discussed in 
fisheries governance.  
A journal article scan using ‘ISI Web of Knowledge’ as a search engine was 
conducted for each value type in October 2012 using the search words listed in Table 1 in 
combination with (“fisheries” OR “fishery”) AND (“governance” OR “management”). 
51 
 
Owing to the many different linguistic connotations associated with the word “value”, a 
direct scan of the word “value” was deemed less meaningful and thus deliberately 
omitted. 
The results indicated that ecosystem conservation, wealth, knowledge, equality, 
secure livelihoods, achievement, tradition, and influence are the eight most widely 
discussed values in fisheries governance research in the decreasing order. This is perhaps 
not a surprising finding, given the prominence of the topics concerning ecosystem, 
economic growth, and livelihoods in the general fisheries discourse (e.g., ecosystem-
approach to management [55], wealth-based fisheries management [56], and sustainable 
livelihoods approach [57]). On the other hand, what also becomes evident from the results 
is the type of values that have been less well-embraced, but potentially important and 
worthy of greater attention. It is argued, for instance, that spiritual values reified through 
religious practices and sacred rituals can serve as a driving force in reviving long-
neglected traditional ecological knowledge for facilitating sustainable management of 
fisheries in East Africa [58]. Also, striving for peace can be an enabling factor in 
developing an integrated management plan that overlays commercial fisheries, tourism 
activities, claims of indigenous people, and territorial disputes, as demonstrated in the 
case of the Shiretoko World Natural Heritage area in Japan [59]. In addition to these 
discrete empirical cases, a conceptual framework centering on social wellbeing has 
recently emerged which highlights the subjective and psychological aspirations of 
individuals for enhancing quality of life [60,61]. Such perspective appears to align well 
with less advanced value types such as self-esteem, freedom, and attachment to place. 
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Coulthard et al. [61] further argues that when applied to a fishery context these values can 
provide a basis for poverty reduction and ecosystem conservation in fishing communities.  
Further examination enabled categorization of the value types into four broad 
orientations. The value types in the ‘better world’ category can be said to hold a worldly 
orientation, as something that is desired for the world/broader society. As such, 
promoting ecosystem conservation, advocating equality, or deepening knowledge all 
carries an altruistic appeal that strives for the common good. Those in the ‘good life’ 
category are oriented towards what is desired for an individual’s satisfactory, eudaimonic 
life. Accumulation of wealth, enhancement of spiritual wellbeing, and hedonistic 
aspirations can be said to closely follow egoistic motives, although it needs not be strictly 
egoistic at all times. Values in the ‘personal virtues’ category hold the orientation of 
desired righteousness of a person. Striving for self-esteem, moderation, or honesty would 
tend to promote a higher attainment of personal merit. Lastly, ‘outward aspirations’ 
signify those values oriented toward desired relationship/quality with outer beings, that is, 
they represent the so-called social values that guide interactions with fellow humans or 
objects outside of self. 
 
Table 1 Twenty-four thematic value types that emerged from a review of eight value 
schemes, followed by the number of articles generated in a literature scan conducted for 
each value type in the fisheries governance context. The value types are described by the 
search words and categorized under the four broad value orientations 
Type of values Search words Number of 
articles 
Broad value 
orientations 
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generated 
(1) Ecosystem 
conservation 
Ecosystem conservation, 
environmental protection, existence 
value, intrinsic value 
315 Better world 
(what is 
desired for 
the 
world/broade
r society) 
(2) Appreciation 
of beauty 
Beauty, aesthetic value 29 
(3) Peacefulness Peaceful, social order 3 
(4) Equality Equality, equity, social justice, future 
generation 
149 
(5) Freedom Freedom 45 
(6) Knowledge Knowledge value, scientific 
knowledge, ecological knowledge, 
intelligence 
221 
(7) Wealth Wealth, economic value, utilitarian 
value 
269 ‘Good’ life 
(what is 
desired for an 
individual’s 
satisfactory, 
eudaimonic, 
life) 
(8) Spiritual 
wellbeing 
Spiritual value, religious value, 
moral value 
2 
(9) Secure 
livelihoods 
Livelihood security, food security 140 
(10) Hedonism Joy, pleasure, recreational value 30 
(11) 
Achievement 
Achievement 106 
(12) Novelty Novelty, creativity 11 
(13) Benevolence Benevolence, compassion 2 Personal 
virtues 
(desired 
virtuous inner 
quality of a 
person 
(14) Moderation Moderation, self-control 8 
(15) Self-esteem Self-esteem, self-respect 1 
(16) Honesty Honesty 0 
(17) Politeness Polite 0 
(18) Attachment 
to place 
Attachment to place, sense of place, 
place value, heritage value 
6 Outward 
aspirations 
(desired 
relationship 
with 
(19) Social 
cohesion 
Social cohesion, social capital, 
community value, sense of belonging 
37 
(20) Influence Social power 95 
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(21) Social 
recognition 
Social recognition, public image 35 human/object 
outside of 
self) 
(22) Tradition Tradition, cultural sustainability, 
cultural value 
102 
(23) Conformity Conformity, obedience 21 
(24) Affection Humanistic love 0 
 
3.2. Images 
 
Images have been associated with a wide array of conceptual backgrounds and framed in 
different terminologies, such as mental model [62], cognitive map [63], cognitive 
orientation [41], and virtual reality [64]. The traditions of anthropology and cognitive 
science have emphasized their linkages to aspects such as culture and internal information 
processing, respectively. Focusing on the fisheries governance context, this paper 
approaches images from the angle of policy decision-making and implementation. In 
other words, it aims to understand how images of governance systems held by 
stakeholders influence policy initiation, execution and evaluation, and in turn how the 
images are affected by the very process. This entry point has been supported by an 
argument such as “individual cognitions or mental models of resources are not irrelevant 
to environmental decision making, as assumed by content-free framing in terms of 
utilities” [62, p. 771]. 
An analysis of the images followed a more qualitative and interpretive approach 
than those aimed for values and principles. This strategy is grounded in the discursive and 
contextual nature of image [65]. Following a journal article scan using ‘ISI Web of 
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Knowledge’ in October 2012 based on the criteria of (“image” OR mental model” OR 
“cognitive map” OR “virtual reality”) AND (“fisheries” OR “fishery”) AND 
(“governance” OR “management”), an in-depth review of the returned articles was 
conducted to grasp the ways in which images have been discussed in fisheries. The result 
was organized into three main types of image-based arguments, accompanied by 
examples of supporting ideas, as listed in Table 2. 
One of the most prominent uses of images and associated concepts in fisheries 
research has been to expose faulty, or at least worrisome, conceptions of various aspects 
relating to fisheries reality. The assertion is that these images, such as the sea as a 
‘frontier’ [66], fishing as ‘mining’ [67], and the ecosystem as a linear, stable ‘pyramid’ 
[68,69], have misled governance effort into the current demise of resource health. The 
cognitive bias described by “Pauly’s ratchet” or “shifting baseline,” which creates a short-
term illusion of resource abundance [70], is also argued to bring serious consequences. 
While real practices and experience shape one’s images, the reverse is also true because 
people are driven by their ideas held in their images. Because people tend to see the world 
in the way the images are drawn, and then act in ways that make the world conform to the 
images, images have a predictive quality [41,64]. In other words, they do not just describe 
what is happening but prescribe what the world ought to be. This line of argument 
maintains that fixing fisheries problems requires a critical review of the use of images in 
fisheries discourse and likely a complete overhaul of certain images, as a consequence. 
Explicit recognition of the similarities and differences in the images of various 
stakeholder groups is another theme discussed in the literature. It posits that the general 
public or different sectors of the society may have certain images of the fisheries. 
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According to Downs and Stea [63], group images arise due to a combination of three 
factors. First, a set of socio-cultural environment contains many regular and recurrent 
features common to all members of a group. This is perhaps why connection to the coast 
and tie to the sea are common images in fisheries. Second, members also share similar 
information-processing capabilities and strategies, that is, the range of fishers’ knowledge 
and expertise may not be too disparate from each other. Thirdly, behavior patterns may 
contain similar origins, destinations and frequencies. In other words, fishers working in 
the same environment may operate with the similar modus operandi about fishing 
practices. As such, when images are shared by a group of people, they serve as the basic 
bond of an organization, culture, or even society [42].  
While images are capable of creating important insights, they are also incomplete, 
biased and potentially misleading [40]. This may thus result in different tiers of people 
possessing disparate images about fisheries. For example, the images held by managers 
and scientists may deviate a great deal from those held by fishers and community 
members [65,71,72]. In governance context, this poses a potential danger as ill-matched 
images could lead to misunderstanding and confrontation, bogging down management 
efforts and generating public outcry. This does not imply that there must be one unifying 
image, however. Jentoft et al. [65, p. 195] advises that “stakeholders need not necessarily 
agree on images, but they must at least be aware of which images are present, how they 
vary or concur, and they must understand where such images come from and what 
prospects they hold”. Smith [71, p. 209] further asserts that “…making explicit these 
underlying cognitive modes would provide more “common ground” for addressing 
management problems”. 
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The third type of argument in fisheries casts a caution against discursive power 
and dominance of a particular image. Kooiman [36, p. 29] argues that “anyone involved 
in governing, in whatever capacity or authority, forms images about what he or she is 
governing”. Similarly, Jentoft et al. [73, p. 1315] explains that “governing is 
inconceivable without the formation of images, and that they are needed for the sake of 
understanding, communication and action”. Such statements affirm that images are 
omnipresent and integral in the act of governing. Images thus play a persuasive and 
rhetorical role in steering the course of governance, shaping how stakeholders view 
issues, problems and other involved parties. By the same token, failure to control images 
can lead to loss of control over policy itself, opening up for a change in regimes [74]. It is 
in the interest of governors, then, to find or create compelling metaphorical images that 
can help clarify or favorably represent their vision of governance and persuade those 
being governed [40]. A powerful example in the history of fisheries is Garrett Hardin’s 
‘tragedy of the commons’ image based on the premise that “freedom in a commons brings 
ruin to all” [75], which became the root metaphor for an enclosure of the open sea, 
leading eventually to the empowerment of coastal states and the declaration of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone [76]. Furthermore, images can be created by a dominant 
societal discourse which constructs a version of reality that is widely perceived as true. 
For instance, St. Martin [77] warns that the neoliberal logic tends to paint fishing 
economies as pre-capitalist, a barrier to capital accumulation, and consequently dictates 
fishers to become capitalist subjects through a blanket promotion of industrialization and 
commercialization. Such a dominant discourse can create forceful images about fisheries 
which may deny other alternative fishing forms such as subsistence, spiritual, and 
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community-based fishery. As such, how images can become hegemonic, and by what 
means, is an area of governance analysis that needs to be continuously explored [27]. 
 
Table 2 Three types of arguments concerning image emerged in fisheries governance 
literature and examples of supporting ideas 
Argument Ideas Reference  
Faulty and 
worrisome images 
of ecosystems and 
fishers 
The idea of the “frontier” being at the core of 
American fisheries policy making it difficult to 
undertake ecosystem management 
Bromley 
[66] 
The frame used in management being similar to that 
of “mining”, seen as a non-renewable resource 
McCay et 
al. [67] 
A particular image of fish and fishermen - of nature 
and society - forged by strong bonds between 
science and the state, which is problematic for 
accommodating the complexities of real world 
fisheries 
Holm [68] 
The image of humans at the top of the trophic 
pyramid no longer applicable for ecosystem-
based approach 
Bundy et al. 
[69] 
Pauly’s ratchet or shifting baseline Pitcher [70] 
Similarity and 
disparity in the 
views of various 
stakeholders 
Governability hinging upon image diversity and 
compatibility 
Jentoft et al. 
[65] 
Different cognitive models exist, and play an 
important role in the way people think about the 
world, affect decision-making 
Smith [71] 
Differences in the views of scientists, resource 
managers, and watermen on how best to manage 
and protect a local fishery 
Paolisso 
[72] 
Discursive power 
and dominance of 
images 
The ‘tragedy of the commons’, described as 
undoubtedly the most influential image governing 
fisheries, leading to widespread policy 
prescriptions in terms of limited access programs, 
quota systems and rights allocations 
Jentoft et al. 
[73] 
Fishing economies represented as pre-capitalist and St. Martin 
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as a barrier to capital accumulation, and fishers 
called by neoliberal discourse to become 
capitalist subjects 
[77] 
 
 
3.3. Principles 
 
Principles are likely the most well-articulated concept of the three. There is already an 
array of national and international guidelines concerning natural resource governance. 
The World Bank [78], the United Nations Development Programme [79], and the 
European Commission [80], as well as Ostrom’s design principles for common property 
resource institutions [81] all provide normative guidance. The fisheries sector also sees a 
collection of overarching standards, most notably the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries [82] and the International Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-scale 
Fisheries recently launched by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations) [83].  
As with the review of values and images, a journal article scan using ‘ISI Web of 
Knowledge’ was conducted in October 2012 to identify some of the most frequently 
discussed governance principles that research attention has been drawn to in fisheries 
over the years. This returned 1175 journal articles containing (“principle” OR 
“guideline”) AND (“fisheries” OR “fishery”) AND (“governance” OR “management”) in 
the article title, abstract, or keywords. Further, in this study a general governance 
principle was framed as a normative concept that stipulates how fisheries should be 
guided by (i.e., a basis on which decisions should be made). Applying this criterion 
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resulted in 141 articles, containing 88 unique varieties of principles akin to the idea of 
principle as ‘how what needs to be done ought to be done,’ proposed in the interactive 
governance. 
Of these, 20 are most frequently referred to and discussed in fisheries, meaning 
they have been mentioned by at least four articles in a non-trivial manner, either with 
their concepts centrally featured or the cause and effect of their application fully 
elaborated (Fig. 1). The collection does not purport to be an exhaustive list, but an 
illustration of a major trend in the discourse about governance principles. Precaution 
receives the most attention by far, followed by principles relating to ecosystem integrity 
and function, adaptability, use of scientific information, participation, conservation, and 
human welfare. As shown in Fig. 1, these principles cover the entire range of sub-systems 
central to the interactive governance, i.e., the natural and social systems-to-be-governed, 
the governing system and the governing interactions. The basis for associating principles 
with governance sub-systems is by determining which system is likely to benefit most 
from the service of each principle. For example, the natural system would arguably be the 
most direct beneficiary of the activation of precautionary principle. Likewise, 
transparency or the use of scientific information would act as relevant guidelines for how 
governing should be carried out. It is notable that more emphasis has been given to the 
principles pertaining to the governing system and the natural system-to-be-governed than 
the other two sub-systems. In terms of the number of different kinds of principles, again 
the focus has been on the principles that inform and guide the functioning of the 
governing system and the natural system-to-be-governed. 
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Fig. 1. Ordering of 20 most frequently referred to and discussed governance principles in 
fisheries identified by this review (the numbers in italics show the frequency of articles 
featuring each principle). The total numbers of articles featuring the principles that belong 
to each sub-system and the breakdown of the 20 principles according the sub-system 
classification are also displayed 
 
The less frequently mentioned principles (the other 68 found in articles) cover a wide 
range, including legitimacy, adjacency, user-pays, no-net-loss, relative stability, and 
limits/sufficiency. While receiving less attention, they are arguably crucial in many 
specific governance situations, hence likely not any less important. For instance, the 
principle of legitimacy is likely to contribute to rule compliance by invoking normative 
obligations of fishers [84]. This principle is expected to improve governing interactions, 
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and becomes a highly requisite concept in co-management where resource users 
themselves become part of the governing system, as elaborated by Jentoft [85]. Limit or 
sufficiency is another principle that has perhaps not gained wide currency but argued by 
many to be worthy of critical consideration. From the natural system perspective, it can 
be expressed as willfully limiting fishing pressure, for instance, on those larger predatory 
species with low productivity rates, given their important role in top-down control of 
ecological processes [86]. Similarly, in the social domain, it is about being satisfied with 
an attainment of a modest and reasonable level of governing goals [87]. Instead of 
striving for the absolute maximum, learning to live with a sufficient amount is suggested 
to be an intuitively sensible, and even rational, guideline. This can underpin personal 
endeavors as well as organized social-economic activities, as Monhegen lobster fishery in 
the state of Maine has demonstrated through self-imposed seasonal closures and limited 
entry [88]. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Review of the values, images, and principles point to two main areas of reflection in their 
roles and potential for improving fisheries governance. First, it has shown that some 
meta-level elements have been topics of active discussion and promotion while there are 
others which have not been given equal consideration. As observed earlier, the current 
study found that fisheries work so far has been making minimal connections to the value 
types in the ‘personal virtues’ category. Yet, striving for personal values could profoundly 
influence governance stakeholders’ leanings towards their decisions and actions. Certain 
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governance challenges such as corruption may in part spring from governors’ lack of 
regard towards benevolence, honesty, or politeness value types, for instance. By the same 
token, it is plausible that any combination of values may be borne by governing actors as 
a source of inspiration. While a well-publicized ‘core’ set of values may take precedence 
in many instances, one must recognize that other value types could be deemed more 
important by certain segments of stakeholders, whether powerful leaders or minority 
groups. How to keep abreast of a wide range of values, understand how they may align 
more to certain stakeholder groups, and re-balance them in governance consideration 
whenever necessary are important research questions. The same logic holds for images 
which at times require re-examination and adjustment to provide checks and balances for 
the hegemonic dominance of influential governing images. Similarly, a set of new 
principles can become promoted and in need of wider subscription for governance 
innovation. It has been cautioned, however, that updating or bringing forward new 
principles in fisheries is “a Herculean task that lies beyond the competence of bureaucrats 
and scientists and requires the mobilization of considerable social forces” [89, p. 782].  
Secondly, generally underpinning the cognitive and normative internal decision- 
and action-generating process, values, images, and principles have distinct roles to play 
and occupy different thematic niches in one’s mindset, i.e., (1) general value priorities of 
an individual, (2) his or her images about the world/fishery, and (3) governance 
principles he/she subscribes to. From the governance perspective, what is most 
meaningful may not be the separate accounts of the values, images and principles that 
people hold, but how they work as a whole to influence governance processes and 
outcomes. Thus, it is not one or the others, but likely a melding of the three that would 
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produce the most holistic and relevant insights. Since different stakeholder groups may be 
imbued with a different meta-level elements, their interests and positions are likely 
varied, depending also on how these elements interplay. For instance, if economic wealth 
and individual freedom are prioritized values, when combined with an image of the 
fishery that resembles ‘race to fish’ or ‘too many boats chasing too few fish,’ this mix 
could give rise to efficiency, exclusivity, and decentralization as their guiding principles. 
A group of stakeholders (e.g., government bureaucrats) in a certain setting with this set of 
value, image, principle arrangement would likely orient their policy decisions towards the 
privatization of the commons with an emphasis on market- and incentive-based 
approaches such as individual transferable quotas and catch shares [90,91]. In another 
case, if social and altruistic values such as equality, social cohesion, and attachment to 
place are prioritized instead and merged with a different set of images that are consonant 
with ‘community solidarity’ or ‘cooperative model’ [77,92,93], fisheries governance 
might come to be organized around principles such as cooperation, equity, and adjacency. 
A group of stakeholders (e.g., nongovernmental organizations) who adhere to this blend 
of values, images, and principles would tend to advocate community-based approaches to 
fisheries management as a result. In a similar manner, it may also be possible to 
characterize the underlying values, images, and principles of the proponents involved in 
large-scale and small-scale fisheries to help better make sense of the large divide that 
seems to exist in their assumptions and operational traits. Recognizing the similarity and 
disparity in the meta-level elements as well as the way they interplay, could, therefore, 
provide an alternate way of deepening an understanding of stakeholder differences and 
reducing the complexity of fisheries governance.  
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Given their potential to influence the course of policy decisions, one of the future 
directions for empirical research could be ascertaining to what extent these meta-level 
governance elements are directly related to, and thus can be used to explain, the 
occurrence of real-world practices, and what effect they produce towards the initiation 
and implementation of governance policies. Already there are studies that have begun to 
explore these aspects. In trying to detect a relationship between the use of illegal fishing 
gear and a bearing of a principle on conservation in a Lake Malawi fishery, Song and 
Chuenpagdee [94] found that fishers who engaged in illegal practices were most 
frequently found having relatively low levels of awareness about conservation as well as 
inclination to promote it. Contrastingly, fishers who held elevated conservation principle 
were mostly associated with owning or operating legal gears. In another example, 
Agrawal [95] draws on the case in India in which initially forced or incentive-based 
participation in environmental practices generates new conceptions of what constitutes 
people’s mindset and lead to formation of new environmentally caring subjectivities. The 
study demonstrated that the quality and the degree of involvement in governance 
initiatives by stakeholder groups could affect the shaping of their meta-level elements and 
vice versa. Taken together, these studies support the view that values, images, and 
principles are relevant components in the governing of people’s actions, and that their 
examination provides another pathway towards facilitating governance initiatives.  
Ultimately, the values, images, and principles that stakeholders hold would in part 
determine the capacity to govern a fisheries system. Incommensurable values, or 
conflicting and incompatible images and principles not only would make wickedness of 
fisheries governance to persist but also contribute to lower governability. Stakeholders 
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may not agree on issues, for instance. With each group promoting their own image of 
‘what is desirable’ or ‘how things ought to be’, what one sees as a favorable decision 
could be a disadvantage for others. As a result, governance initiatives can be marred with 
resistance or indifference rendering the system less governable. Interactive governance 
theory posits that improving stakeholder interactions could enhance governability via 
democratic participation and wide representation, for example. But the contrary can also 
hold true, for malicious governing interactions, in the case of dictatorship, may 
deceivingly inflate governability by moderating people’s demands through oppression 
and censorship. This is why the quality of interactions is important and should be 
carefully assessed [16]. A critical look at the meta-level governance elements can be 
expected to help uncover ethical reasoning as well as power relations that tend to 
dominate interactions among governance actors. For example, questions need to be raised 
about the degree to which local resource users accept and are ready to follow state rules, 
visions, and policy messages, or how non-governmental organizations represented by 
their staff and activities become a vehicle that serves to extend the political rationalities of 
the state [96]. Such an investigation opens an avenue for bringing in the analytics of 
‘governmentality,’ submitted by Foucault [97], into the discussion. “As indicated by the 
semantic linking of the words governing and mentality, governmentality…is a field of 
enquiry that problematises the collective and often taken-for-granted systems of thought 
that make governing strategies appear natural and given at certain times in history” [98, p. 
8]. The comparison of values, images, and principles and ensuing examination of the flow 
and unevenness of power may reveal a sense of coercion, marginalization, or contestation 
implicated in governance process. One’s values may be co-opted or silenced via 
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interactions with other stakeholders, which would invariably affect the governability of 
the system. Bringing the analytics of governmentality into the overall governability of a 
fisheries system presents a prospective theoretical inquiry that can build upon the 
articulation of the meta-level governance elements. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper examined values, images, and principles in the context of fisheries 
governance. Exploring their diversity through a review of journal articles, it was shown 
that a wide array of these meta-level elements have been discussed in the literature, but 
with a varying degree of attention. Values that promote ecosystem conservation, wealth, 
knowledge, equality, and secure livelihoods appear to be more frequently featured. 
Images that worrisomely liken fishery to an extractive and competitive resource frontier 
have been sharply pointed out. Further, principles that aim to guide the operation of 
natural and governing systems, such as precaution and adaptability emerged as the 
prevailing topics of debate. While their eminence signifies a major pattern in the way a 
fisheries discourse has been conceived and aspired, the review also revealed those that 
have been seldom discussed, but nevertheless, deemed important by various groups of 
fishery stakeholders. Being aware of the diversity in these elements as well as the 
potential differences in the way various stakeholders embrace them would offer an 
alternate entry point to approaching governance for resolving fisheries problems, 
especially those with a high degree of wickedness. 
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Ensuing research could focus on learning about, or developing, mechanisms for 
reconciling and re-balancing the wide spectrum of values, images, and principles. This 
will be important not to lose sight of other noble elements and help bring holism and 
open-mindedness into stakeholder interactions. Values, images and principles are difficult 
to discern due to their inherent nature and their subtleness. However, a survey tradition in 
the social sciences that employs direct ranking or rating of a set of values offers one 
possible method of eliciting and comparing stakeholder values [23,99]. Principles could 
take a similar survey approach that utilizes choice inquiries, for example, based on paired 
comparisons [94]. Because these methods offer numerically-based results, they would 
likely need to be corroborated by qualitative information in order to capture nuanced 
context-driven details and derive proper meanings. Understanding images could be led by 
qualitative techniques to permit exploration of rich and multi-faceted imaginations but 
also aided by modeling or mapping exercises to attain a mixed method design [29,65].  
By using methodological approaches such as these with necessary modifications, 
elucidating values, images, and principles’ linkage and effect on governance responses, 
decisions and actions, and vice versa, presents an area of future research that can 
strengthen their policy relevance. For example, questions such as “would a marine 
protected area succeed in this region given the existing set of values, images, and 
principles of involved stakeholders?” or “would the reorientation of policies aimed at 
small-scale fisheries require a reconceptualization of current images, values, and 
governance principles?” pose a useful inquiry. Finally, the articulation of the meta-level 
elements offers potential in facilitating an analysis of power dynamics between 
stakeholder groups. One could raise a question as to “to what extent are the images, 
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values and principles of some stakeholders hegemonic, thus suppressing those of others?”  
Here, how a related concept of governmentality by Foucault can be drawn in to help 
facilitate this inquiry represents a prospective research direction. 
Understanding values, images, and principles may help broaden the discussion, 
raise new research questions, and create an opportunity for stakeholders to heighten 
appreciation of diversity and compatibility among each other. At the same time, an 
explicit expression of these underlying elements could bring greater transparency, 
accountability and more equitable exercise of power. A more systematic and holistic 
understanding of values, images, and principles is thus warranted to enhance 
governability and remains an important area for empirical research.  
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Abstract 
Institutional thinking has long been central to fisheries governance. Defined in its most 
generic form as structural constraints that provide regularities, reduce uncertainties and 
shape people’s interactions, institutions create an enabling or controlling environment for 
specific governing actions and decisions to take place. Over the years, fisheries 
governance has relied heavily on the creation and evolution of institutions, especially 
those related to property rights and access rules. A growing body of literature is calling, 
however, for a broader notion of institutions that can deal with the social, cultural and 
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historical aspects of fisheries, including meanings and values, trust, and norms. This 
review highlights recent changes and emerging trends, relevant to addressing current 
challenges in fisheries governance and promoting sustainability. 
 
Introduction 
 
Institution is a wide-ranging concept, differently conceived and applied to diverging 
circumstances and topical fields. Many meanings and usage of the concept of institution 
have been well-noted by scholars of various academic disciplines interested in 
deciphering and classifying its details (see [1,2]). Jentoft [3] provided a critical view of 
institutions in fisheries, suggesting the key roles that institutional design and dynamics 
play in the effectiveness of fisheries management. He called for clarification about what 
institutions mean, what they do, and how they develop over time. Rather than solely 
relying on rational choice theory which has dominated institutional thinking in fisheries, 
Jentoft followed Scott’s definition of institutions as consisting of ‘cognitive, normative, 
and regulative’ structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social 
behavior [1], suggesting that a broader concept of institutions is required. This 
proposition aligns well with the increasing consensus that today’s challenges in fisheries 
governance are linked in part to institutional failure [4,5], and with the recognition that 
these challenges are ‘wicked’ problems [6**]. Supported by a growing body of literature 
in recent years, we argue that the purview of institution should be extended to include 
regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements in order to more adequately inform 
the design and maintenance of institutional arrangements (Figure 1). This, according to 
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Kooiman [7] is needed to facilitate legitimate and effective governance and address 
current global fisheries problems.  
 
We begin by introducing various strands of theoretical approaches, whose diversity and 
commonality has given rise to Scott’s conception of institution. This is followed by a 
brief summary of the four main types of institutional arrangements much discussed in 
fisheries policy making in the past decades. Governance challenges brought about by 
these existing arrangements are also presented. In light of these, we emphasize key 
emerging institutional thinking grounded in a more inclusive notion of institution, which 
we consider to have major influences in addressing concerns in global fisheries 
governance and sustainability.  
 
 
Figure 1 Diagrammatic representation of institutional thinking in fisheries governance 
centering on a broadened scheme proposed by Scott of what institutions comprise 
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Institutional thinking in fisheries 
 
Theoretical approaches 
Various facets of institutional thinking have garnered much attention in fisheries research 
and policy making. The most well-known account is the common-property analysis of 
Ostrom and her colleagues [8-10], which theorizes and tests institutional ideas for solving 
collective action problems such as the “tragedy of the commons” in the context of 
fisheries (and other common pool resources) [11]. At the core of their inquiry lies a 
question about why the rationality of individual fishers leads to a collective irrationality 
in the form of resource depletion, when resource sustainability would be in their long-
term self-interest. As a version of rational choice approaches to institutions, it assumes 
that economic calculations drive individual behavior, and the rules that prescribe and 
permit behavior are thus conceived as the institutions that help reconcile individual and 
collective rationality. This line of thinking has led to the implementation of highly 
influential fisheries management schemes that include incentives, access regimes, and 
property rights (see for example [12–18]). Other institutional studies take in a more 
sociological view, such as the ‘embeddedness’ concept of Granovetter [19], and 
organizational theory of Meyer and Rowan [20] and DiMaggio and Powell [21], which 
highlight some overlooked aspects of institution such as trust, reciprocity, ideology, and 
organizational values (see for example [22,23]). Sharing a similar theoretical foundation, 
the ‘normative institutionalism’ of March and Olsen [24] proposes institutions as a 
collection of values and rules that are normative in the way in which they impact 
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institutional members. Here, individuals operate under the ‘logic of appropriateness’, that 
is, individual behavior is motivated by the dominant institutional values, and would 
remain within their parameters [2]. Other fisheries scholars have a more cognitive 
approach by defining institutions as structured and persisting patterns of behavior as they 
mediate access to, and control over, natural resources (see for example [25,26,27*]). This 
way of theorizing institutions would tend to focus on cultural habits, customs and social 
taboos, for instance, as ‘taken-for-granted’ sources of constraining fisher behavior. In 
another case, those who are conscious of historical institutionalism are more likely to take 
a macro-perspective, tracing the evolution of an institutional form and asking how it 
shapes fisher interaction with one another and with nature (see for example [28,29,30*]).  
 
Institutional arrangements 
In fisheries, four main types of institutional arrangements are much discussed, commonly 
called hierarchical, private property, community-based and co-management, respectively. 
While their conceptual characteristics can be discerned from each other with relative ease, 
there is often an overlap and blurred distinction between them. The hierarchical, state-
controlled system has been a long-standing feature in natural resource management 
including fisheries. Supported by the idea that individual self-interest inevitably drives 
resources to depletion when left alone in an open-access regime, and propelled by the 
idea of territoriality of coastal seas under the Law of the Sea, fisheries were put under the 
control of the state and many government-coordinated fisheries institutions were created 
around the world in the mid-twentieth century [22,31,32]. This form of government-
centered institution has suffered numerous instances of failures, however, stemming from 
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the ‘principal agent problem,’ i.e. the behavior of politicians and government officials 
who serve their own interests more than those of the public [4,33]. This problem may 
occur through agents exploiting information asymmetries, entering into corrupt 
transactions, or engaging in the promotion of special interests at the cost to the public. 
Other reasons for failure are a strong penchant for regulatory uniformity giving little 
regard to variations in the local ecology [34], poor interest and understanding of social 
organization [35], introduction of perverse subsidies [36], and concentration of power in 
the hands of local elites [37,38]. Blind faith and uncritical reliance in science and 
technical progress can also cause government efforts to break down and introduce errors 
[34,39,40]. Failed attempts to manage the Newfoundland cod fisheries are a clear 
example of a hierarchical institutional failure, as illustrated by Bavington [31]. Oran 
Young [41] has extended this idea of state management of natural resources to study 
inter-state institutional arrangements, alternately called as international regimes, to tackle 
transboundary natural resource issues and mull over the effectiveness of supra-national 
structures. 
 
Driven by the similar logic as the state control model, private property institutions were 
introduced to provide fishers with an assurance that benefits from their investments will 
accrue to them, accompanied by secure entitlements [42]. The main thrust of recent 
debate about property right schemes has been on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). 
According to Chu [43], eighteen countries are currently using ITQs to manage their 
fisheries, but not all of them are successful. Based on the anecdotal analysis by Hilborn et 
al. [44], top-down, state control with poor ability for monitoring and implementing 
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regulations is one of the reasons for unsuccessful ITQ systems, such as those in New 
England groundfish and Argentinian hake fisheries. Success stories experienced in New 
Zealand rock lobster, Canadian sablefish, and Canadian and US Pacific halibut fisheries 
can be attributed to factors such as strong local cooperatives, effective government 
control and appropriate incentives that encourage behavior consistent with conservation 
value. Scholars like Bromley [45] and Pinkerton and Edwards [46] warn, however, 
against indiscriminate promotion of ITQs, noting that they do not always lead to 
economic benefits. Failure can still occur, for instance, with uncertainty about resource 
availability, long time horizons, absence of efficient markets for certain resources [4], as 
well as the many unexpected and unanticipated outcomes of management processes and 
institutional design [30*]. The spatial dimension of private property institution is also 
being considered. Holland [47] advocates the establishment of spatially-designated 
property rights and zoning regulations that will attenuate the problems of ITQs and 
territorial user rights in fisheries (TURFs). Opposing views are, however, highly critical 
of privatization and spatial enclosure through raising concerns with respect to equity and 
erosion of community identities [48,49]. 
 
On the other end of the spectrum is community-based, local-level fisheries management. 
This institutional arrangement can be further characterized as taking two forms. A 
traditionally-oriented type has existed for a long time, and a few can still be found in 
various pockets of the world (see for example [50,51]). In these instances, a long-term 
tradition based on customary ways of managing fisheries is intricately linked to, and 
inseparable from, community functioning. This self-governing institution has been much 
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touted as an alternate solution to the commons dilemma [10,52]. In recent decades, there 
has been a renewed interest in establishing community-based fisheries institutions, 
especially in places where livelihood needs are more directly connected to local marine 
resources [53,54]. This latter emergence differs from the earlier one in that it is largely 
driven by the contemporary donor/policy support of government and non-governmental 
organizations [55] and that it is being promoted, not only in developing countries but also 
in the so-called First World context [49,56]. A study on the nascent involvement of 
coastal communities in fisheries management in countries surrounding the Gulf of 
Thailand reveals key governmental needs for this form of arrangement [57]. The 
emerging economy countries like Vietnam and Cambodia need significant legislation to 
control fisheries operations and greater clarity about the role of communities, whereas in 
Thailand, greater support by the government to promote local-level enforcement and 
monitoring activities is required. Furthermore, current global policies, e.g. subsidies [58], 
trades [59], and certification schemes [60], have increased the connectivity between 
community-based institutions and external governance structures. Critical to proper 
functioning of this type of institutional arrangement, whether customary or policy-driven, 
are questions of how they can adapt to broadening influences and how they can use the 
integration into a wider world to their advantage without losing their community-based, 
grass-root integrity. 
 
Another type of institutional arrangement commonly found in fisheries is co-
management. Considered a hybrid form, it typically manifests as a sharing of 
responsibility between government and local-level fishery organization(s). Originally 
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articulated by Jentoft [61] and Pinkerton [62], it has since been developed into other 
related forms such as adaptive co-management, which is an extension of adaptive 
management into the social domain. This form of institutions draws explicit attention to 
the learning (experiential and experimental) and collaboration (vertical and horizontal) 
functions and aims to contribute to trust building and the formation of social networks 
[63,64]. Though typically seen as democratic, legitimate, and cost-effective, hence an 
attractive type of institutional arrangement, there still remain tensions to be addressed. 
Critiques of co-management contend that the problem of free-riding would persist in co-
management because the interests of fishers and their social relations would be unaffected 
and guided by individual utility, which favors abandoning this cooperative mode of 
governance [23]. Proponents, however, counter that once one shifts away from the 
rational choice frame of mind, co-management can represent a markedly different social 
system where cultural and social qualities of human communities are taken seriously, and 
become more than simply a reconfiguration of incentive structure or a set of rules [23,65]. 
In a similar vein, Chuenpagdee and Jentoft [28] highlight the crucial role of path-
dependency and human cognitive elements such as trust and community ties in affecting 
the success of co-management implementation. Such nuanced analysis of socio-cultural 
constructs of leadership and social capital stands in stark contrast to the still widely-held 
reductionist view of co-management (see for example [66]), which relies on a positivistic 
science of politics that seeks predictive explanations but fails to fully appreciate the 
complexity, contingency and subjective meanings embedded in governance.  
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Emerging trends in fisheries institutions 
 
The continued challenges in fisheries governance call for, among other things, innovation 
in institutional thinking. The dominating institutional arrangements in fisheries have 
resulted in an emphasis on formal and informal rules, with attention drawn to access 
regimes and fishing rights, whether state-driven and private property are concerned. 
Sometimes even the community-based management utilizing tenure and taboos is unduly 
generalized to only speak about local fishing restrictions guarding against the “tragedy of 
the commons” while missing out on other rich social and cultural meanings and functions 
such as prestige and status [27*]. Institutions can, however, embody more than just ‘the 
rules of the game’ [67]. Arguing against rational choice as a sweeping basis for 
institutional design, Jentoft [3] suggests that the concept of institutions be broadened to 
include the social and cultural underpinnings of the management systems and to capture 
the social processes and governance mechanisms that are essential to fisheries 
management.  
 
By weaving together the various strands of institutional theories found in economics, 
political science and sociology, Scott [1] broadens the definition of institution to comprise 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive “pillars”. The normative pillar involves 
defining goals and objectives and also designating appropriate ways to pursue them 
through activation of values and norms. It appeals to social obligation and conformity as 
opposed to coercion of the regulative rule. This perspective is closely related to the 
normative institutionalism of March and Olsen [24]. The cultural-cognitive pillar 
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emphasizes the extent to which behavior is informed and constrained by the ways in 
which knowledge is constructed and codified. It is about the creation of shared knowledge 
and belief systems rather than the production of rules and norms (see [68]). Under this 
view, socially constructed models, shared assumptions, and common beliefs, through the 
use of symbols such as signs and gestures, and one’s internal images that provide a way 
of seeing, underlie all decisions and choices. 
 
Several authors have drawn from this wider conception of institution (see for example 
[69*,70**,71*,72-75]. Notably, De la Torre-Castro and Lindstrom [70**] argue for a 
“broad institutional approach” that recognizes the complexity and multifaceted nature of 
institutions, including issues around trust and relationship. In their view, a vast majority 
of efforts in fisheries governance have focused on rules and economic incentives, while 
very few have included norms, and even less cultural-cognitive elements. Regulations, 
despite their importance, offer a limited scope for institutions, which may lead to a 
perspective that is biased and partial if they are not backed by norms and cultural-
cognitive institutions. More succinctly, Caballero Miguez et al. [72, p. 627] submits that 
“it is quite clear that institutional approach in studying fishery resources can clearly not 
be limited to issues of property rights.” Coulthard [71*, p. 408] echoes this view by 
stating that “the meanings of the Padu system (a customary marine tenure institution in 
South Asia) therefore reach beyond property rights and fishing access…” It becomes 
evident from these studies that community norms, trust relations, values and beliefs, 
historical factors, and social and cultural meanings, as well as community organization, 
form an essential underpinning of any fisheries institution, in addition to the codified or 
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informal rule system. What is perhaps more remarkable is that several of these studies are 
unequivocally situated in the theoretical framework of Ostrom and Northian sense of 
institution, with due attention to property rights, rules, and regulations for the governance 
of common pool resources [29,69,74]. Yet, they explicitly appeal to extend from the 
traditional focus on the regulative aspect. For instance, Tang and Tang [74, p. 103] 
emphasize cultural-cognitive elements such as beliefs and rituals by contending that: 
 
Among the indigenous communities that are successful in conservation, most have 
developed elaborate institutional rules for defining resource boundaries, user 
rights, resource allocation rules, monitoring arrangements, conflict resolution 
mechanisms, and more (Ostrom 2005). These institutional rules are supported not 
just by knowledge of the local environment, but also by deep-rooted social values 
and belief systems passed down through generations (Klooster 2000). In some 
aboriginal belief systems, natural resources are considered as gifts from gods, and 
deserve care and respect from humans. In some cases, routine social rituals may 
have evolved for other purposes, but have contributed to maintaining an effective 
resource conservation regime (Fowler 2003). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this review, the four types of institutional arrangements most commonly featured and 
widely debated in fisheries are presented to demonstrate how each of them comes with 
particular strengths that make them suitable for certain circumstances. There are also 
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weak points that make them subject to failures. A critical look at these institutions reveals 
that co-management seems to have been more receptive towards other theoretical 
possibilities, which prioritize harmonistic relationships and mutual coordination. The 
state-driven, private property and community-level fisheries institutional types, on the 
other hand, have been much analyzed in relation to common property theory, which 
shares many assumptions with the rational choice approach. However, hierarchical and 
private property arrangements need not be exclusively regulative-driven, only to be 
concerned with incentives and sanctions for individuals. There are social and cultural 
mechanisms at work through individuals’ membership in institutions such that same 
people would make different choices depending upon the nature of the institution within 
which they were operating at the time [2]. As a growing number of scholars have noted, 
we leave open the possibility of such rules-heavy arrangements to be also affected by 
shared values and meanings. Thus, all four institutional arrangements can benefit from 
widening their institutional perspectives to examine Scott’s three pillars of institutions 
and their interactions. We argue especially that the cultural-cognitive aspect of 
institutions holds much untapped explanatory power for analyzing how institutions shape 
fisher interactions, helping to reveal what has largely been ‘taken for granted’ and 
overlooked in mainstream fisheries research. As evident by the emerging thinking about 
institutions, broadening the concept helps enhance our understanding of the ever complex 
and unpredictable fisheries systems and secures that appropriate institutional 
arrangements are in place for promoting sustainability and for improving fisheries 
governance. 
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Chapter 4 Eliciting values and principles of fisheries stakeholders in 
South Korea: a methodological exploration 
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Abstract 
A rising eminence of governance concept in natural resource policy has meant widening 
and more meaningful stakeholder participation in decision-making. Yet, it may also 
intensify complexity in resource planning and practice as more diverse values and 
principles are represented. We develop a survey-based method to elicit and understand 
stakeholder values and principles in an effort to help highlight their roles in shaping 
natural resource governance. This experimental design, called ‘P+ sort’ to recognize its 
methodological foundation on both pile sort and Q sort methods, utilizes a semi-
structured sorting procedure with verbal questions to capture both quantitative and 
qualitative data as well as to increase simplicity and user-approachability. An empirical 
testing of the P+ sort was conducted in South Korean fisheries, which are undergoing a 
major governance reform. Results show promising utilities of P+ sort for identifying 
value priorities and the salient principles of stakeholder groups, examining the 
convergence as well as notable differences in these elements, and providing policy-
relevant input into the natural resource governance process.  
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Introduction 
 
Meaningful involvement of multiple stakeholder groups in various aspects of governance, 
especially those that are politically and economically marginalized, is considered 
essential in addressing concerns and challenges in natural resource sustainability 
(Chuenpagdee et al. 2004; Gray 2005; Jentoft 2005; Kooiman et al. 2005; Larson and 
Soto 2008). This is the case for all modes of governance, including the hierarchical and 
centrally-driven format, but particularly so for self-governance and co-governance 
(commonly referred to as community-based or co-management). Through an inclusive, 
engaging and respectful process, the experiences, interests and worldviews of a broad 
range of stakeholders can be incorporated in decision-making, and their underlying values 
and principles can enter the dialogue, thus helping to shape sensible policies. The 
multitude of values and principles, while enriching the quality of discussion, can also lead 
to ‘hard choices’ and ‘messy situations’ especially if they appear conflicting and 
incommensurable (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009; Kooiman and Jentoft 2009; 
Lachapelle et al. 2003; Rittel and Webber 1973). According to the interactive governance 
theory (Kooiman et al. 2005), understanding what these values and principles are, what 
they are informed by, and how they influence actions can contribute to alleviating tension 
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and conflict and lead to more governable natural resource arrangements (Bavinck et al. 
2013; Kooiman and Jentoft 2009). 
Following from this, learning about values and principles and examining their deep-
seated convergence or disparity among different stakeholder groups is hypothesized to 
provide an alternate entry point into making sense of the social-political complexity 
inherent in resource use issues (Chapter 3 – Song et al. 2013). In this process, values and 
principles would complement each other; the former as the general notions of what is 
desirable and important (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Vaske and Donnelly 1999;) and the 
latter as more specific operational guidelines, or “codes of conduct” by which the desired 
end-states are achieved (Lockwood et al. 2010; Song and Chuenpagdee 2011). Satterfield 
and Gregory (1998) also argue for a similar pairing to link values with another attribute 
which is more action-based and context-rich in order to prevent values from remaining as 
abstract statements disembodied from practical governance experiences. 
The study of values for governance and policy purposes has been chiefly influenced 
by relativistic traditions that are suited to the gauging and monitoring of public opinion 
from the position of ‘value-neutrality’ (Brown 1984; Satterfield and Kalof 2005).1 Within 
this tradition, scholars such as Mitchell and Carson (1989) and Hanemann (1994), siding 
with applied welfare economics, elevated valuation techniques such as contingent 
valuation involving the willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept procedures to be the 
most commonly accepted form of value elicitation. While such monetary methods capture 
people’ preferences expressed in quantitative metric useful for economic benefit-cost 
assessment, they are less adequate in accounting for values that are non-market-based, 
ethically-driven, or culturally-derived (Chan et al. 2011; Sagoff 2004; Satterfield 2001). 
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On the other hand, others like Keeney et al. (1990) argue that a qualitative approach to 
elicitation utilizing narratives and interviews tends to be time-consuming, anecdotal, or 
overly descriptive with detailed verbalization of non-utilitarian values, yielding 
cumbersome application to policy-making.  Furthermore, “ask-direct-questions-receive-
direct-answers” format surveys utilizing conventional ranking or rating procedures can 
be, though efficient and statistically rigorous, void of contextual information and clues, 
often leading to ‘empty’ or shallow discussion of values (Satterfield 2001). Overall, 
wholesale reliance on either elicitation approach without acknowledging its weakness 
would create a danger of misrepresenting the values of stakeholders and/or relegating 
discussion to powerful elite, such as government managers, academic researchers and 
industry lobby groups (Satterfield 2001). Consequently, there lies much room for creative 
measures to be introduced and experimented in the elicitation of values and other 
normative aspects to provide a greater set of methodological options. 
In this paper, we combine a quantitative survey approach with qualitative verbal 
narratives to elicit detailed information that can be useful for policy-makers. The specific 
combination explored in this study is called “P+ sort”. It builds on the existing sorting 
techniques such as pile sort and Q sort, but aims to achieve an ‘intermediate’ level of 
sophistication by offering a more structured format than the pile sort (P) while remaining 
simple with fewer assumptions and constraints than the Q sort. The use of the modestly-
structured sorting procedure combined with qualitative input is to ensure that the design is 
approachable and comprehensible to a number of stakeholder groups. Such consideration 
is an important one, especially in the context of governance, given the difficulties of 
many groups, including resource user communities and laypeople (i.e. the general public), 
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in articulating the deeply-held and privately defended values and principles (Keeney et al. 
1990; Satterfield 2001). 
The empirical testing of the proposed approach was conducted in South Korean 
fisheries, in which a co-management program, referred to as Jayul, was initiated by the 
central government in the previous decade and is being implemented across the country. 
Similar to natural resource governance initiatives elsewhere, the main struggle of the 
program implementation is to foster a policy environment where an active involvement of 
local fishers and other resource-dependent members is encouraged and appreciated. This 
problem context serves a useful test case for examining the feasibility of the P+ sort to 
study values and principles of fishery stakeholders. In the present study, the two main 
groups investigated and compared are fishers and community resource users, on one 
hand, and managers/researchers on the other.  
We commence with the conceptual development of the P+ sort method by drawing 
comparisons with other existing survey-based elicitation methods. The practical 
considerations of the design are further illustrated using the example of the South Korean 
case. Following the description of our sampling strategies and the survey process, we 
present the analyses and summarize the results. Finally, this article reflects on the 
findings to examine their implications to the governance situation and formulate 
suggestions that can inform future directions. We conclude by revisiting the feasibility of 
the P+ method and discussing some of its limitations.   
 
Developing a method 
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Experimental design 
Designing an alternate elicitation method has remained an active area of research, which 
tries to provide wider options that supplement the more dominantly-positioned monetary 
valuation techniques (e.g., Mitchell and Carson 1989) as well as the ranking and Likert-
scale rating exercises (e.g., Alwin and Krosnick 1985; Rokeach 1973). Notably, Gregory 
et al. (1993) suggests an improved contingent valuation approach that better 
accommodates multidimensionality of values and reduces cognitive demands upon 
respondents by drawing upon multiattribute utility theory. In another case, a damage 
schedule method proposes using paired comparison survey to derive non-monetary 
measures of relative importance of natural resources (or seriousness of adverse impacts 
on them) as a proxy to stakeholder values (e.g., Chuenpagdee et al. 2001). In addition, 
qualitative approaches such as pencil-and-paper tasks and open-ended interviews that 
employ transcription, coding and content analysis have focused on obtaining “thick” 
value descriptions (e.g., Buijs 2009; Satterfield 2001).  
The design of the method developed in this study utilizes a sorting technique. 
Similar to the basic tenets of existing sorting procedures such as pile sort and Q sort, 
values and principles are presented in a deck of cards, and through manual sorting of the 
cards, values and principles are judged according to their importance and placed into 
different piles. Generally, sorting allows use of a large number of target values than direct 
ranking or paired comparison, which are limited to a fewer number of values due to a 
greater level of effort and longer response time required for a large set.
2
 The need to work 
with a potentially sizable number of values and principles that may exist and prove to be 
crucial in natural resource context serves as an important criterion for a sorting-based 
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design. In addition, arranging cards into different piles or categories on a sorting board 
permits visual display of the sorted pattern and induces implicit comparisons between 
values, such that values grouped together would imply a similar degree of importance and 
likewise dissimilarities are also differentiated. This marks an advantage over a Likert-
scale type of rating exercise in which each value is evaluated independently without 
necessarily making connections to other values (McCarty and Shrum 2000). An 
incorporation of a comparing mechanism, albeit implicit, is a required trait that allows 
discerning of relative importance among the values and principles as survey participants 
go through the exercise. Furthermore, sorting of cards offers an intuitive and interactive 
mode of elicitation. It has been pointed out that the conventional survey format that relies 
heavily on direct question-answer arrangement “avoids the very language and style that 
many people use to discuss values, that is, conversational talk that encompasses everyday 
reflections on beliefs and values” (Satterfield 2001, p. 332). In the current design, both 
the cards and the display of sorting results on the board could act as a ‘conversation 
piece’ that assists articulation of values. To actively encourage further discussion and 
drawing out of qualitative information, follow-up questions about the personally-held 
meanings of important values and principles are offered, after the completion of the 
sorting task. Key characteristics of the relevant survey methods, including P+ sort are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Key characteristics of comparable value elicitation methods 
Method Key characteristics 
Ranking  Direct comparison of values yielding more precise distinctions about their 
relative importance 
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(e.g.rank-
ordering, pair-
comparison) 
 Forcing choice similar to real-life situations 
 Longer response time and greater respondent fatigue when involving a 
large set of values 
Rating  Values are evaluated independently 
 A set of rating produces absolute standings as well as an inferred rank-
order of values, arguably producing more information than a set of 
ranking 
 Applicable to a greater range of and more sophisticated statistical 
analyses 
 Less time-consuming, easier to administer allowing for the collection of 
data among a large number of values 
 Potential lack of differentiation (e.g. many ties) and skewed distribution 
of responses 
Q sort  Highly structured and constrained version of sorting yielding both rank-
order and a normal distribution of values 
 Applicable to well-defined statistical analyses as part of Q methodology 
 Allows the collection of data among a large number of values 
 Longer response time, greater respondent fatigue than other sorting 
methods 
Pile sort   Exploratory method geared towards revealing similarity between values 
 Allows for the collection of data among a large number of values 
 Easy to administer and intuitive 
 Conducive to drawing out qualitative data 
 ‘Lumper-splitter’ problem which makes comparison of individual 
responses less adequate  
P+ sort   More focused aim with specific instructions than pile sort 
 Allows implicit comparison among values 
 Allows for the collection of data among a large number of items 
 Easy to administer and intuitive 
 Conducive to drawing out qualitative data 
 ‘Lumper-splitter’ problem which makes comparison of individual 
responses less adequate  
 
Main elements of the P+ sort 
Rokeach (1973), who has pioneered a human value tradition, presented a list of plain 
value labels, such as ‘happiness’, ‘national security’, ‘courage’, and ‘politeness’, to 
participants for rank-ordering. While this was proved to be implementable in diverse 
social settings, the meanings of these labels were assumed to be familiar to many 
laypersons and hence no additional explanations were deemed necessary. The current 
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study, however, is couched in the more specific conditions of natural resource 
governance. Some of the relevant management principles, such as subsidiarity, user-pays, 
and precaution, may not be readily graspable by user communities and government 
managers alike. Hence, we decided to use short phrases or sentences to represent the 
values and principles on the cards in order to be more reflective of the resource context 
and to help facilitate judging and comparing of these items. Only one statement 
representing either a value or a principle is written on an individual card. 
Study participants are given a deck of cards containing randomly shuffled value 
statements in the first round of exercise and principle statements in another, and are asked 
to place each card on a sorting board according to a specific instruction, such as “please 
sort based on importance”. The board itself contains distribution markers which indicate 
pre-defined importance categories, as shown in Fig. 1. This represents a more structured 
and focused design than a highly exploratory unconstrained pile sort, which leaves 
respondents to determine the criteria for grouping similar cards as well as the number of 
piles to be generated (Weller and Romney 1988). The design of the P+ sort also deviates 
from the Q sort, a much more elaborate sorting technique, stemming from a bigger rubric 
of Q methodology (Brown 1980; McKeown and Thomas 1988). There are several reasons 
for using the P+ sort design. First, there is a concern that a Q sort task lies beyond the 
cognitive aptitude of most people to perform adequately (Bolland 1985), as it normally 
involves 10 or more categories and restricts the individual sorting responses to fit into a 
fixed pattern that approximates a normal distribution (Brown 1980). Dunn-Rankin et al. 
(2004) suggests that the consensus for the number of categories on a scale is from 3 to 9. 
Because values and principles (and their relative importance) are not something that 
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people contemplate on a regular basis, and since resource users in rural areas may lack 
formal education, this study chose a simple design with three categories, resembling 
three-point scale of importance, denoted with very-, somewhat-, and little-important. 
Secondly, the P+ sort is distribution-free and imposes no explicit constraint on how many 
cards can be placed in any of the three categories. At the same time, to discourage against 
‘lumping’ (i.e., sorting all the cards into one or few categories, see Table 1) and a 
tendency to judge objects too low or too high (Weller and Romney 1988), the design 
comes with evenly-spaced grids as a visual cue to suggest that all three categories in the 
scale are equally available. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Generic design of the P+ sort method comprising cards, a sorting board and semi-
structured follow-up questions 
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Sorting responses can be analyzed using non-parametric statistical procedures such as the 
Kendall coefficient of concordance W and the chi-square test through an assignment of 
weighted scores to the three categories (i.e., 3 to very-, 2 to somewhat-, and 1 to little-
important). Also, an analysis of sorting frequency data can be conducted to ascertain 
value and principle hierarchy. Qualitative information solicited in the form of voluntary 
comments and follow-up, probing questions (shown in Fig. 1) are transcribed and 
organized according to pertinent value and principle items. In this way, both quantitative 
and qualitative data are used in the explanations about which values and principles are 
important or meaningful to respondents and the reasons why. 
 
Application to a case study: coastal fisheries resources in South Korea 
 
Description of Korean fisheries and the co-management system 
South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea) is located in the southern part of the 
Korean Peninsula in the Northwest Pacific region (Fig. 2). Endowed with productive 
fishing grounds in all three adjacent seas (Kang 2006), fishing has naturally taken place 
from ancient times, and helped satisfy much of the domestic fish consumption demands 
over the years. Fish occupies an integral part of Koreans’ dietary life and intimately 
connected to their culture even to this date. Korea is also one of the top fish-producing 
nations in the world with inclusion of seaweed and shellfish production (FAO 2012). In 
the coastal fishery, there are nearly 150 target species of commercial significance, and 
with over 28 licensed fishing gear types permitted in coastal fishery, it has the strong 
character of multi-gear/multi-species (Han 2009). 
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Following independence from colonial rule in 1945, fishery has been chiefly 
managed under the overarching direction of the central government who sets regulations, 
issues licenses, enforces rules, and provides benefits and subsidies to communities 
(Cheong 2004). The 50 years of government-centered management in the modern era, 
however, has proved inadequate in resolving various environmental and social challenges 
that have surfaced surrounding fisheries (Cheong 2003a; Han 2009). As a response to the 
ineffective management regime, the central government initiated a new governance mode 
called the ‘Jayul’ program in 2001. It aims to raise the level of community participation in 
managing local fisheries and ultimately to instill a sense of ownership in resource users 
(Lee et al. 2006; MOMAF 2003). Jayul, meaning free will in Korean, is a type of placed-
based co-management program where government sets out the institutional framework 
and provides financial and technical assistance to local fisher organizations, while the 
latter drafts and carries out a management plan. 
Since its inception a decade ago, the number of community fisher organizations 
participating in the program has reached 893 in 2011, and there have been several 
exemplary cases in which fishing income has increased and illegal fishing has subsided 
through this process (MOMAF 2005; Uchida et al. 2010). Yet, doubts have also been 
raised as to whether this governance reform is genuinely taking root. Many Jayul 
communities simply exist only on paper with no substantial follow-up activities (Seo and 
Byeon 2006). In addition, a financial incentive system that the central government has set 
up to entice fishing community organizations to join in and keep up with the activities 
could have been promoting further reliance on government, negating its original 
intention. Are the governance ideals of co-management, such as participation and 
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cooperation, being fostered and valued by the resource communities? Can there be 
inconsistencies between what is being promoted by the government and what is being 
valued by the communities, which could impede its effectiveness, especially if the two 
are conflicting? Given the high expectation that achieving this new mode of governance 
may represent the only viable option for improving the fisheries situation in Korea (Lee 
and Shin 2004), insights about values and principles of local fishers and those of 
government could provide a timely and helpful contribution to promote implementation 
of this governance reform. 
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Fig. 2 Map of South Korea (community sites are shown as double circles; triangles 
indicate survey locations with managers/researchers) 
 
Value and principle statements 
We drew 16 values and 16 principles from lists previously developed by the authors 
based on the review of fisheries resource governance discourse (see Song et al. 2013 or 
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Chapter 3). Though not universal, each set reasonably offers a comprehensive scope 
encompassing environmental, social, altruistic and egoistic values as well as principles 
pertaining to the natural, economic and governing fisheries systems. The sets of 16 are 
relatively small and manageable, as suggested by Rokeach (1973). Table 2 presents the 
values and principles and the statements used to portray them. The statements provide 
contextual descriptions of the domestic fisheries conditions. At the same time, following 
the guidelines of Dunn-Rankin (1983), they were designed to be simple, direct and short 
(rarely exceeding 20 words), and each containing only one complete thought. Therefore, 
the crafting of the statements requires a fine balance between being too specific and being 
too general. For example, in ‘Fishing grounds should be used exclusively by the 
designated fisher groups’ (Table 2(b)), there is no indication of who the designated fisher 
groups are, and likewise any mention of exact types of fishing ground is purposefully 
avoided. This is to minimize strategic voting of respondents and to encourage making the 
judgments based on the underlying concept and not on the specifics that may conjure up 
attitudinal sentiment or immediate benefits or losses associated with their particular role 
in the fishery. Iterations of pre-testing with fishing community leaders and policy 
researchers assisted the development and fine-tuning of the statements. In addition, 
forward- and back-translations helped ensure cross-cultural and conceptual equivalence 
between the English and Korean versions. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statements for (a) 16 values and (b) 16 principles 
(a) Values Value statements presented in the cards 
Conformity Acceptance of fishery rules and regulations  
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Ecosystem conservation Healthy marine ecological system  
Equality Equal fishing opportunity amongst fellow fishers  
Freedom Freedom to decide when and where to fish  
Hedonism Enjoyment and pleasure in fishery life 
Honesty Integrity in fisheries governing system 
Influence Strong leadership in fishery management   
Knowledge Comprehensive knowledge on marine ecosystem 
Moderation Moderate catch target 
Peacefulness Fishing villages without conflicts  
Secure livelihoods Secure livelihoods from fishing work  
Self-esteem Sense of pride for working in the fishing industry 
Social cohesion Cohesion among the members of fishing community  
Social recognition Greater public recognition of fishing work  
Tradition Many young people taking interest in fishing tradition  
Wealth High economic income from fishing work  
 
(b) Principles Principle statements presented in the cards 
Adaptability Fishery rules should be reviewed frequently to better respond to rapid 
changes in fishing conditions 
Adjacency Access to use a fishing ground should be first granted to those who live 
near it  
Cooperation Cooperation among fishers and fisher organizations should be increased 
Ecological sustainability Overfishing should be prevented in all fishing operations  
Ecosystem integrity Fishing should be done without disrupting ecosystem integrity  
Efficiency Fishing technology should be enhanced such that fish can be caught 
with less effort 
Equity Benefits of fishery policy should be applied fairly to all fishers 
Exclusivity Fishing grounds should be used exclusively by the designated fisher 
groups  
High-level decision-
making 
Central government should provide financial support to coastal fishing 
communities  
Human welfare Fishery policy should address fishers’ needs  
Legitimacy Governing authority should be considered legitimate by fishers 
Participation Fishery rule making should be based on the participation of fishers  
Precaution More closed seasons should be established  
Scientific information Fishery rules should be made based on scientific data 
Subsidiarity Fishery rules should be set at the community level  
User-pays License fees should be charged to fishers for the privilege of using 
public resources 
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Elicitation protocol 
Each respondent was asked to sort the 16 value cards with the instruction: “The following 
phrases contain various aspects that may be deemed important in creating a healthy, 
productive coastal fishery and fishing life. As someone involved in the fishery, how 
would you place the following aspects in terms of their importance? Please place the 
cards into the three categories ranging from ‘very important’, ‘somewhat important’, and 
‘little important’, in any way you like in the provided grid”. Once satisfied with the way 
the cards were sorted, he/she was guided to offer verbal explanations about the rationale 
and meaning behind the sorting choices, especially with regard to the values considered 
very important. The same procedure was repeated for the 16 principle statements with a 
slightly varied instruction: “The following statements describe several ways as to how 
coastal fisheries management can be carried out. In your opinion, how important is each 
statement in guiding coastal fisheries management in your area?” The cards were re-
shuffled prior to each survey to ensure random ordering. 
 
Survey process 
The survey was conducted during fieldwork to South Korea in 2012. The two main 
respondent groups were community members dependent on local fisheries resources and 
government managers/academic researchers/non-governmental consultants. The survey 
with the former group was conducted in eight fishing communities to account for diverse 
resource settings that exist in the Korean coastal fishery, whose locations and attributes 
are displayed in Fig. 2 and Table 3(a).
3
 This inclusive setup is expected to hold the 
findings of the survey in greater relevance to the Korean coastal fishery as a whole, and 
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induce more systematic comparisons to tease out potential group differences and 
similarities in values and principles. 
Quota sampling was used to target 25 participants at each site, giving thus 200 
community respondents in total. Both pile sort and Q sort are shown to generate 
meaningful results with a relatively small number of participants. Limited member size of 
communities and irregular work schedules of many members also served as practical 
constraints to random sample selection. Nevertheless, comparable demographic details 
across the eight communities were attained with respect to variables such as age, years in 
fishery and formal education, and gender composition (Table 3(b)). Participation was 
solicited in the public surroundings of fishing villages, such as streets and fishing 
wharves, as well as by visiting residential houses during daytime. Individual face-to-face 
survey was conducted to minimize any social pressure that may exist and thereby 
influence their response. Respondents comprised adult individuals, both male and female, 
involved in the production and the marketing aspects of fishery, which include harvesters, 
processors, retailers, wholesalers, and retired fishers. Although their activities in the 
fishery as well as the level of dependence on the resources for supporting livelihoods 
varied, they all drew direct or indirect income from fisheries. Direct observation 
complemented the survey process during 1 to 2 week long visits to each community. The 
survey with 25 government fishery managers and researchers took place in their 
respective offices scattered across the country. Each survey took about 15-30 minutes to 
complete. Lastly, data verification and preliminary analyses were carried out following 
data collection, which involved re-visits to the communities and management offices to 
discuss the findings and confirm its validity. 
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Table 3 (a) Fishery attributes and (b) demographic information of respondent groups 
 Resource dependent community 
Manager/ 
researcher  
 
(a) 
Bakmi-ri 
Goongpy
ong-ri 
Gusipo 
Dongho-
ri 
Giseong-
ri 
Jiksan2-
ri 
Gubok-ri Sim-ri Total 
Location 
West coast 
– north 
West coast 
– north 
West coast 
– south 
West coast 
– south 
East coast East coast 
South 
coast 
South 
coast 
All areas - 
Main fishery 
Clam, 
octopus, 
oyster 
Clam, 
octopus, 
finfish 
Crab, 
octopus, 
finfish, 
elver 
Crab, 
octopus, 
clam, elver 
Finfish, 
sea 
mustard, 
abalone 
Finfish, 
anchovy, 
sea 
mustard 
Mussel 
culture, 
finfish, 
octopus 
Mussel 
culture, 
finfish 
Oversees all 
fishery 
- 
Fishing 
environment 
Intertidal 
area 
Intertidal 
area, water 
column 
Water 
column, 
interdital 
area 
Water 
column, 
intertidal 
area 
Water 
column 
Water 
column 
Water 
column, 
intertidal 
area 
Water 
column 
Oversees all 
environment 
- 
Year joined the 
Jayul program 
2004 2007 2003 2007 2001 2006 Not joined Not joined - - 
Member size of 
Jayul community 
107 117 72 102 79 75 152
^
 101
^
 - - 
(b)           
# of respondents 
surveyed 
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 225 
Male 15 19 23 22 20 19 23 23 23 187 
Female 10 6 2 3 5 6 2 2 2 38 
           
Average age
+
 61 61 54 60 64 59 57 59 49 - 
Age range* 39-82 40-79 26-82 37-81 50-80 35-80 39-78 39-77 31-65 - 
Years of fishery 
experience*  
3-60 6-60 1-50 1-55 1.5-50 0.5-55 5-60 4-40 1-44 - 
Years in formal 
education
+
 
9 9 8 8 9 9 10  9 17 - 
+
 denotes average; * denotes range;
 ^
 denotes member size of existing non-Jayul fisher organization (i.e., a fishing village cooperative)  
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Analysis of results 
 
We first conducted the Kendall coefficient of Concordance W, a non-parametric statistic 
useful for assessing agreement among respondents.
4
 In effect, the test reveals the degree 
to which respondents in each group agree with one another about which values and 
principles are more (or less) important. If the test shows significant agreement, each 
group can be considered a unit, permitting thus an aggregation of all individuals as one 
group for further analysis. In case of absence of significance, aggregation will take place 
only among individuals with agreed ranking, creating thus more than one group of 
respondents. In such instances, more respondents may be solicited to increase the sample 
size. Persistent disagreement may, however, suggest a possibility of a highly 
heterogeneous member composition or an existence of smaller factions. As shown in 
Table 4, the chi-square scores for all nine groups for both sets of value and principle were 
greater than the upper-tail critical value of chi-square distribution at 95% confidence 
level, indicating significant in-group agreement. In the analysis that follows, all 25 
respondents from each community are treated as a group with the same applying to all 
managers and researchers. This result also in part helps validating the sample size of 25 
respondents targeted in each community. 
 
Table 4 Kendall’s W and chi-square scores for the nine surveyed groups (the critical value 
for α=.05 and df=15 is 24.996) 
(a) Values 
Bakmi
-ri 
Goon
gpyon
Gusip
o 
Dong
ho-ri 
Giseo
ng-ri 
Jiksan
2-ri 
Gubo
k-ri 
Sim-ri Manag
er/rese
119 
 
g-ri archer 
W 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.26 
Χ2 48.58 53.99 46.79 30.66 40.93 52.70 57.84 49.09 99.00 
(b) Principles          
W 0.10 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.28 
Χ2 37.36 85.47 59.19 58.19 34.86 28.41 44.64 52.29 105.1 
 
Important values and principles  
Next, in order to reveal the most (and least) esteemed values and principles, the frequency 
of each card being sorted “very important” by the nine respondent groups was first 
analyzed. If the majority of group members, i.e., more than 13 out of 25 respondents, 
considered a certain value statement to be very important, the group is considered to have 
prioritize that particular value, and thus is counted as one. For each value and principle, 
then, the number of such groups was tallied, as displayed in Fig. 3. We further 
differentiate the majority groups into those in the upper level (with two-thirds majority or 
at least 17 people) to increase the power of the analysis. The results produce a hierarchy 
of the values and principles based on importance, and show that four values and three 
principles were consistently agreed by most groups to be very important (Fig. 3). For 
values, ‘ecosystem conservation’ (healthy marine ecological system) was judged to be 
highest in terms of importance with eight of the nine groups considering it very important 
according to two-thirds majority, in addition to all nine groups judging it very important 
based on over-half majority. The top status of this value can be exemplified by 
respondent explanations such as “this is the foundation of everything involved in the 
fishery” [R27].5 Other comments also stressed this value’s vital connections to 
livelihoods, human health, and the sense of place, whose examples include “the 
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ecosystem is dying; for humans to be healthy, the sea must be healthy first” [R38]. Next, 
the groups prioritized the importance of statements that represent ‘wealth’, ‘honesty,’ and 
‘secure livelihoods’. Earning income and supporting livelihood were strong desirables in 
the fishery and fishing life, and honesty, according to the explanation by the respondents, 
was construed to mean both restraining from illegal fishing as well as an absence of 
corruption in the system. On the other hand, ‘hedonism’ (enjoyment and pleasure), 
‘equality’ (equal opportunity at fishing), and ‘moderation’ (catching a moderate amount) 
were among the values that garnered relatively little importance.  
The principle set also resulted in a clear distinction between those that were highly 
endorsed and those consistently relegated, as shown in Fig. 3(b). ‘Equity’ (equitable 
distribution of benefits) was indicated to be the most important principle in fisheries 
governance. The prevailing conception of equity among the respondents was that benefits 
derived from fishery should be distributed proportional to one’s level of effort, diligence 
and/or investment. One community member explains: 
“There are several types of fishers, and among them, those who go on a boat should be 
given the priority treatment, because they risk their lives the most, and their work is the 
most physically difficult; that is fairness and equity. Among the boat fishers, benefits 
should be equally distributed.” [R72] 
High importance of a conservation-oriented principle ‘ecosystem integrity’ (fishing 
without disrupting ecosystem integrity) and a key management principle ‘adjacency’ 
(giving priority access to a fishing ground to those who are geographically close) were 
also widely noted. By contrast, the result identified ‘precaution’ (a wider establishment of 
closed seasons), ‘exclusivity’ (an exclusive use of fishing ground by designated groups), 
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and ‘user-pays’ (paying license fees for the privilege of resource use) to be among the 
least important principles, as they rank near the bottom of the importance hierarchy (Fig. 
3(b)). 
 
 
Fig. 3 Importance hierarchy of (a) values and (b) principles (in reverse order) based on 
the tally of groups who judged each value and principle very important according to two 
types of majority: over-half majority and two-thirds majority in each of the nine groups (* 
indicate significant difference beyond .05 level between aggregate community groups and 
manager/researcher group, see Fig. 4 for details) 
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The final step of analysis involved examining the convergence and disparity between 
respondent groups. First, a quick check for the consolidation of the eight fishing 
communities and the manager/researcher group was performed using Principal 
component analysis (PCA).
6
 The simple premise is that the groups will end up on the 
same factor if their sorting results are similar (Brown 1980). For values, all nine groups 
had significantly loaded on the first factor, while for principles, two factors were retained 
with the eight community groups loading on one and the manager/researcher group 
loading on the other. Based on this result, the communities were combined into a single 
aggregate group while the manager/researcher group was left to form its own group. This 
result allows the analysis to focus on comparisons between the two most disparate 
groupings. It also suggests that community respondents, despite their diverseness in 
locations, fishery experiences and the degree of involvement with the Jayul, held similar 
underlying value priorities and salient principles when understood from a broad metric of 
importance.  
Next, we conducted the chi-square test, a non-parametric statistic appropriate for 
assessing the significance of differences among independent groups based on the 
frequency data (Siegel and Castellan 1988). As shown in Fig. 3(a), among the 16 values, 
‘freedom’ (operational freedom in deciding when and where to fish) and ‘knowledge’ 
(comprehensive knowledge on ecosystem) displayed significant difference at 95% 
confidence level suggesting notable disagreement in the way the two respondent groups 
regarded these values. Interestingly, these statistical differences appear to have generated 
from the manager/researcher group’s particularly weak emphasis on these two values, as 
inferred from Fig. 4(a) and illustrated through responses such as “freedom in fishing is 
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inevitably constrained by fisheries institutions” [R221], and “there is no real need to 
know everything, since it is possible to have a well-functioning fishery without 
comprehensive knowledge” [R219]. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Percentages displaying the sorting patterns of the significantly different (a) values 
and (b) principles, compared between aggregate community group (CM, n=200) and 
manager/researcher group (M/R, n=25)  
 
For principles, a greater range of divergence was observed than the value set, as the two 
groups significantly differed in five principles: ‘adjacency’, ‘participation’ (user 
participation in rule-making), ‘efficiency’ (technological enhancement improving catch 
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per unit effort), ‘scientific information’ (rule-making based on scientific data), and 
‘exclusivity’. As shown in Fig. 4(b), the user community group upheld adjacency, 
efficiency, and exclusivity higher than the manager/researcher group, while they regarded 
participation and scientific information with less importance than the formal expert group. 
For example, with respect to adjacency, community members brought forward the 
arguments of local stewardship, frequent resource use by those who live near, and the 
need to have a mechanism to regulate outsiders. When it came to the weaker standing of 
participation, their rationale was attributed to community members’ little interest in 
getting involved in management, seeing it mainly as the government’s responsibility. 
Some also expressed the futility of their participation due to an imbalance of power and 
asymmetrical knowledge vis-à-vis government officers. This was in stark contrast to the 
managers/researchers’ utmost regard towards participation as the only group selecting this 
principle as very important with a two-thirds majority (Fig 3(b)). 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
This study examined the values and principles of two fishery stakeholder groups as a way 
of making sense of the complexity inherent in natural resource planning and practice. An 
exploratory sorting-based method, P+ sort, was developed to elicit mixed qualitative-
quantitative expressions of values and principles, and was applied to the case of fisheries 
co-management program in South Korea. This concluding section discusses the results in 
light of the governance initiative and reflects on the feasibility, limitations and the future 
prospects of the P+ sort method. 
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The results reveal a widespread agreement at the level of values between the 
community group and the manager/researcher group. While the significant differences in 
the ‘freedom’ and ‘knowledge’ should be acknowledged, given that they were relatively 
unimportant values considered by the both groups (as observed from the importance 
hierarchy in Fig. 3(a)), the divergence may not play a crucial role in the overall 
governance process. Rather, convergence in the highly regarded values of ecosystem 
conservation, wealth and livelihood security, and integrity would deserve heightened 
attention since these shared values could serve as the normative foundation for all 
governance activities and policy direction. Likewise, the high importance of equity and 
ecological principles is also noteworthy. At its root, both the governors, represented by 
managers/researchers, and those-being-governed, made up of fishing communities, agree 
on the basic conceptions of what is desired and what is important for the coastal fishery at 
large. Holding a similar set of values could signify a common starting ground, to which 
people can refer back in cases of confrontation or impasse. It offers a refuge when 
stakeholders want to start fresh, keep things simple, or go back to the drawing board. This 
is not to say that value conflicts do not exist or can always be avoided, as they likely 
pervade and persist in any resource context including the Korean example. However, 
when facing hard choices or no resolutions are in sight, being explicit about the agreed 
values could present an opportunity for people to come together to form a compromising 
decision.  
The result of this study revealed more acute differences regarding principles, which 
perhaps have a more direct bearing on the implementation of a co-management system. 
For example, the manager/researcher group is shown to be an avid supporter of user 
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participation in management and rule-making, while the community groups’ enthusiasm 
about this key co-management principle is, though considerable, markedly weaker. 
Hence, despite the many positive developments of the Jayul program in the last decade, 
the participatory mindset may be slow in being rooted across the communities, 
substantiating the concerns about the communities’ cursory involvement. The government 
therefore may need to re-evaluate its high ambitions for the Jayul program and also seek 
an alternative timeline and strategies for its continuing implementation. In the case of the 
adjacency principle, many managers/researchers were found to object to strengthening 
local priority access and use rights to nearby fishing grounds for the fear that fishing 
communities may not always effectively manage a given coastal environment, as 
indicated by previous examples of mismanagement (see Cheong 2003b; 2005). Yet, 
adjacency is conceptualized as a key enabling factor towards a more community-
empowered approach to fisheries management (Davis and Wagner 2006). Its activation is 
expected to guarantee a legal as well as a geographical basis for coastal communities to 
maintain fishing livelihoods. Further, it is considered a defense against the vulnerability 
of local fishery collapse arising from outside influences, such as large-scale industrial 
fishers or corporations being dispensed with nearshore fishing privileges. Thus, the 
differences in these principles could present areas of critical reflection for both resource 
users and managers.  
The occurrence of a general agreement in what people believe to be the most 
important notions of coastal fisheries but seeing more pronounced differences in how to 
go about operationalizing them begs further explanation. The pattern observed in this 
study, which revealed the values displaying a greater convergence than the principles, 
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finds precedence in another study. The findings of Satterfield and Gregory (1998) showed 
that while environmental values surrounding forest management did not necessarily differ 
between groups, questions about preference of more specific management actions 
generated strong differences of opinion. They argued that there is a problematic 
“tendency to confuse expressions of values that refer to an individual’s fundamental 
beliefs with operational expressions of those values in terms of context-specific 
objectives or the means by which desired end-states are achieved” (ibid., p. 633), and 
added that “…values cannot be considered independently of the detailed and informative 
contexts in which they are expressed” (ibid., p. 635). In other words, values and 
principles may have distinct roles to play occupying different thematic niches in one’s 
mindset. In addition, an examination of values without also understanding how they may 
be communicated at the more operational level of principles can become meaningless, if 
not altogether misleading. As corroborated by Satterfield and Gregory (1998), the result 
of this study reaffirms a possibility that disagreements in principles may be underpinned 
by a shared value base. To put broadly, people may be more similar than they are 
different when we move away from the visible differences and practical constraints. A 
diverse set of fishing communities studied here was also in general agreement about 
what’s fundamentally important for the fishery. In such cases, active discussion of the 
underlying notions such as values and principles could open up a way of clarifying and 
bridging the differences and leading to policy decisions which various groups can come 
to accept and appreciate. Facilitating dialogue between groups is expected to improve 
governing interaction, contributing thus to higher level of governability. 
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The P+ sort developed in this study offers further support to value-centered 
research. Enabled through a design that emphasizes local context, approachability and 
user-interaction, it may offer a chance to systematically explore, update and articulate 
one’s basic ideas such as values and principles. It can also be used to target respondents 
with a wide range of demographic traits, including senior community members with little 
formal education or no previous exposure to a value survey, as demonstrated in this case. 
Comments from the surveyed respondents about the method support this. For instance, 
they found the method interesting (e.g., “like piecing together a puzzle”), empowering 
(e.g., “we are learning through this exercise”), and even liberating (e.g., “a load taken off 
my chest”). They embraced the research idea conveyed, saw relevance, and were satisfied 
with the outcomes. Several participants wished “more of this type of research” to be 
carried out, especially by the government officials. The survey nature of the P+ sort also 
potentially allows a cost-effective way of attaining a large sample size, though in this 
study the results are illustrative not representative due to the purposive sampling of the 
community sites
3
 and the quota sampling of the respondents. 
Despite the benefits it proposes, the method currently has several limitations. 
Similar to the concern faced in most elicitation procedures that rely on direct question-
answer format, the use of descriptive and hypothetical statements to portray values and 
principles makes respondent judgment sensitive to their wording. It is possible that the 
same value or principle can be depicted in a number of different ways, including 
incorporating pictures or other visual stimuli onto the cards. The challenge would be to 
construct a concise idea for each item that describes a resource context with which all 
stakeholders can identify. Careful pre-testing of the statements is suggested to help 
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alleviate this potential shortcoming. Furthermore, making variations in the parameters 
that make up the design are to be encouraged in future practices. For example, a larger 
number of scale points (i.e., piles) can be experimented with, which may permit an 
application of more rigorous and sophisticated statistical analyses. Also, aiming this 
method at diverse natural resource cases, a different array of stakeholder groups, or an 
elicitation of other less-tangible concepts such as governing images (see Chapter 5) 
would test its wider applicability and likely lead to further methodological refinement.  
This article responds to the need to make available a wider opportunity for 
expression of values and principles. As a response to the call to incorporate people’s 
values and principles in the policy domain and to understand their convergence and 
disagreement among a widening set of stakeholders, the value research, such as that 
performed here, is a crucial undertaking for achieving more governable natural resource 
arrangements. The P+ sort may offer a useful methodological avenue with which this 
endeavor can be further explored. 
 
Notes 
 
1.  Relativistic traditions are juxtaposed with axiomatic traditions which operate on the 
premise that certain values are better, more important, and intellectually defensible 
than others. 
2.  The difficulty of ranking increases significantly when the number of objects exceed 20 
(Russel and Gray 1994) or even as few as four according to McCarty and Shrum 
(2000). 
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3.  The selection of the communities was based on three criteria using purposive 
sampling: (1) member size to ensure that an adequate number of members are 
available in each community for survey participation; (2) duration of participation in 
the Jayul program such that the communities who joined the program prior to May 
2006 were separated from those who joined later. The duration of participation served 
as a proxy for the level of experience in the program with an assumption that long-time 
participants have a higher degree of familiarity and expertise accumulated throughout 
the years of participation than recently joined ones; and (3) type of fishery to cover a 
wide operational and geographical characteristics. Final selection produced four 
clusters of two communities, as shown in Fig. 2. 
4.  Testing the significance of W, when N is larger than 7, the sample distribution 
approximates chi-square with N-1 degrees of freedom (Siegel and Castellan 1988). 
5.  [R27] refers to respondent #27. 
6.  Principal component analysis was performed through XLSTAT software (version 
2012). It used the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient with no rotation of factors.  
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Chapter 5 Exploring stakeholders’ images of coastal fisheries: a South 
Korean example 
 
Target journal: Human Ecology 
 
Andrew M. Song and Ratana Chuenpagdee 
 
Abstract 
Images that stakeholders have about fisheries can fundamentally influence how fisheries 
are to be governed, as recent literature has begun to elucidate. They represent underlying 
perspectives about the issues in question and the world at large such that they may help 
explain why certain governance decisions and actions come about and how policy ideas 
become carried forward. While it is crucial to properly identify and discuss them, how 
they appear and function in an empirical setting is not yet fully understood, making it less 
amenable to assessing their meanings and generating practical lessons. Using a case of 
coastal fisheries in South Korea and its governance initiative in progress called ‘Jayul’, 
this study captures the images of various stakeholders as they are expressed through an 
exploratory survey design and inductively formulated themes and categories. The results 
show a broad range of thematic content and four general dimensions within which images 
are manifested. In addition to revealing the diversity associated with stakeholders’ 
images, the study is also an illustration of how one can go about conducting an image 
inquiry and what can be expected from its results, paving ways for future studies. 
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Implications for the governance situation in Korean fisheries are drawn to demonstrate 
images’ significant bearing on the workings of governance processes. 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, a line of thinking has arisen in fisheries governance discourse which 
focuses on stakeholders’ images (Bundy et al. 2008; Cinner et al. 2012; Jentoft et al. 
2010, 2012; Kooiman et al. 2005; Thornton and Laurin 2005). These conceptual 
developments explore what images mean in governance contexts and how they may 
influence governance processes. Images are “representations of the issues in question and 
the world at large” (Jentoft et al. 2012: 186), and they provide visions for other governing 
elements such as regulations and incentives, as well as guide behavior of those being 
governed. Overall, they form an underlying cognitive framework through which 
stakeholder views are understood and organized, and their decisions and actions 
explained. The assertion is that they can help attain a deeper understanding of past 
experiences, make sense of current trends and events, and even offer a reasonable ground 
upon which the future course of action can be foreseen, thereby making governance a 
more proactive endeavor. Hence, images should be properly considered and made explicit 
in a governance process. 
More specifically, according to a review of how images (and other analogous 
concepts such as mental models and cognitive frames) have been approached and 
discussed in fisheries (see Song et al. 2013 or Chapter 3), images gain importance in at 
least three main ways. First, a faulty representation of fisheries realities can mislead 
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governance effort into perverse consequences. Thomas Huxley’s (1883) idea that “all the 
great sea fisheries are inexhaustible” is one example of the well-publicized images in 
fisheries policy-making. Secondly, images can exhibit disparity among different 
stakeholder groups, which pose a potential danger as incompatible images could lead to 
misunderstanding and confrontation (see also Hall-Arber et al. 2009). Greater awareness 
and appreciation of different ways of seeing are called for to carefully negotiate the socio-
political complexity emanating from potential image disagreements. Finally, a discursive 
power and hegemonic dominance of certain images are what fisheries governance must 
also be made conscious of. An ideology or a discourse maintains its discursive power 
through images it creates and propagates. For example, the neoliberal ideology paints a 
forceful portrayal of fishing economies as pre-capitalist and a barrier to capital 
accumulation. This particular image of fishing communities is consequently used to 
promote a capitalistic mode of production and fisher identity, while repudiating other 
alternative fishing forms such as subsistence, spiritual, and community-based fishery (St. 
Martin 2007). Therefore, how images are linked to ideological purposes and how they can 
become hegemonic becomes another important theme in the ways images influence 
governance processes and outcomes.  
The concept of images is, however, less than clear-cut and invites various 
interpretations. Its unverbalized appearances, indefinite meanings, and multiple usages 
make it difficult to clearly delineate the general characteristics of the images captured in a 
governance system. What constitutes an image? What is the range of different images 
held by various stakeholders? What is the level of coherence among them? Do images 
describe future aspirations and carry a normative conviction? Are they imbued with 
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positive or negative overtones and therefore present a certain outlook on governing 
matters? Such questions have not been fully examined in the context of an empirical 
setting. As a result, what is still less apparent are the dimensions within which our 
understanding of stakeholders’ images lie, and this creates challenges in how to study 
them. Consider a practitioner interested in studying images held by stakeholder groups in 
a certain locale. He/she needs to first have an idea of what he/she is looking for when 
searching for the images, how to capture them, followed by how to make sense of the 
acquired data, i.e., what they really mean. Only then, images can contribute to enhancing 
an understanding of a particular governance situation, and practical suggestions can be 
raised.  
The studies of stakeholders’ images thus far have either focused on their conceptual 
development (e.g., Jentoft et al. 2010, 2012), or revolved around a particular issue such as 
marine protected areas (Jentoft et al. 2012) and ecosystem-based management (Bundy et 
al. 2008), or specific metaphors such as ‘fishing as mining’ (McCay et al. 2011) and ‘the 
sea as a frontier’ (Bromley 2005). In this article, in order to provide a general illustration 
of what stakeholders’ images may look like and how to empirically study them, we take a 
broad stroke and assess what a wide array of fishery stakeholders might express as their 
images about the fishery and fishing life, using the case of South Korean coastal fisheries. 
Through primary data collection using surveys, the elicited responses are inductively 
analyzed to describe the contours of stakeholders’ images as well as to generate policy-
relevant insights. Additionally, an exploratory methodological framework designed to 
serve this objective is offered, tabling one introductory way of elucidating images of 
stakeholders. 
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We commence by revisiting key theoretical definitions and attributes of images 
informed by a wider set of literature, especially as they are approached from the 
interactive governance perspective. Next, a brief outline of the fisheries situation in Korea 
is provided including a description of a governance initiative called ‘Jayul program’. 
Following a section on the design and application of the survey method, we present 
several key thematic areas of the images that emerged as the results of the study. 
Subsequently, compiled responses allow identification of image characteristics, and we 
reflect on the findings to discuss their implications for the Jayul governance and 
formulate suggestions that can inform future directions. We conclude with a summary of 
potential contributions to method and theory which might encourage further research. 
 
Theoretical conceptions of images from interactive governance perspective 
 
Aristotle regarded images as the main medium of thought (Eysenck and Keane, 2000), 
and proclaimed that thoughts are impossible without images (Hummel 1993). Despite 
opposing debates on their utility over the years due in part to their elusive nature 
(Goldstein 2008), the traditions of anthropology and cognitive science have put great 
emphasis on images and explored their linkages to aspects such as culture and internal 
information processing, respectively. In addition, images have become also relevant to the 
resource governance context. Approaching from the angle of policy decision-making and 
implementation, the most salient issue becomes understanding how the images that 
governance stakeholders hold influence policy initiation, execution and evaluation, and in 
turn how they are affected by the very process. This entry point is supported by an 
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argument that “individual cognitions or mental models of resources are not irrelevant to 
environmental decision making, as assumed by content-free framing in terms of utilities” 
(Atran et al. 2005: 771). 
The interactive governance perspective highlights image as one of the fundamental 
elements representing the normative and cognitive concerns of fishery stakeholders 
(Chuenpagdee 2011; Kooiman et al. 2005; Song et al. 2013). Images gain additional 
significance because their disagreements and interactions can affect the overall 
governability of a fishery system (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2009, 2013). Framed as 
‘meta-level’ governance (i.e., what governs governance), images, along with values and 
principles, underpin the overall governance process, guiding, shaping and inspiring 
decisions and actions. Kooiman (2003: 29) argues that “anyone involved in governing, in 
whatever capacity or authority, forms images about what he or she is governing”. 
Similarly, Jentoft et al. (2010: 1315) explains that “governing is inconceivable without 
the formation of images, and that they are needed for the sake of understanding, 
communication and action”. Such statements affirm that images are omnipresent and 
integral in the act of governing. Because images can serve a persuasive role and be used 
as a rhetorical tool to shape policy, it is in the interest of governors, then, to find 
compelling images that can help clarify or favorably represent their vision of governance 
(Morgan 1997).  
Images are not only the domain of those who govern, however. Every person 
involved in the fishery holds an idea of what they believe, what they perceive could 
happen, and what they think should happen (Jentoft et al. 2010), whether they are strong 
or weak, elaborate or vague. In fact, images are understood to go deeper than simple 
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opinions stated by stakeholders (Jentoft et al. 2012). Whereas attitudes and perceptions 
provide a useful way of assessing people’s sentiments about specific objects, situations or 
issues, they themselves are based on other mental constructs, such as values and images, 
which are slow-changing, few in number and deeply ingrained (Rokeach 1973; Vaske and 
Donnelly 1999). Images are, instead, “a way of thinking and a way of seeing that pervade 
how we understand our world generally” (Morgan 1997: 4). Thus, images help describe 
our life-world: they encapsulate and synthesize numerous independent observations into a 
coherent model and provide a basis for explaining other additional observations (Jentoft 
et al. 2012). Further, images have a predictive quality. While real practices and 
experience shape one’s images, the reverse is also true because people can be driven by 
their ideas held in their images. Because people tend to see the world in the way the 
images are drawn, and then act in ways that make the world conform to them, they do not 
just describe what is happening but prescribe how things ought to look like (Carrier 1998: 
Foster 1965). 
Finally, images are typically said to be stable and dependable, treating any 
inconsistent observations with suspicion or outright rejection. Yet, they do shift over 
time, and may also go through an abrupt switch at times akin to an epiphany. Boulding 
(1956) posits that images become what they are through the continuing process of 
receiving and responding to innumerable messages via face-to-face communication, 
personal or secondary observation, news media, and policy directives. In fisheries, images 
may be altered as stakeholders observe changes in the natural conditions or start to 
engage in new practices. For instance, as a response to a decline in natural fisheries 
system the image of wild capture fisheries in South Korea has broadened to encompass 
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stocked fish, i.e., those reared in the hatchery, released as juveniles, and then caught later 
in the sea. As a result, it is customarily accepted by producers and consumers alike that 
the stock and release fish are part of the wild fisheries, and only those fully grown in fish 
tanks or offshore cages are labeled as farmed fish. Also, with an introduction of 
government policies such as individual vessel quotas in the Norwegian coastal cod 
fishery, each vessel has begun to be imbued with an image of a self-regulating governor, 
who is responsible not only for the operation of catching fish, but also for making 
arrangements with regard to processing, staffing, and managing of the quotas and capital 
investments (Johnsen 2013).  
 
Case study of South Korean coastal fishery 
 
General characteristics of the fishery  
South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea) is located in the southern part of the 
Korean Peninsula in the Northwest Pacific region (Fig. 1). Endowed with productive 
fishing grounds in all three adjacent seas – the West Sea, the East Sea, and the Korea 
Strait which joins onto the East China Sea (Kang 2006), fishing has naturally taken place 
from ancient times, and helped satisfy much of the domestic fish consumption demands 
over the years (Hong 1995). Fish occupies an integral part of Koreans’ dietary life and 
intimately connected to their culture even to this date. According to data recorded since 
1960s, fish has consistently contributed over 40-50% of the animal protein intake per 
capita per day (Han 2009). On the production side, Korea ranked 13
th
 in the world in 
2010, with inclusion of seaweed production (FAO 2012). In the coastal fishery, there are 
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nearly 150 target species of commercial significance, which include squid, mackerel, 
saury, blue crab, anchovy, and hairtail as well as a wide variety of shellfish and seaweeds 
(Kang 2006). Also, with over 28 licensed fishing gear types, it has the strong character of 
multi-gear, which include gillnet, hook and line, traps, longlines, and hand gear such as a 
hand hoe for catching clams (Han 2009). Also, boats weighed under 8 tons are allowed to 
operate in the coastal waters representing the small-scale sector. 
 
A brief history of governing of fisheries and the ‘Jayul’ governance initiative 
Korean people have always had close ties with the three neighboring seas, using them 
throughout history for national security, trading, and the associated exchange of cultures 
as well as for fishing (Hong 1995). In the pre-modern period, many inshore fishing 
grounds were privatized by clans and village authorities. With the beginning of the 
Japanese occupation of Korea in 1911, the colonial government took over and 
restructured Korean fisheries by introducing fishing rights and laws and also founded 
fisheries cooperatives at the village level. This shift endowed the government with the 
exclusive power to grant and manage licenses and effectively placed the colonial state in 
charge of overall fisheries management (Cheong 2004). Following independence in 1945, 
post-colonial government inherited much of the colonial setup, and the fishery has been 
chiefly operating under the overarching direction of the central government who sets 
regulations, issues licenses, enforces rules, and provides benefits and subsidies to 
communities (Cheong 2004; Choi and Han 2002).  
In recent years, however, it was becoming increasingly evident that the 50 years of 
government-centered management is proving inadequate to account for diverse regional 
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characteristics, and resolve various environmental and social challenges that have 
surfaced surrounding fisheries (Cheong 2003; Han 2009). In addition, fishers were prone 
to rely on the central government for subsidies and policy direction (Lee 2010). As a 
response to the ineffective management regime, the central government initiated a new 
institutional arrangement called the “Jayul Community Fisheries Management” in 2001 
(hereafter referred to as ‘the Jayul’). This governance initiative aims to raise the level of 
community participation in managing local fisheries and ultimately to instill a sense of 
ownership in resource users (Lee et al. 2006; MOMAF 2003). Jayul, meaning free will in 
Korean, is a type of placed-based co-management program where government sets out the 
institutional framework and provides financial and technical assistance to local fisher 
organizations, while the latter drafts local constitution that specifies committee 
composition, membership rules, fishing restrictions and penalties, among others, and 
carries out the management plan for their fishery. 
Since its inception a decade ago, the number of community fisher organizations 
participating in the program has reached 893 in 2011, and there have been several 
exemplary cases in which fishing income has increased and illegal fishing have subsided 
through this process (MOMAF 2005; Uchida et al. 2010, 2012). Yet, doubts have also 
been raised as to whether this governance reform is genuinely taking root. Many Jayul 
communities simply exist only on paper with no substantial follow-up activities (Seo and 
Byeon 2006). Moreover, a financial incentive system that the central government has set 
up to entice fishing community organizations to join in and keep up with the activities 
could end up promoting further reliance on government, negating its original intention. 
For instance, there is a worry that discontinuation of the funding or facing low prospect of 
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receiving financial benefits may arouse negative sentiments towards further participation 
in the program and induce communities to lapse back into inaction (Lee 2010).  
 
          
Fig. 1 Map of South Korea (community sites are shown as double circles; triangles 
indicate survey locations with managers/researchers) 
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The central government has expressed the ambition of broadening its participation and 
benefits to 1,400 fisher organizations by 2014 and to nearly all 2,000 coastal communities 
nationwide in a foreseeable future (Lee 2010; PPACP 2008). Lee and Shin (2004) also 
submits that achieving this new mode of governance represents the only viable option 
available in improving the fisheries situation in Korea. Corresponding to these high 
expectations, a study of images stakeholders hold about the coastal fishery and their 
interactions can be undertaken to generate alternate insights as to the Jayul’s impeded 
progress and explore ways it can negotiate its challenges. 
 
Method and study design 
 
With the aim of providing a comprehensive account of stakeholders’ images operating in 
the governance system of Korea’s coastal fisheries, we designed and employed a semi-
structured survey to target a wide range of fishery stakeholders. A set of short questions 
was presented in the survey reflecting the four aspects of a fisheries system: the natural, 
the socio-economic, the governing system, and the governing interactions, as stipulated 
by interactive governance theory. This scheme, depicted in Fig. 2, follows the idea that 
images people form about something can be informed by various elements and challenged 
from multiple angles. In addition, images can be emblematic, and they are typically 
unverbalized and remain at the subconscious level. As follows, the survey design does not 
attempt to directly ask about images, while also giving respondents purposely little 
opportunity to contemplate about them. Instead, the questions seek to capture the first few 
words that come to their mind, as they likely are the most pressing ideas they have about 
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the fisheries reality. At the same time, more detailed expression is encouraged if the 
respondents feel inclined to elaborate on their responses. Lastly, the succinct phrasing of 
the questions helps to minimize response bias; thus the responses can be of any length 
and can cover any aspect of the systems in question. Each survey took about 10-15 
minutes on average to complete, offering a time-effective way of engaging a potentially 
large number of respondents. 
 
         
Fig. 2 Survey questions to elicit stakeholders’ images about fisheries and fishing life 
corresponding to four aspects of a governance system 
 
Respondent groups 
Fishery stakeholders targeted in the survey included government managers and 
researchers, as well as resource users and fishing community members, who are 
increasingly regarded as bona fide actors with different governing roles (Gray 2005; 
Johnsen 2013; Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001). In order to ensure a comprehensive array of 
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fishery experiences, fishing environments, and the varying level of involvement with the 
Jayul, respondents were drawn from multiple fishing communities. Final selection 
identified eight sites – four clusters of two communities, whose locations and attributes 
are displayed in Fig. 1 and Table 1, respectively. For instance, the eight studied 
communities show a diverse set of target fisheries ranging from clam-gleaning in 
intertidal mudflats in Bakmi-ri and Goongpyeong-ri, finfish-based boat fishery in Gusipo 
and Jiksan2-ri, to mussel culture in Gubok-ri and Sim-ri. Their involvement in the Jayul 
program also varies from zero to a decade-long participation. This inclusive setup is 
expected to hold the findings of the survey in greater relevance to the Korean coastal 
fishery as a whole, and induce more systematic comparisons between communities to 
tease out potential differences in images. 
 
Survey process 
The survey was conducted during fieldwork in South Korea in 2012. Participation with 
fishing community members was solicited in the public surroundings of fishing villages, 
such as streets and fishing wharves, as well as by visiting residential houses during 
daytime. Individual face-to-face survey was conducted to minimize any social pressure 
that may exist and hence influence their response. The community respondents comprised 
adult individuals, both male and female, involved in the production and marketing aspect 
of fishery, which include harvesters, processors, retailers, wholesalers, and retired fishers. 
Although their activities in the fishery as well as the level of dependence on the resources 
for supplementing livelihoods varied, they all drew direct or indirect income from 
fisheries. As shown in Table 1, 25 participants in each community was targeted using 
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quota sampling. Limited member size of communities and irregular work schedules of 
many members, for instance, served as practical constraints to random sample selection. 
Nevertheless, comparable demographic details across the eight communities were 
attained with respect to variables such as age, years in fishery and formal education, and 
gender composition (Table 1(b)). The survey with 25 government fishery managers and 
researchers took place in their respective offices scattered across the country. Informal 
chats with additional key informants and direct observation during 1 to 2 week long visits 
to each community were used to triangulate the data and thus complemented the survey 
process. 
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Table 1 (a) Fishery attributes and (b) demographic information of respondent groups 
 Resource dependent community 
Manager/ 
researcher  
 
(a) 
Bakmi-ri 
Goongpy
ong-ri 
Gusipo 
Dongho-
ri 
Giseong-
ri 
Jiksan2-
ri 
Gubok-ri Sim-ri Total 
Location 
West coast 
– north 
West coast 
– north 
West coast 
– south 
West coast 
– south 
East coast East coast 
South 
coast 
South 
coast 
All areas - 
Main fishery 
Clam, 
octopus, 
oyster 
Clam, 
octopus, 
finfish 
Crab, 
octopus, 
finfish, 
elver 
Crab, 
octopus, 
clam, elver 
Finfish, 
sea 
mustard, 
abalone 
Finfish, 
anchovy, 
sea 
mustard 
Mussel 
culture, 
finfish, 
octopus 
Mussel 
culture, 
finfish 
Oversees all 
fishery 
- 
Fishing 
environment 
Intertidal 
area 
Intertidal 
area, water 
column 
Water 
column, 
interdital 
area 
Water 
column, 
intertidal 
area 
Water 
column 
Water 
column 
Water 
column, 
intertidal 
area 
Water 
column 
Oversees all 
environment 
- 
Year joined the 
Jayul program 
2004 2007 2003 2007 2001 2006 Not joined Not joined - - 
Member size of 
Jayul community 
107 117 72 102 79 75 152
^
 101
^
 - - 
(b)           
# of respondents 
surveyed 
25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 225 
Male 15 19 23 22 20 19 23 23 23 187 
Female 10 6 2 3 5 6 2 2 2 38 
           
Average age
+
 61 61 54 60 64 59 57 59 49 - 
Age range* 39-82 40-79 26-82 37-81 50-80 35-80 39-78 39-77 31-65 - 
Years of fishery 
experience*  
3-60 6-60 1-50 1-55 1.5-50 0.5-55 5-60 4-40 1-44 - 
Years in formal 
education
+
 
9 9 8 8 9 9 10  9 17 - 
+
 denotes average; * denotes range;
 ^
 denotes member size of existing non-Jayul fisher organization (i.e., a fishing village cooperative) 
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Data analysis 
Data were analyzed using an inductive ‘thematic analysis’ procedure, appropriate for 
capturing intricate meanings and highlighting salient patterns within the data set, as 
described by Braun and Clarke (2006). Representing a more common and generic form of 
qualitative data analysis, it offers flexibility in working with various types of data, 
including the single-word responses or short expressions used in this study (Saldana 
2009). The data was first translated from Korean to English by the first author, who holds 
proficiency in both languages. All responses were transcribed and coded. Whenever a 
new code (i.e., category) was identified, previous responses were re‐examined to assess 
their relevancy and re-assigned as appropriate. The next phase involved searching for 
repeated common patterns (i.e., themes) and gathering the relevant coded responses 
within the identified themes. The resulting themes were reviewed and refined to ensure its 
representativeness of the coded data as well as its coherency to the overall story it 
generates. Lastly, we reviewed our findings with community leaders and key informants 
to confirm its validity. Under this scheme, each response represents an image on the 
wide-ranging aspects of the fishery/fishing life. The coded responses are organized into a 
set of identifiable categories, while the categories are then grouped into themes. The 
themes would therefore represent major areas of collective imagination that are invoked 
in stakeholders’ minds.  
 
Results 
 
Ten most widely-expressed image categories 
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The list of themes and categories emerged for each respondent group was compared with 
each other to search for commonality. This resulted in ten most widely-expressed 
categories across the groups, as shown in Fig. 3. Together with 18 additional categories, 
they make up a total of 11 themes observed in the overall responses (Table 2). Despite 
being less prevalent, according to the frequency of the coded responses, the additional 
categories have certain roles to play in shaping an individual or a group’s image about the 
fishery. Their importance would likely be contingent upon specific geographical and 
socio-economic contexts. The ten most frequently expressed categories are briefly 
illustrated, as they are organized according to the four aspects of a governance system.  
 
Table 2 11 image themes and 28 categories generated in the survey representing an 
inclusive range of stakeholders’ images about fisheries and fishing life  
Image theme Image category Positive (+), 
negative (–), 
or neutral (○) 
images? 
Corresponding 
aspects to a 
governance 
system* 
Cleanness of 
the environment 
Pollution and environmental degradation due 
to anthropogenic influences 
– N 
 Clean coastal environment + N 
 Action items for clean coastal environment ○ N 
Fish as natural 
resources 
Fish as resources, their productive functions 
and socio-economic benefits 
+ N-S 
 Resource depletion and overfishing – N 
 Management measures for fishery resources ○ N-G 
Sense of place Familiar, characteristic, and idyllic scenery ○ N-S 
 Connection of coastal environment to 
physical health and peace of mind 
+ N-S 
 Inadequate awareness and mindset about the 
sea and the fishery 
– N-S 
Fishing income 
and livelihood 
Economic and physical difficulties in fishing 
work 
– S 
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 Livelihood and income activities ○ S 
 Modest or content living + S 
Rural 
development 
issues  
Cultural and political marginalization, aging 
population, and development needs  
– S 
 Depleted expectation and hope – S 
    
Community 
cohesion 
Strong sense of community + S 
 Eroding community norms and social capital – S 
Government 
duties and 
structure 
Provision of assistance, advice, and fisher-
oriented policy 
○ S-G 
 Government organization and structure ○ G 
Enforcement of 
regulations 
Dissatisfaction and resentment towards coast 
guards 
– G 
 Law enforcement against illegal fishing ○ G 
Appraisal of 
government 
efforts 
Gratitude and appreciation for government + G-GI 
 Unhelpful and ineffective work – G-GI 
Differences in 
roles and 
perspectives 
Recognition of differences in roles and 
perspectives 
○ G-GI 
 Government as an inflexible armchair expert – G-GI 
Quality and 
quantity of 
interactions 
Close relationship, mutual dependence, and 
frequent communication 
+ GI 
 Breakdown in communication, and 
unproductive, hostile relationship 
– GI 
 Little or lack of interactions – GI 
 Hierarchical, vertical interactions ○ GI 
* N- natural system; S- socio-economic system; G- governing system; GI- governing 
interactions 
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Fig. 3 Ten widely-expressed categories that form the main images about fisheries and 
fishing life, as conceived by the surveyed stakeholders and prompted by the four aspects 
of a fisheries system 
 
Natural system 
Respondents frequently made reference to negative trends observed in the coastal and 
fisheries environment. They expressed concerns on human-driven pollution and 
environmental degradation through remarks such as “garbage/styrofoam”, “effluent 
discharge from upstream or shore-side factories”, “ghost gear”, “fish kills”, “oil spills”, 
“exotic species introduced through ballast water”, and “construction of a seawall/tide 
155 
 
embankment that disrupts sand and current movement and creates stagnant water in the 
blocked estuary”. Overfishing or resource depletion of local stocks was another 
dimension that constituted the image about environmental harm. At the same time, the 
positive notions of a productive resource system were also made explicit. “Lots of fish in 
the sea”, or the various fish species that are targeted and caught, such as mussel, flatfish, 
eel, swimming crab, octopus, and manila clam, were some of the direct responses for the 
natural system envisaged by the surveyed fishery stakeholders.  
 
Socio-economic-cultural system 
The socio-economic domain of fishery and fishing life was predominantly conjured up 
with reference to wealth generation, livelihood activities, and income concerns. On one 
hand, images focused on great or modest prosperity experienced in the fishery through 
remarks such as “life is okay even though income is not high”, “making a living and 
putting food on the table is not a big problem; it’s a calm, smooth life though not 
abundant”, and “the standard of living among fishers is still generally higher than 
farmers”. More frequently mentioned images, however, depicted harsh realities of a 
fishing life that relates to physically strenuous labor, vulnerable working environment, 
and concerns for income, retirement and livelihoods. Examples of responses directly 
spoke to this desolate picture: “living ‘paycheck to paycheck’ relying on each day’s 
earning”, “for me, there is no option but fishing, whether it works or not; I have to fish till 
the last day I am able to work”, “we are the poorest (in the society)”, “debts are a 
problem; fishing require loans to operate unlike agriculture, and there is no interest 
relief”, “fishing work is on the verge of extinction”, and “stagnant seafood price even 
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when the price of every other product is going up”. In addition, wider cultural and rural 
development deficiencies contributed to the way socio-economic sphere is 
conceptualized. Aging fisher population is a dominant element as indicated by comments 
such as “young people are leaving; if I were younger, I would have left too; it’s sad but 
true”, “with aging population, there is no vision for the future” and “soon there will be no 
one to go out on boats”. Too few recreational and cultural amenities as well as inadequate 
education and health facilities were also mentioned. On a bigger societal scale, fishery 
was viewed as a marginalized sector through comments such as “support to fisheries 
being placed on a low priority compared to cattle raising and agricultural industries”, and 
“macro policies such as Free Trade Agreements promoting national interests but at the 
expense of primary industries such as fisheries”. 
 
Governing system 
The central government has been a major governance actor in the fishery through a 
hierarchical management system that has been in effect since 1908, when the first 
Fisheries Act was introduced (MIFAFF 2012). In this study, its presence was found to be 
framed in two main streams of viewpoints. First, many respondents spoke about 
government’s organization, roles, and responsibilities, with an emphasis on the services 
they provide to fishers and communities. Provision of financial and technical assistance, 
policy guidance, instruction and educational sessions, together with enforcement and 
safety-at-sea activities by the coast guard formed a key area of attention informing the 
ways respondents imagine the coastal fishery. The other prevailing notion displayed a 
sentiment highly critical of government’s work. Though not all comments were as stark 
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as this: “they are thieves; fisheries research institutes and government fisheries 
departments should all be gotten rid of”, many still decried government’s ineffectiveness, 
insensitivity and inflexibility. For example, statements like “what they do fail to create 
any substantial help to fishers”, “the coast guard conducts excessive enforcement of 
regulation on small-scale fishers; they should give a break to small boats”, and “it’s all an 
armchair talk; what they know and do is useless, ineffective, and theoretical; it simply 
doesn’t fit with the reality” are illustrations of the typical images characterizing this 
dominant narrative. 
 
Governing interactions 
With regard to the relationship between governing authority and fishing community, two 
opposing themes, one favourable of the relationship and the other not, were identified to 
contribute most to the interactions that give rise to image formation. The more prevalent 
of the two framed their interactions as inadequate, infrequent, and antagonistic. Words 
observed in the data such as conflict, distrust, discord, protest, resentment, and hostility 
found in the responses succinctly characterize this viewpoint. A portion of the 
government managers/researchers’ responses were also shown to hold a similar view, 
illustrating the relationship through phrases such as “oil and water” and “two parallel 
lines that never meet (unfortunately) which symbolize continuing efforts by the 
government and fishers, but separately and with different trajectories of thoughts”. 
Among the community respondents, comments such as “there is little contact (with the 
government), so I don’t know” and “interactions are virtually non-existent; maybe for an 
education session, but even that is perhaps once a year, and I have no business that brings 
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me to visit the fisheries office” also occupied a substantial share of the responses. They 
imply, not only inadequate interactions prevail, but also that having no relationship can 
deprive fishers of any image (e.g., neither positive nor negative) towards the governing 
system. On the other hand, a view that suggests positive and improved interactions was 
also present. Some respondents highlighted close relationship, mutual understanding and 
dependence, frequent communication, active cooperation, and little confrontation, among 
others. For instance, community respondents in Sim-ri and Gubok-ri submitted that 
“government fisheries office exists because fishers exist; they treat fishers much better 
these days”, and “there are now many possible (fishery-related) organizations to interact 
with”. In addition, a statement by a government fisheries officer, which says “the 
relationship should be like a large push cart where one pushes and one pulls as they move 
together; government can lead and fishers can make suggestions”, further describes the 
positive interactions in the envisioning of the fishery. Such image also provides a fertile 
ground for the implementation of the Jayul co-management system. 
 
Dimensions of stakeholders’ images 
The results of the survey point to several dimensions about the general characteristics of 
stakeholders’ images, as summarized in Fig. 4, thus preparing us for a better 
understanding of what we look for in images and how to make use of them in governance 
processes. First, it was observed that there are positive, neutral, and negative images. In 
fact, what was most striking is that often the same issue is presented in all three senses, as 
shown in Table 2. For instance, the good quality of the natural environment could conjure 
up a hopeful image of “a tidy, clean and pretty coastal village”, while other responses are 
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framed in a negative connotation by emphasizing polluting elements and environmental 
degradation. It is also possible that neutral images are brought forward as in the response 
of “garbage recycling”. Thus, it appears that images may carry a certain degree of value 
judgments, which influence people’s outlook on a given subject matter. What determines 
their disposition in the first place and how the positive or negative responses contribute to 
certain governance outcomes are two of the potential research questions that can further 
illuminate the usefulness of images. 
Secondly, images can overlap between the different aspects of a fisheries system, as 
listed in Table 2. While the four systems are used in the survey as prompts to guide 
responses, a significant portion of the images generated here are shown to be connected to 
more than one system and imbued with multiple meanings. For example, a theme labeled 
‘sense of place’ bridges the natural and social system by creating images that pertain to 
emotional well-being and physical health gained from a clean coastal environment and 
rural lifestyle. Responses such as “living in this coastal environment, my mind opens up 
and I feel refreshed and relieved” and “this is a longevity village; we have clean air which 
is good for our health” serve as an illustration of this characteristic. Additionally, a 
particular image of stock enhancement was mentioned with reference to several different 
contexts. Regarding the natural system, it was conjured up as a remedy to the 
environmental condition of depleted natural fish stocks. In the context of socio-economic 
system, it was prompted as an income boosting project. Similarly, it can also hold the 
meaning of a government initiative, or as a combination of all of these. Images therefore 
likely reflect a complex reality, similar to what Jentoft et al. (2012) presents in their 
model of stakeholders’ images about marine protected areas. The fact that images may 
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not fit neatly into a single category, and that they can lend themselves to different and 
multiple interpretation is something to be recognized in governance. 
In addition, images are also shown to have a time dimension, representing past or 
future conditions as well as embodying current affairs. People not only describe what they 
see happening in the present time in their images, but may also reflect on what they saw 
and experienced in the past to highlight any changes. Furthermore, images may capture 
what people envisage as a future possibility or what they would like to see, thereby 
prescribing how things ought to be. Subsequently, images can often have the look and 
feel of ‘causes’ and ‘solutions’ about an issue. Responses about governing interactions 
provide an example. One image problematizes a past relationship, “in which the 
government was standing at a higher ground looking down at fishers while fishers 
looking up to the government personnel”. Another image depicts “a need for a proper 
notice, an explanation of new or changed regulations in advance by the government, and 
not simply focusing on law enforcement and issuing fines” as a suggestion towards a new 
and improved form of interactions. 
Finally, it is also observed that images may describe an activity as something that is 
action-based, as opposed to a portrayal of ‘how things are’ that explains the state of 
affairs. In the socio-economic realm, prevailing responses drew an image of various 
livelihood activities taking place in a fishing community, from “going to the beach and 
collecting oyster and clam with simple gear”, and “throwing a large rock out from the 
boat as part of casting anchovy nets”. Another group of images was formed visualizing 
difficult conditions in coastal fisheries, which depicted stagnant seafood prices, 
productivity-deprived fishing grounds, tough and physically-demanding nature of fishing 
161 
 
work especially in the cold and dangerous sea, and an unpredictable income inflow, 
among others. Therefore, images might be directly associated with action or instead 
provide a context from which action could arise. 
To this effect, all images can be situated within the continuum of these four 
dimensions and classified accordingly. Thinking about images in this way is expected to 
provide a helpful avenue with which their implications to governance issues can be 
clarified and elucidated. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Four dimensions of stakeholder images outlining their general characteristics as 
identified in this study 
 
Implications for the Jayul program 
 
The image themes and categories represent areas to consider in reflecting on past 
governance processes and formulating future directions, as they tell us concerns, 
aspirations, and otherwise salient features to which fisheries stakeholders find important 
or influential. Based on the results and the observed community characteristics, we 
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present three major areas of discussion and illustrate the potential utility of exploring 
stakeholder images in drawing out Jayul governance implications. Specifically, we seek 
to explain what aspects of the Jayul program align with the fishery stakeholders’ images 
of the fishery and their fishing lives, and what disagree; how images help make sense of 
the current progresses and challenges of the program, and which images need to be 
addressed in promoting its sustenance and effectiveness. 
 
Strengthening local environmental stewardship amid macro coastal development  
First, all fishery stakeholder groups identified pollution as a widespread problem to the 
local fishery by citing a large range of polluting elements. Further, they held aspirations 
towards a clean coastal environment, which also connects to increases in resource 
productivity and human health. This is one of the prevailing themes where stakeholder 
images closely align with the intent of the Jayul program and also where progress at the 
local level has been made. Various cleanup activities have been a key component of Jayul 
activities emphasized and practiced over the years with many communities engaging in 
monthly coastal clean ups (MOMAF 2003, 2005; Uchida et al. 2010). For instance, in the 
two of the Jayul communities studied in this study (Gusipo and Giseong-ri), noticeable 
differences in coastal tidiness was observed. Gusipo, in particular, has constructed a 
garbage/ghost gear collection point in the central area of their harbour, which has greatly 
contributed to cleaning up the shore and enhancing resource productivity in the nearby 
water.  
A sub-set of images in the ‘pollution and environmental degradation’ category 
concerning macro anthropogenic processes may, however, show that local stewardship 
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can be thwarted by the occurrence of large-scale coastal development activities. The 
effects of these macro developments are often far-reaching and even irreversible, as they 
create a direct impact on the natural and socio-economical make-up of fishing 
communities (Choi 1998; Kang et al. 2004). Construction of a seawall which blocks an 
estuary or a nuclear power plant which affects seawater temperature, for instance, may 
overwhelm and discourage an individual or a community to the extent that their 
stewardship initiative and commitment to act with their images of clean local 
environment is compromised. For example, rubbish, burning of garbage, and rotting old 
gear were widely observed in the harbour in Sim-ri, a non-participant in the Jayul 
program. A reason for inaction inferred from the images of community members could be 
that Sim-ri opens up to highly industrialized Masan bay, one of the most polluted bays in 
Korea (Rye et al. 2011). Being confronted with more than 30 years of chronic pollution 
and contamination problems may have caused coastal inhabitants to feel powerless 
against the large-scale projects and to become disillusioned about local cleanup activities. 
A fisher respondent in Sim-ri elaborated on this image by stating that “acting to prevent 
pollution is difficult, as the industry is first configured to produce pollution; things that 
we manufacture are in the end all pollutants, and disposing them on land eventually all 
ends up in the sea”. He added that “in his fishing practice and daily living on the coast, he 
knows what to do and what not to do, but finds it all difficult to prevent the sea from 
getting polluted”. Thus, as these images reveal, ensuring the environmental goals of the 
Jayul program would benefit from paying greater attention to the (negative) impacts of 
large-scale development processes. This point further reminds us the importance of 
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considering the Jayul program in the larger context of macro socio-economic policy and 
regional traits. 
 
Addressing livelihood concerns and dependence on government intervention 
Income motives and improvement of livelihoods were identified as another leading theme 
in the stakeholders’ images about the fishery. Consistent with this, generating direct 
benefits to community members through non-trivial income increase has been one of the 
principal aims of the Jayul (Lee 2010), and is presumed to be a prerequisite or the 
‘bottom line’ for keeping communities motivated and interested in carrying out the Jayul 
activities. To this end, through the financial and advisory support of the government and 
non-governmental organizations, there has been a sustained effort involving projects such 
as stock enhancement activities, construction of drying and icing facilities, and tourism 
ventures (MOMAF 2005).  
From the results of this study, it also became clear that respondents including both 
fishers and managers/researchers hold strong images of government assistance and 
intervention as being integral to the fishing life. With examples such as “advice, 
guidance, instruction, leadership”, “government support for subsidized fuel and gear 
repair”, “law enforcement against illegal fishing by coast guards”, and “stock 
enhancement by releasing juveniles”, the prevalence of this image category could 
represent a recognition of the roles that government can play, and perhaps should 
continue to play to a degree, even with the active implementation of the Jayul program. 
On the other hand, the issue of government compensation has surfaced as a thorny 
subject for both Jayul and non-Jayul communities. Given the macro-societal preference 
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for large-scale coastal development concerning land reclamation and industrial 
construction in Korea (Yoon and Yeo 2005), compensation for the damages incurred to 
fishing has become a topic of intense pursuit and scrutiny among fishers, as it could allow 
them to acquire instant wealth (Lee 2008, 2011). The compensation is in large part 
granted on an individual basis, which may lead to competition and jealousy among 
fishers, and weakening of community unity. It also presents little incentive for a 
community to organize as a group, and is therefore considered a major impediment to the 
community’s decision to join the Jayul program. As a key informant overseeing the Jayul 
program at the national level confided, “once the compensation relating to the 
development project becomes a possibility or is applied to a community, the community 
cannot usually mobilize itself to participate in the Jayul”. Also, in order to be subject to a 
maximum compensation amount, a community tends to shy away from being associated 
with another government assistance-linked scheme (such as the Jayul). Such dependence 
on government intervention shown through the stakeholders’ images helps explain and 
reaffirm the challenges the Jayul has faced in establishing itself as a voluntary and 
nationwide initiative and acts to substantiate the doubts raised about the self-directedness 
of the Jayul communities. 
 
Engendering cordiality and balance of power in governing interactions 
The images also suggested that fishery stakeholders’ view of the governing authority was 
greatly shaped by the interactions with the coast guard. While the coast guard’s role was 
acknowledged and appreciated by some, a prevailing response of the community 
respondents objected to the way they carried out their work. As they protest against too 
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much interference and inflexibility in enforcing rules, such images represent a concern to 
Jayul implementation. An excessive system of regulation and sanction may stifle the 
spirit of co-management and create an antagonistic environment in which the coast guard 
is dreaded as a dominant authority figure to be complied with or a nuisance to be avoided, 
rather than a governing partner. For example, responses such as “coast guards look down 
on fishers; fishers go through an insulting and bitter experience” and “the new coast guard 
office was set up here in Gubok-ri a few years ago, and now law enforcement has been 
too severe; this is making things way too inconvenient and it is tiring to always watch for 
their action” depict the coast guard as an unwelcomed actor in the minds of fishers. Even 
the fishers in Bakmi-ri and Gusipo, who maintain a well-established Jayul program with 
generally productive relations with the coast guard, were shown to discreetly break 
certain rules and avoid contact with the coast guard whenever possible.  
A similar observation can be made about government managers and researchers. 
According to the images of community respondents, the governing authority was 
effectively reduced to ‘armchair experts’, who may be well-versed in the theory and be 
proficient in working out the numbers, but are out of touch with on-the-ground realities 
and have little understanding of the contextual details.  
At a more superficial level, a so-called “image makeover” would be useful in 
dispelling the negative and hostile representation of the governing authority and branding 
themselves as working partners. This may be achieved through enabling frequent field 
visits and providing institutional support that rewards flexibility in rule enforcement. But 
these images on governing interactions are most likely rooted in a more entrenched 
power-suffused relationship amongst actors. Community responses such as “fishers need 
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to follow government’s guidance and do what it tells them to do” and “as long as fishers 
follow the law, there is no problem” exemplify such viewpoint that assumes the 
government’s role as a leader and the fishing communities’ subordinate position. 
Addressing this fundamental issue would require a structural adjustment that stretches 
beyond the perimeters of the Jayul. For one, it would involve relinquishing some 
managerial grip on the part of the governors and accepting higher autonomy in decision-
making on the part of those-being-governed (see Chapter 6). Dealing with power would 
not be necessarily about creating a power-neutral situation, but to recognize its dynamics 
and strive towards a productive balance of power. Adopting a mindset of humility by 
managers and researchers might be the first step required to foster this cognitive shift. 
With growing confidence and prosperity through successful Jayul organization, fishing 
communities may also feel empowered thereby elevating the images of themselves. As 
this analysis shows, stakeholder interactions, characterized with friction and antipathy, 
appear prevalent. In order to help foster a more horizontal mode of fisheries governance 
consistent with the aims of the Jayul program, engendering cordiality and balance of 
power would represent an area requiring appropriate consideration. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study is an exploratory assessment of the stakeholder images in the South Korean 
coastal fisheries. The objective is two-fold: to derive inductively the major thematic 
contents of their images, and at the same time to delineate the general characteristics of 
images as they surface from an empirical setting. The scope of this inquiry was therefore 
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set deliberately broad, involving a wide range of fishery stakeholders, minimally-phrased 
probing questions, and an open topic that deals with fishery and fishing life as a whole. 
The simple and succinct research design adopted in this study is suited for targeting a 
greater number of respondents (over multiple study sites) and geared towards eliciting 
dominant images. Comparisons among communities of diverse geographical and 
governance setup are also enabled. As it offers a different type of image analysis, we 
expect this design can serve as a supplement to an extensive ethnographic research that 
involves full-length interviews and sustained interaction. 
Based on this method, the elicitation of images generated a diverse array of themes 
and categories. Not only reaching into different facets of a fisheries system, images are 
also shown to simultaneously represent multiple situations with blurred thematic 
boundaries. Other dimensions of images include positive, negative, or neutral 
connotations attached to them, and action-oriented versus depicting the state of things. 
Moreover, images are imbued with a time component: their expression is grounded in 
past events, current trends, or future aspirations, which can be framed as causes or 
solutions to an issue in mind. 
Through these characteristics, images tell us what is on stakeholders’ minds as the 
underlying concerns and aspirations about the issues in question and the world at large, 
forming basis for people’s decisions and actions. Therefore, images help explain why a 
certain fisheries condition comes about and offer an indication of how it should proceed. 
A discussion of the key images in the South Korean coastal fishery, together with the 
observed features of the visited communities, give details to why the voluntary 
implementation of the Jayul program has been faced with difficulty: (1) impacts of large-
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scale coastal development and macro policy trends may thwart the promotion of local 
environmental stewardship; (2) government assistance and intervention is still seen 
integral to maintaining the fishery and fishing life; and (3) power-suffused and 
antagonistic interactions are widespread leading to mistrust and unproductiveness in the 
relationship between government/university and fishing community. It is conceivable that 
all three images are linked and could interact to create a combined effect. Likewise, the 
diversity of stakeholder images would pose similar challenges of having to make sense of 
multiple perspectives, but it also may reveal synergistic opportunities in identifying how a 
fisheries system can be made more governable. We submit that a closer inspection of the 
images is a useful undertaking in deepening an understanding of governance initiatives, 
and thus we encourage continuing exploration into this topic. 
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case of South Korean coastal fisheries 
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Abstract 
Institutions are structural constraints that provide regularity, reduce uncertainty and shape 
people’s interactions, acting to enable or hinder governance change. This is relevant to 
the fisheries context, with various forms of institutional arrangements, such as co-
management, being initiated to promote a transition from a hierarchical, centralized 
system to a more collaborative form of resource governance. In this article, governance 
transition in South Korea’s coastal fisheries, facilitated by the ‘Jayul Community 
Fisheries Management’ program, is studied. Its institutional aims are the focus of the 
analysis, followed by how they align with the ‘mindsets’ of fishery stakeholders, which 
forms part of the local context. Such features and their relationship are important areas to 
consider in understanding how this governance transition would work in practice. Taking 
a broad approach to analyze institution, the study includes not only the more-frequently-
researched regulative aspect, such as rules and law enforcement, but also the normative 
and cultural-cognitive dimensions, which consider social norms and cultural images. The 
results describe partial, and at times acute, mismatches between these components, and 
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help to highlight the impeded progress of the Jayul implementation. Overall, this article 
demonstrates the care needed in attuning institutions to people’s underlying ideas, and 
suggests possible pathways promoting a range of institutional aims, which can be used to 
contextualize various community setups existing in the fishery. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Modern governance concept has recently been applied to fisheries, as a new way to 
address an increasingly vulnerable resource status, illegal fishing, and acute socio-
economic issues such as poverty and marginalization, (Béné and Neiland, 2006; 
Chuenpagdee, 2011; Folke et al., 2005; Kooiman et al., 2005; Sissenwine and Mace, 
2003). This has meant an increased emphasis on stakeholder participation, setting of clear 
visions and operating principles, and devolution of authority and responsibility, among 
others. The typically-held hierarchical, unilateral governing of the central government 
buttressed by the regulation and enforcement regime is giving way to consensus, trust, 
and cooperation-based mechanisms entailing more direct involvement of multiple actors 
and resource user groups (Meuleman, 2008). Not many would disagree with this 
transition need, especially for fisheries governance given the complexity of the issues, 
although many researchers and practitioners may still have questions about its efficacy. 
For instance, co-management can be path-dependent, meaning that outcomes may have 
already been largely determined by the time it was conceived and initiated (Chuenpagdee 
and Jentoft, 2007). There are also social and political concerns arising during 
implementation such as the participation paradox (Suárez de Vivero et al., 2008), elite 
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capture (Platteau and Abraham, 2002), and the lack of capacity of resource user 
communities (Fabricius et al., 2007). Consequently, less fruitful attempts at governance 
change have been observed around the world (e.g., Cheong, 2005; Cudney-Bueno and 
Basurto, 2009; Pinkerton, 1999; Scholtz et al., 1998). In achieving fishery sustainability, 
these challenges point to a need for a comprehensive analysis of the governance situation 
in order to foster a shift towards a more effective collaboration and local resource users’ 
participation.  
Part of the analysis of governance change concerns the institutional domain. Most 
commonly defined as structural constraints that provide regularity, reduce uncertainty and 
shape people’s interactions, institutions create an enabling or controlling environment for 
governing decisions and actions (Chuenpagdee and Song, 2012 or Chapter 3). Through 
its inertia and stability, institutions can work to resist change and reinforce the status quo 
(Scott, 2008). Yet, they can also trigger positive feedback, thus serving as a catalyst in 
bringing changes to the system. ‘Getting institutions right’ would hence be an important 
task for any governors concerned with reaching their new or established governing goals.   
Given the premise that institutions play a crucial role in affecting how governance 
takes shape and operates, this article aims to demonstrate its relevance by undertaking an 
institutional analysis of a co-management system in South Korean coastal fisheries. 
Governance transition has been undergoing in Korea’s fisheries through an 
implementation of a new institutional arrangement called ‘Jayul Community Fisheries 
Management’ program (hereafter referred to as ‘the Jayul’). Though top-down in nature, 
there is a firm belief among government officers and academic researchers that an active 
and meaningful participation of fishers in the management of local fishery can be ensured 
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if and when the ‘change in mindset’ of fishers takes place. In other words, embracing a 
new set of convictions consistent with the aims of the Jayul on the part of fishers is 
regarded as a necessary condition for ushering in a more collaborative form of 
governance. Recognizing this critical link to a successful governance transition, this 
article approaches the feasibility of the change in mindset from an institutional 
perspective. More specifically, the analysis focuses on what the Jayul program aims to 
promote, what mechanisms it relies on for its implementation, how its aims match the 
existing ‘mindset’ of fishery stakeholders, and what effects the mismatch creates towards 
the ‘mindset change’ as well as governance transition. A broad approach to analyze 
institution advanced by Scott (2008), which has been recently introduced to the field of 
fisheries, is utilized in this research in order to gain deeper insights into these inquiries.  
The article commences with an elaboration of institution as drawn from interactive 
governance theory and the analytical framework as informed by Scott (2008). Following 
a description of the empirical setting and the method, the results section traces the key 
institutional elements that the Jayul program embodies and attempts to foster in the 
coastal fisheries. Next, how the institutional aims match the prevailing mindsets of the 
fishery stakeholder groups is described using examples from South Korea, based also on 
the studies about their values, principles and images (see Chapters 4 and 5). Lastly, the 
article concludes with discussion about the implications for the program’s future 
implementation and a reflection on this institution-mindset linked approach and its 
potential contribution to fisheries governance in general. 
 
2. Theory and analytical framework 
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Kooiman et al. (2005)’s interactive governance theory considers institutions one of the 
central aspects in governance: 
[governance is] the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal 
problems and create societal opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of 
principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them (Kooiman et 
al., 2005, p. 17). 
Governance relies on the proper functioning of institutions to maintain its structure and to 
enable societal interactions. But the reverse is also true; the functioning of institutions is 
also contingent upon specific governance circumstances within which they are situated. 
According to the above definition, ‘caring for’ institutions is a necessary part of 
governance undertaking, implying that institutions are not stand-alone entities but meshed 
into a wider societal and historical context. Institutions therefore require a context-based 
treatment as to their design and implementation. For example, despite the best intention 
and careful design, an institutional arrangement such as co-management might be stymied 
by a lingering culture of distrust between government and fishers (Pinkerton, 1999). Also, 
disjuncture in regulations between different levels of government can create legal 
loopholes that can nullify the community-based management of a local fishery (Cudney-
Bueno and Basurto, 2009). As highlighted in the case of South Korea, the ‘mindset’ of 
fishers could constitute another crucial part of the cultural context (Chapter 4 and 5), 
which the design and implementation of co-management could therefore consider.  
In this analysis, a mindset is conceptualized to comprise three meta-governance 
concepts – values, images, or principles. Generally underpinning the cognitive and 
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normative internal decision- and action-generating process, they appear to have distinct 
roles to play and occupy different thematic niches in one’s mindset and, i.e., (1) general 
value priorities of an individual, (2) his or her images about the world/fishery, and (3) 
governance principles he/she subscribes to (see Chapter 2). 
The people’s mindset and the institutional arrangement (represented by the meta- 
and the second order of governance, respectively, according to the interactive governance 
perspective, see Chapter 1) can be theorized to hold a coupled relationship. Institutions 
delimit individual freedom and thought processes while individuals take strategic actions, 
reflecting their underlying values, images and principles, to create, maintain, and 
transform institutions (Giddens, 1984; Kjaer, 2004; Scott, 2008). This ‘structure-agency’ 
duality becomes even more pronounced in the context of change. Talcott Parsons submits 
that institutionalization takes place when people shed their idiosyncratic mindsets and 
begin to conform and orient themselves to a common set of normative standards and 
value patterns (Scott, 2008). In other words, individuals internalize these established 
shared norms so that they hold them as the private basis for their action. At the same time, 
institutions also evolve, and “much of that evolution comes about as a result of the 
somewhat disparate values of individuals who are recruited into the institution” (Peters, 
1999, p.149). The disparate values may spark innovation and controversy inducing 
changes in institutions themselves. From this, instituting co-management would be about 
two things: (1) affecting members’ mindsets so that they align with the institutional 
structures and aims (i.e., structure informing agency); and (2) institutional arrangements 
being designed and practiced in accord with the mindsets of fisheries stakeholders (i.e., 
agency informing structure). Hence, an analysis that examines the match between the co-
181 
 
management and people’s mindsets would help highlight this reciprocal interaction. 
Further, an understanding of the content and the extent of mismatches, for example, is 
expected to provide insights about the feasibility of the mindset change and eventually the 
governability of the co-management implementation. 
Many fisheries scholars have taken an interest in institutions. In particular, the 
resolution of collective action problems in common pool resources arguably forms the 
most prominent and influential angle of study of fisheries institutions thus far in both 
coastal settings (e.g., Basurto, 2005; Caballero Miguez et al., 2008; Ostrom, 1990) as well 
as the high seas (e.g. Berkes et al. 2006, Hanna 1999). More recently, however, a new 
trend has emerged in fisheries research, which highlights a broadening purview of 
institution (Chapter 3). Drawing from a scheme formulated by Scott (2008), authors such 
as Jentoft (2004) and de la Torres-Castro and Lindström (2010) have called for a more 
balanced analysis that not only focuses on the regulative dimension most closely 
associated with the common pool resource inquiry, but also normative and cultural-
cognitive aspects, which have largely remained peripheral in institutional discourse. As 
such, institutions grounded in cultural habits, social taboos, or religious beliefs, for 
example, can equally create a robust effect on shaping fishers’ actions as much as what 
formal and informal rules and incentives might prescribe.  
 Specifically, the broad-based analytical framework defines institution as 
comprising three ‘pillars’ – regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. According to 
Scott (2008), the regulative pillar is concerned with setting regulatory frameworks and 
enforcing them. It relies on the mechanisms of rules, incentives and sanctions to shape 
people’s actions. It is expedient and coercive in nature, arousing self-interest as well as 
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fear of punishment. The normative pillar involves defining goals and designating 
appropriate ways to pursue them through activation of values and norms. It appeals to 
social obligation and conformity as opposed to the benefit-cost calculations of regulative 
rule. Binding expectations are at work, and feelings of shame or pride are activated. The 
cultural-cognitive pillar emphasizes the extent to which action is informed and 
constrained by shared knowledge and common belief systems. Under this view, 
compliance would occur because other types of behavior are simply inconceivable and 
unorthodox. Relying on symbols and culturally-supported images to give meanings, 
routines are followed because they are taken-for-granted as simply the way things are 
done. Together, they define legal, moral and cultural boundaries of people’s actions 
(Scott 2008). It is acknowledged that “each element is important and, sometimes, one or 
another will dominate, but more often – in robust institutional frameworks – they work in 
combination” (ibid., p. 47).  
 
3. Description of the empirical setting and methods 
 
3.1. General characteristics of South Korean coastal fisheries 
South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea) is located in the southern part of the 
Korean Peninsula in the Northwest Pacific region (Fig. 1). Endowed with productive 
fishing grounds in all three adjacent seas – the West Sea, the East Sea, and the Korea 
Strait which joins onto the East China Sea (Kang, 2006), fishing has naturally taken place 
from ancient times, and helped satisfy much of the domestic fish consumption demands 
over the years (Hong, 1995). Fish occupies an integral part of Koreans’ dietary life and 
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intimately connected to their culture even to this date. According to data recorded since 
1960s, fish has consistently contributed over 40-50% of the animal protein intake per 
capita per day (Han, 2009). On the production side, Korea ranked 13
th
 in the world in 
2010 with inclusion of seaweed production (FAO, 2012). In the coastal fishery, there are 
nearly 150 target species of commercial significance, which include squid, mackerel, and 
blue crab, as well as a wide variety of shellfish and seaweeds (Kang, 2006). Also, with 
over 28 licensed fishing gear types permitted in coastal fishery, it has the strong character 
of multi-gear (Han, 2009). 
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Fig. 1 Map of South Korea (community sites are shown as double circles; triangles 
indicate survey locations with managers/researchers) 
 
3.2. Governance history and structure 
In the pre-modern period, many inshore fishing grounds were privatized by clans and 
village authorities. With the beginning of the Japanese occupation of Korea in 1911, the 
colonial government took over and restructured Korean fisheries by introducing fishing 
rights and laws and also founded fisheries cooperatives at the village level (known as 
185 
 
uchon-gyes). This shift endowed the government with an exclusive power to grant and 
manage licenses and effectively placed the colonial state in charge of overall fisheries 
management (Cheong, 2004). Following independence in 1945 the post-colonial 
government inherited much of the colonial setup, and the fishery has been chiefly 
operated under the overarching direction of the central government, which sets 
regulations, issues licenses, enforces rules, and provides benefits and subsidies to 
communities (Cheong, 2004; Hong, 1995). A common classification of coastal fishery 
emanating from this management tradition specifies three types of fishing, i.e., license-, 
permit-, and report-based (see Chapter 1 for more details). First, license-based fisheries 
include those taking place in intertidal and nearshore areas such as shellfish and seaweed 
gleaning, fixed gear operation, and aquaculture. The harvesting privileges are licensed to 
lawful holders allowing them to maintain exclusive management and fishing rights to a 
designated area. Much of the areas subject to licenses are ‘village-owned’ fishing 
grounds. They are governed by respective fishing village cooperatives (i.e., uchon-gyes), 
who therefore have been the main occupants of this fishery. More recently, however, the 
licenses are increasingly being conferred or leased out to private individuals to operate 
the fixed gear or aquaculture in keeping with the rising scale of production and capital 
investment (Cheong, 2003a). The second type of fishery involves fishing using vessels 
and gears in the inshore and offshore waters. Regulated through issuance and withdrawal 
of quinquennial fishing permits by the county and city governments, the permits are held 
by individual fishers, who may be members of uchon-gyes and/or sector-specific fishing 
gear associations. The third type is called ‘report’ fishery. Although it has the highest 
number of certificate holders (121,453 in 2009) among the three types, it forms a minor 
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part, as it allows fishers to carry out smaller-scale, rudimentary type of fishing operations 
on an individual basis. City or county government responds to requests of each fisher by 
issuing a certificate which is valid for five years (MIFAFF, 2012). In addition to the 
above, other instruments of the centrally coordinated fisheries management regime 
include technical regulations (e.g. mesh size, catch size, and closed seasons) and the Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC). 
 
3.3. Jayul Management Fisheries Community – ‘the Jayul’ 
In recent decades, it has become increasingly evident that the 50 years of government-
centered management is proving inadequate to account for diverse regional 
characteristics, and resolve various challenges such as stock depletion, illegal fishing, and 
decline of coastal villages (Cheong, 2003b; Han, 2009). In addition, fishers were prone to 
rely on the central government for subsidy and policy direction (Lee, 2010). As a 
response to the ineffective management regime, the central government initiated a 
nationwide program called the Jayul in 2001. This new institutional arrangement aims to 
raise the level of community participation in managing local fisheries and ultimately to 
instill a sense of ownership among resource users (Lee et al., 2006; MOMAF, 2003). 
Jayul, meaning free will in Korean, is a type of placed-based co-management program 
where government sets out policy guidelines and provides financial and technical 
assistance, while a local fisher organization drafts and carries out a management plan for 
their fishery. 
Since its inception a decade ago, the number of community fisher organizations 
participating in the program has seen an over 10-fold increase to reach 893 in 2011, and 
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there have been several exemplary cases in which fishing income has increased and 
illegal fishing has subsided through this process (MOMAF, 2005; Uchida et al., 2010). 
Yet, doubts have also been raised as to whether this governance reform is genuinely 
taking root (OECD 2011). Many Jayul communities exist only on paper with no 
substantial follow-up activities (Seo and Byeon, 2006). In addition, a financial incentive 
system that the central government has set up to entice fishing community organizations 
to join in and keep up with the activities could be promoting further reliance on 
government, negating its original intention. For instance, there is a worry that 
discontinuation of the funding or facing low prospect of receiving financial benefits may 
arouse negative sentiments towards continuation in the program and induce communities 
to lapse back into inaction (Lee, 2010).  
Such concerns underscore the challenges facing the implementation of the Jayul 
program. The central government has expressed the ambition of broadening its 
participation and benefits to 1,400 fisher organizations by 2014 and to nearly all 2,000 
coastal communities nationwide in a foreseeable future (Lee, 2010; PPACP, 2008). The 
initiative is supported by government officers and researchers, such as Lee and Shin 
(2004) who submit that achieving this new mode of governance represents the only viable 
option available in improving the fisheries situation in Korea. Corresponding to these 
high expectations, there is a need for a thorough understanding of the Jayul program and 
its interactions with fishing communities. To this effect, this article looks at what the 
Jayul program is set up to institute and how it fits with the mindset of the fishery 
stakeholder groups. 
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3.4 Study methods 
Primary and secondary data for this study was collected during two fieldtrips to South 
Korea in 2009-2012. A review of written documents (including academic papers, 
government reports, and media articles), informal chats with key informants, and direct 
observation were used for the analysis of the Jayul as an institutional arrangement. The 
study of people’s mindset was conducted using a mixed-method survey which targeted 
two groups: fisheries resource dependent community members (n=200) and government 
managers/academic researchers/non-governmental consultants (n=25) (see Chapter 4 
and 5 for full details). Fig. 1 shows the various survey locations. By using a set of latent 
concepts – values, images, and principles – to represent one’s mindset, the survey elicited 
participants’ underlying aspirations and concerns, their understanding of the operational 
guidelines for the fishery, and their outlook on the fishing life in general. Much of the 
data collection, including the survey and the document analysis, was carried out in 
Korean language by the author who holds proficiency in the language. 
 
4. Results 
 
The result presents the institutional aims of the Jayul program as shown on the official 
documents and as reflected by key informants. They are related to all three pillars of 
institution under the scheme of Scott (2008). First, the cultural-cognitive elements are 
introduced, followed by the aims that characterize the normative aspect. Lastly, the key 
regulative components of the Jayul are assessed. The subsequent section explores the 
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(mis-)match between the aims and the mindset by pairing up the three pillars with the 
meta-governance concepts. A summary is provided in Table 1.  
 
4.1 Institutional aims of the Jayul 
4.1.1 Cultural-cognitive elements 
The Jayul, first and foremost, aims to foster self-reliance and local-initiatives among 
resource user communities. The term Jayul stands for ‘free will’, ‘on one’s own 
initiative’, or ‘autonomous’. A government publication (PPACP, 2008, p.9) sets out a 
vision for the Jayul as: “with minimum control and involvement of the central 
government, fishery resources get adequately managed and utilized by fishers themselves 
with self-created rules that fit the local context.” From this, it appears that the Jayul marks 
a rather dramatic turn towards community-based governance through advancing the 
image of fishers and community members as the bona fide leaders and managers of the 
local fishery. At the same time, however, ambivalence on the part of the central 
government is also observed with regard to the degree of community self-reliance and 
autonomy being aspired. The same document also submits a differing view. It prescribes 
that the central government would establish an overarching framework of objectives, 
means and directions for the Jayul, and under this guideline, a detailed management 
scheme that involves a specific fishery, target species, and fishing ground would be 
created by fisher organizations (PPACP, 2008). This latter view imagines the Jayul not as 
a self-directed, autonomous community initiative, but a contained one under the auspices 
of government partners and other centrally-positioned actors, whose evaluative and 
advisory role is perceived to be integral to the process (Lee, 2010; MOMAF, 2003). This 
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inconsistency presents a potential source of confusion at the most basic level of 
conceptualization. A more precise delineation of Jayul’s images would help attain policy 
coherency by clarifying stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities, and send clear messages 
to the public about what the Jayul hopes to achieve. 
Notwithstanding the ambivalent nature of the Jayul, many researchers and 
government managers converge on the view that Jayul is a ‘cultural movement’ to 
instigate sweeping improvements in coastal communities (Lee and Shin, 2004; MOMAF, 
2003; PPACP, 2008). This is a departure from seeing it as a narrow sector-based project 
set up to produce specific and quantifiable outcomes, such as fishery income 
enhancement. This view highlights the criticalness of mindset change within wide 
community members from simply relying on government direction and support to taking 
on increased responsibility and bearing a sense of ownership for local resources in order 
to make coastal villages a more livable and viable place. To this end, sustained 
participation in projects such as stock enhancement activities, coastal clean-ups, fishing 
ground monitoring, and community events and businesses have been identified and being 
promoted as what will trigger the shift in the mindset of community members. 
 
4.1.2. Normative elements 
Another aspect emphasized in the Jayul is community norms. It attempts to advance the 
notion that self-reliance and local-initiatives promoted is not necessarily to be carried out 
by each individual fisher but as an organization in a collective setting. It aims to foster a 
sense of oneness, brotherhood, or fellowship for the greater good of a fishing village 
(PPACP, 2008). The Jayul is a group activity: fishers can participate only as a group, 
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most typically through uchon-gyes or area-based gear associations. It thus encourages 
strengthening of an existing organization or creating a new one in its absence. 
Subsequently, it appeals to social capital, social networks and mutual coercion to help 
deter illegal fishing, achieve equitable production and distribution of fishing income, 
resolve disputes, and raise participation in community activities (Bodin and Crona, 2009; 
Grafton, 2005). In the present study, this sentiment is echoed by several informants, that 
the promotion of a community norm is a crucial element of what the Jayul embodies and 
is trying to institute. For example, a fisheries officer in Gochang County observed a 
greater degree of willingness to follow rules and to cooperate among community 
members at more established Jayul communities, while in less established sites, suspicion 
and disputes were more prevalent. Similarly, the president of the Jayul Association, a 
nascent non-governmental body representing the Jayul communities at the national level, 
commended the foresight of the initiators of the Jayul for not only advocating the self-
reliance component but also emphasizing community values as a complementary 
institutional element in the promotion of governance change. 
 
4.1.3 Regulative elements 
Participating in the Jayul program, first and foremost, requires that an interested 
community creates a local constitution that specifies committee composition, membership 
rules, fishing restrictions, and penalties, among others. A research output published by the 
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MOMAF)
 
stipulates that the self-created rules 
of the Jayul community should be set within the legislative boundary of the central 
government such that they do not negate or conflict with the national fisheries regulations 
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(MOMAF, 2003). It also adds that in cases where the technical fishery rules of the Jayul 
community are deemed more appropriate, through consultations with the central 
government, the national fisheries regulation may be revised. Hence, the current 
legislative setup appears to present a nested hierarchical system in which Jayul 
community rules are encouraged to govern the specifics of the local fishery operation, and 
yet they themselves are governed by the national fisheries regulation. 
Promoting the Jayul in the regulative dimension, however, involves at least another 
level of rule-setting, i.e., the national-level recognition of those Jayul rules by the central 
government. In December 2004, the Fisheries Law underwent a revision to provide 
indirect guidance to the implementation of the Jayul (PPACP, 2008). The Act 70 
proclaims that, (1) in terms of provision of administrative, technical and financial 
assistance, government will give priority to those fishery groups that have created and 
implemented their own rules to protect fishery resources, improve fishery management, 
and maintain social order; (2) the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries will determine 
the details on the methods and processes for providing assistance including evaluation 
metrics for community rules and the definition of eligible fisher groups. Notwithstanding 
these broad clauses that set the protocol for government assistance to encourage 
community fishery initiative, an official recognition of the Jayul program as well as the 
community-created rules in the national legal domain remains absent. The uncertain 
status of the Jayul-created rules in the overall regulative system may, however, undermine 
their efficacy and legitimacy, which is further discussed in section 4.2.3 below. 
 
4.2 (Mis-)matches between the Jayul aims and stakeholder’s mindset 
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4.2.1 Cultural-cognitive – Images 
So, how do these aims of the Jayul compare with the mindsets of the people? First, the 
prevalent image of aging fishing community expressed by survey respondents appears ill-
fitted with the ideas of self-reliance, self-direction and local-initiative endorsed by the 
Jayul. As presented in Chapter 5, this is an image that portrays a lack of younger 
generation of fishers in fishing communities, likely reflecting the general societal trend of 
aging population and out-migration of young people in rural areas (Cheong, 2003b; 
DeWind et al., 2012; Kim, 1982). Aside from the conventional socio-economic problems 
of labour shortage and stagnation of regional economy, the absence of younger generation 
could pose further difficulty to the implementation of the Jayul. Several respondents 
expressed concerns with regard to the declining aptitude and enthusiasm of an older 
generation of fishers to follow new currents of knowledge and try embracing a new mode 
of governance. For instance, a Jayul consultant who has retired from an official 
government fisheries officer duty (Respondent #218) stated: 
“The most important thing is having young people in fishing villages to overcome the 
situation of aging population. Young people can act as a catalyst for vitality. From them, 
ideas are more quickly generated and practiced. But currently even the community leaders 
are often senior members, let alone the members themselves. This has an implication for 
the Jayul; senior members generally repel new ideas, such as what the Jayul embodies. As a 
result, an impetus for new projects suffers.”   
Likewise, a pessimistic outlook on fishery emanating from this image was also noted. 
Fishers’ comments include “...fishing will end with our generation; who will come here 
knowing that it presents a tough life?” (Respondent #87), “there are no young people 
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coming here (to live in fishing villages), plus I don’t want to recommend it either” 
(Respondent #168), and “young people after graduating university do not want to get into 
fishery, they form an idea that fishery will not work for them” (Respondent #190). As 
such, the trend of aging population and out-migration of young people may now have 
been accepted as a dominant cultural image, with any deviation seen as an oddity. This 
could pose an additional hurdle to achieving sustainable and viable fishing communities, 
and further serve as an institutional constraint for the implementation of the Jayul. 
In addition, a widespread image of the government as a provider of support and 
direction to fishing communities may represent another mismatch that inhibits the 
mindset change (see Table 1). According to the survey (see Chapter 5), responding to the 
question of what is first conjured up in the mind about government, words such as 
‘financial and technical assistance’, ‘policy guidance’, ‘educational sessions’, and 
‘enforcement and safety-at-sea activities by the coast guard’ formed a major part of the 
vocabulary for both fishers and managers/researchers, informing the ways respondents 
imagine the coastal fishery. Such views seem to confirm the centrality of governance 
assistance in the functioning of coastal fishery, and acts to substantiate the doubts raised 
about the self-directedness of the Jayul communities. A provincial fisheries officer 
(Respondent #222) commented: 
“Fishers think that they are naturally entitled to receive subsidized fuel. Fishers also would 
not be so keen in stock reinforcement activities if it meant that the expenses are paid by 
themselves, and not come from public tax money. They think it is a government’s apparent 
duty to provide such assistance to fishers.” 
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Representing a community perspective, a fisher who engages in abalone aquaculture 
(Respondent #52), shared a similar idea about the necessity of government support: 
Yes, it might be true that receiving and expecting to receive support might make people 
lazy. But aging population is a serious phenomenon, and government support is ever more 
necessary. Without it, fishing communities might collapse in no time. Collapse of fishing 
and agricultural societies mean collapse of the whole country. So the government need to 
maintain necessary living and working conditions in the fishing communities by providing 
appropriate and necessary support. 
Responses such as these exemplify the culture of reliance on government support, and 
add to the weight of this deeply-ingrained modus operandi. Changing the mindset of 
fishery stakeholders to embrace self-reliance and local-initiatives would thus hinge upon 
how well the pervasiveness of this image can be attenuated or even reversed. This may 
appear a difficult undertaking, nevertheless one that would contribute positively to 
facilitating the Jayul implementation. 
 
Table 1 Summary of mismatches between the institutional aims of the Jayul program and 
the mindset of fishing communities organized under the broad analysis scheme inspired 
by Scott (2008) 
 Institutional aims of the Jayul 
program towards coastal fishing 
communities 
Mindset of fishery stakeholders 
represented by values, images, and 
principles  
Cultural-
cognitive 
Self-reliance and self-initiative in 
fishing communities, 
notwithstanding government’s 
ambivalence towards the degree of 
community autonomy aspired 
Images confirming long-held 
reliance by fishers on government 
assistance and policy direction 
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Jayul as a pan-community cultural 
movement to raise the general 
livability of coastal area, going 
beyond a narrow sector-based 
project with specific objectives 
Images depicting aging population 
and out-migration of young people 
in fishing villages – reducing the 
acceptability of new governance 
ideas such as the Jayul 
Normative Community cohesion and social 
norms; ‘doing it as a group’ 
Values suggesting prevalence of 
individualistic mindset and 
operational traits involved in the 
permit-based boat fishery  
Regulative Drafting of local fishery rules and 
community activities, 
notwithstanding a lack of 
recognition of the Jayul in the 
national fisheries law 
Principles indicating subordinate 
position of local fishery rules to 
national regulations and lengthy 
amendment process in making 
national regulations in line with 
local fishery rules 
 
4.2.2 Normative – Values 
The spirit of cooperation and community norm advocated through the Jayul program may 
also find a mixed trajectory when seen from the perspective of stakeholders, through their 
prioritized values. The importance hierarchy of 16 values was formed based on the survey 
responses of two respondent groups: fishers/community members and government 
managers/researchers (Chapter 4). First, the relatively high standings of the social 
cohesion and peacefulness values by both groups suggest that overall unity and harmony 
within and across fishing communities are important goals. This can be considered a 
positive fit in terms of facilitating the mindset change to institute community norms. 
However, an individualistic, competitive, and private mindset appears more evident when 
observing the relatively little regard given to the equality value (i.e., equal fishing 
opportunity amongst fellow fishers) and the cooperation principle (i.e., cooperation 
among fishers should be increased). Another notable outcome is the significant gap in the 
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degree of importance for the freedom value (i.e., freedom to decide when and where to 
fish) between the two groups. In this case, respondents in the fisher/community member 
group valued operational freedom in fishing much higher than those in the 
manager/researcher group, citing reasons that a fisher should be free to fish whatever and 
in however ways as long as the activity is within the legal boundaries of regulation. 
The individualistic and competitive mindset is identified to be a particularly thorny 
issue in the boat fishery based on the permit system (see Chapter 1 for details on this 
fishery type). Clearly-demarcated fishing boundaries are elusive in practice. Illegal 
fishing and fisher conflicts tend to be more widespread, and reliance on regulative 
measures alone to control the fishing operation has failed in many cases. Similar to the 
situation of common pool resources (e.g., Ostrom 1990), the Korean case of boat fishery 
can be understood as grappling with the “tragedy of the commons”, in which competition 
and privately-held behaviour prevails. The survey responses also echoed the sentiment of 
weak community norm in the boat fishery. For instance, an owner-operator in Dongho-ri 
who targets mixed species (Respondent #128) stated: 
“Fishing, as I see it, is an individual activity; one works individually and earns own money. 
If you have the means and power to do it, do it. If not, you don’t do it. There is no ‘let’s do 
this together’”  
Similar views were expressed emphasizing that fishing is an individual business. They 
further elaborated that “…therefore, community rule is not possible” (Respondent #107), 
“leadership is not very important” (Respondent #121), “there is little dependence on 
cooperation among fishers” (Respondent #144), “[boat fishery] cannot have a 
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group/organized system” (Respondent #181), and “a fisher is free to go anywhere as long 
as he is within the legally-permitted provincial boundaries” (Respondent #116). 
Situated within this hyper-individualistic mode of fishing operation, it remains 
uncertain how the weak social norm among fishers can be elevated to enable the initiation 
and sustenance of Jayul organization in the boat fishery. Lee and Shin (2004) affirms that 
the permit-based boat fishery is a sector that requires the Jayul governance the most, 
given the urgent challenges regarding overfishing and economic unviability, but the one 
that faces the most difficulty in implementation. Such acknowledgement adds to highlight 
the normative predicament in activating community values, bringing the boat fishery 
under the guidance of the Jayul, and therefore instituting a widespread governance 
transition in the Korean coastal fishery. 
 
4.2.3 Regulative – Principles 
In the regulative sphere, setting of local fishery rules at the community-level is stipulated 
to be a core component of the Jayul program (Table 1). Local rules are expected to reflect 
on-the-ground realities and regional fishery characteristics more effectively and also serve 
as an essential mechanism in creating the idea of a self-manager of a local fishery. These 
rules are drafted and agreed among the Jayul members and later reviewed and approved 
by the Jayul program adjudication committee at the regional level, which comprises 
representatives from fishing community, government, academia, and non-governmental 
organizations. It thus may be assumed that people involved in the Jayul program would 
naturally recognize the necessity and utility of having community rules in place. The 
survey result displaying an importance hierarchy of 16 principles (Chapter 4), however, 
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revealed that the subsidiarity principle (presented to respondents as ‘fishery rules should 
be set at the community level’) garnered considerably little importance to both 
fisher/community member group and manager/researcher group. Several responses by the 
fisher/community members, in particular, illustrate this sentiment. A fear of corruption 
and elite capture forms one major reason, described by comments such as “this can be 
dangerous; community rules can be abused by those who make them, serving their own 
interests” (Respondent #97), and “government should set the regulations, otherwise local 
elite who has influence and money can distort the rules for their own benefit” 
(Respondent #111). Also, low legitimacy conferred to community-level rules was 
mentioned: “government regulations and restrictions should be what needs to be upheld 
and followed; ...when fishers make their own rules, they would take them lightly and 
violate them often.” (Respondent #139), “if rules are made at the community level, it is 
doubtful that it will be complied; other communities would have a different set of rules 
and conditions, so there can be losses and people raise objections” (Respondent #182). 
Hence, many people saw little reason for the setting of community-level fishery rules. 
While all Jayul communities have composed local rules as a requirement to be part of the 
Jayul program, this situation casts doubt as to the true appreciation and usefulness of 
them. Contrasting the main objective of the Jayul, the generally weak enthusiasm about 
community rules would create a hindrance to its ongoing implementation.   
The analysis points to another concern in reference to the degree of authority or 
influence community-level rules should hold, compared to the regulations set at higher 
levels. As mentioned earlier, the local fishery rules are only allowed to be established 
within the boundary of national regulations. This implies that, in the case of abalone, for 
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instance, the voluntary size limit in a Jayul community can only be set greater than the 
national standard of 7 cm declared by the Fisheries Resources Protection Decree. While 
this example makes common sense, the current system can also be counterproductive and 
frustrate the efficacy of Jayul community rules. For example, a nationally-enacted 
seasonal closure for swimming crab (Portunus trituberculatus) in Gochang County 
spanned between June 16 and August 15 in 2012. However, local fishers observed in the 
last few years that crab in this area were still moulting near the end of August, possibly 
due to changes in sea temperature. Given this environmental change, resumption of 
fishing on August 16 does neither benefit the ecosystem nor fishers due to low product 
value of soft shell crab. While the fishers of the Jayul community of Gusipo voluntarily 
agreed to abstain from fishing in the adjacent fishing ground until the end of August, 
fishers who travelled from other areas (which is legal under the permit system) dismissed 
the local resolution and started targeting crab once the official period expired, with the 
claim that they are simply following the national regulation. Unfortunately, this created a 
situation where local fishers were forced to enter crab fishing, driven by the fear of 
resource scarcity and the ‘race-to-fish’ mentality. In response, the local fishers have 
approached the government about making an adjustment in the national regulation. Yet, 
the revision process likely poses a Herculean task to communities as it would involve an 
enactment of ministerial ordinances or a tabling of an amendment at the National 
Assembly. Adding to resentment and disputes against visiting fishing fleets, this case 
exemplifies how national fisheries regulation can interfere with the Jayul rules that aim to 
reflect resource dynamics and practical regional differences. 
201 
 
Subsequently, the current setup of the regulative system inadvertently weakening 
the standing of the Jayul institutional arrangement has become a real possibility. Useful 
inquiries would include streamlining the regulative institutions such that Jayul community 
rules can take precedence over national laws, where deemed appropriate, and adjusting 
the review process so that they can be integrated into the overall rule system in a more 
efficient and responsive manner that involves less time and lower cost. In this sense, the 
adaptability principle (i.e., fishery rules should be reviewed frequently to better respond 
to rapid changes in fishing conditions), which garnered relatively little importance in the 
survey, can be activated and utilized to a greater degree in the future (Chapter 4). Efforts 
such as these are expected to contribute to creating appropriate regulative mechanisms 
that would help bridge the gap between the institutional aim and people’s mindsets. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In its 11
th
 year of implementation, the Jayul has expanded nationwide and support has 
grown over the years from both the government sector as well as from communities. It 
carries high hopes and great ambitions to help the coastal fishing communities move into 
prosperity. Emphasis has been on fostering greater participation of fishers and developing 
a sense of autonomy in the management of local fishery, similar to the vision of co-
governance (Kooiman et al., 2005). Its aims, as observed from the analysis here, are noble 
and well-meaning, and it has been called that a change in mindset of fishers and resource-
dependent community members would provide the crucial link in translating them into 
reality. Not many would have thought that this process is quick and easy, as evident from 
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the many articles and papers written on the Jayul program which raise several concerns. 
Yet, reviewing the mindset of the fishery stakeholders, as studied through the meta-
governance concepts of values, images, and principles (Chapter 4 and 5), and 
juxtaposing them with the aims of the Jayul program, as done here (Table 1), shows that 
the challenge of mindset change is indeed a complex proposition. Have the institutional 
aims of the Jayul been overly idealistic? Is the ability to institute an underlying shift in 
people’s mind overestimated? This result suggests that the successful implementation of 
the Jayul may be delayed unless there is a way to address the mismatches between the 
institutional arrangement and the peoples’ mindset. In addition, a more critical 
observation would point to the question of whether the change in mindset has been a 
rather unfounded claim or a wishful thinking without the concrete plans or instruments in 
place to actually make it happen. Although beyond the scope of this article, the possibility 
of the phrase being used as a ‘lip-service’ to the promotion of the Jayul forms another 
notable inquiry for assessing the course of governance transition. 
In light of this analysis, sweeping changes in the mindset of fishers has not fully 
materialized at the national scale. In addition, the prospect of this change does not readily 
appear at the moment. However, the observed cases of fishing communities thriving 
under the Jayul scheme (see MOMAF, 2005), including several of those studied in this 
research, suggest that some communities have made the Jayul program work for them and 
brought about changes to improve their community life. Such cases demonstrate a closer 
alignment of the mindset with the Jayul institutions occurring at a local level. Perhaps, 
one way to move forward, then, is a ‘contextualized’ approach to the Jayul aims. Rather 
than adhering to one set of overarching objectives, as currently is the case, a range of 
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aims can be provided (or even formulated through a collaborative consultation process 
akin to the spirit of the Jayul, see Jentoft et al., 2012). Various degrees of self-reliance 
may be specified, for instance, from very little to very high, recognizing that different 
communities could flourish under a different setup, depending first and foremost on their 
inherent qualities, as suggested by the governability framework (Chuenpagdee, 2011). 
This exploration would allow a continuum of governance mode to exist which spans 
between hierarchical-, co-, and self-governance. 
According to interactive governance theory, the ultimate goal of governance is to 
make fisheries systems more governable, given the multiple problems and issues facing 
the fishery (Bavinck et al., 2013). A transition into a more collaborative mode, and the 
implementation of the Jayul program in South Korea, may be approached more from this 
angle of governability. This would mean that conforming to the Jayul institution may not 
be easily applicable to all communities, given disparate fishers’ mindsets. In such cases, 
insistence on the Jayul could in fact make things less governable. While a continuing 
promotion of the Jayul program through affecting people’s agency should be encouraged 
in most communities, it is also suggested that a re-consideration of the institutional aims 
to include a range of governance mode is a worthy venture that could raise the quality of 
fishery management in those communities shown to be greatly distanced from what the 
Jayul hopes to achieve. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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Understanding the process of governance transition through an examination of institution-
mindset relationship forms a useful analysis for gauging an efficacy of such move. 
Theoretically, this approach suggests a way of studying the interactions between the 
meta- and second-order of governance. It also directs our attention to the ‘structure-
agency’ duality much discussed in the wider literature. Applied to practice, the South 
Korean example provides an opportunity to link the co-management institutional 
arrangement with the ‘change in mindset’ of resource user communities and to explore 
the (mis-)matches between the two parts. This was done using an analytical scheme that 
takes a holistic view of institution comprising a cultural-cognitive, a normative and a 
regulative dimension. The analysis reveals that the Jayul co-management program intends 
to promote a ‘cultural’ movement that enhances self-reliance and social capital in coastal 
communities. It also encourages drafting and carrying out local fishery rules to better 
reflect regional fishery characteristics and to help disseminate the idea of a self-manager. 
Yet, misalignments of these aims with what fishery stakeholders fundamentally hold to be 
important suggest challenges ahead. The dominant image of government assistance may 
overwhelm the promotion of self-direction, especially with a weak presence of a younger 
generation of fishers. The individualistic values ingrained in the boat fishery also do not 
correspond well with the community norms. Furthermore, low regard for local-level 
management principles may stifle the influence of Jayul community rule system. As a 
result, the change in mindset, arguably a critical component to Jayul implementation, may 
face a longer, if not ungovernable, trajectory. Overall, this article demonstrates the care 
needed in attuning institutions to people’s underlying ideas. It highlights their interplay 
and its potential effects on the progress of governance transition. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation research adds to the existing body of knowledge on governance 
transition by exploring two key formulations of the interactive governance theory – meta- 
and second order of governance, i.e., people’s mindset and institutions, respectively. 
Research questions are informed by the nascent concept of governability, which is related 
to the overall quality for governance of the whole fisheries system, attributed to both 
inherent and constructed characteristics of the system-to-be-governed, as well as the 
capacity of the governing system and how the two systems match. In the context of this 
research, key questions include: What are the ‘mindsets’ of fishery stakeholders, as 
represented by, and studied through, their values, images, and principles? Do their values, 
images and principles agree or differ among fishery stakeholder groups, and to what 
extent? What does the co-management program as an institutional arrangement aim to 
promote, and how do they compare with the ‘mindsets’ of fishery stakeholders? 
Governability of a fisheries system hinges upon these factors and this is demonstrated 
from an application to the case study of South Korean coastal fisheries. The research 
process involved an interpretation and conceptualization of the theoretical ideas and also 
development of methods that would enable primary data collection of these under-
researched aspects of natural resource governance. In doing so, an understanding of the 
governance situation in Korean fisheries is enhanced and policy-relevant insights 
generated. The major points of this thesis are summarized at four levels in the following 
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section. The chapter concludes with an identification and description of four main future 
research interests, followed by a reflection on governability concept. 
 
Major conclusions  
 
Theoretical contributions 
This dissertation research is one of the few studies focusing on the meta-level of 
governance. Meta-governance implies ‘governance of governance’. In other words, there 
is something beyond what is visible and apparent which drives resource managers’ 
decisions and actions. Similarly, citizens, resource users, or those-being-governed also 
have their own logic of action and ways of imagining the world around them. These may 
vastly differ between the two groups or they may overlap to a great degree. According to 
the interactive governance theory, this remains an important research issue. An empirical 
study of meta-order elements, as done in Chapters 4 and 5, could reveal a fundamental 
divide between key stakeholder groups, for instance, offering a clue as to why governing 
actions may face indifference or resistance. Likewise, it can provide guidance on how to 
sustain certain initiatives by building on what values, images and principles stakeholder 
groups may have in common.  
While the boundaries between values, images, and principles may not be clearly 
drawn, when considered together they can be conceptualized to have distinct enough roles 
to play in one’s mindset, i.e., (1) general and relatively abstract value priorities of an 
individual, which transcend specific situations; (2) images about the world/fishery, which 
may act as an information filter or a model for how things work; and (3) governance 
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principles one subscribe to, which provide yardsticks for their conduct. They are also 
argued to be slower-changing, fewer in number and more deeply ingrained than opinion-
based constructs such as attitudes and perceptions. Chapter 2 proposes a framework for 
the articulation of these meta-level elements in unison.  
On another level, institutional thinking, which forms the second order of 
governance, has been the focus of many fisheries research. The most dominant form has 
been the common-property analysis of Ostrom and her colleagues (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 
1990; Ostrom et al. 2002), which proposes and tests institutional ideas for solving 
collective action problems, such as the “tragedy of the commons,” in the context of 
fisheries and other common pool resources. As a version of rational choice approaches to 
institutions, it assumes that economic calculations drive individual behaviour, and the 
rules that prescribe and permit behaviour are conceived as institutions that help reconcile 
individual and collective rationality. As submitted in Chapter 3, this line of thinking has 
led to the wide implementation of regulative fisheries management schemes that include 
incentives, access regimes, and property rights. 
The work of W.R. Scott (2008) on institutions details an inclusive spectrum of 
institutional components that stem from various theoretical approaches, as reiterated in 
Chapter 3. Taking account for not only the well-advanced regulative aspect, but also the 
normative and cultural-cognitive dimensions highlighting shared goals, social norms, 
habits, and common knowledge among others, this analytical framework can be used to 
reflect a broadening perspective occurring in the study of fisheries institutions. However, 
a direct application of this approach to empirical cases has been limited up to now. The 
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attempt to apply this to South Korean fisheries in Chapter 6 is therefore a novel 
contribution. 
 
Methodological advances 
This dissertation offers an innovative method, P+ sort, to elicit values and principles of 
stakeholders. The method strikes a fine balance between making use of quantitative and 
qualitative data, among other things. Data collection in P+ sort is guided by a use of a 
sorting board, a deck of cards to be sorted, and a questionnaire booklet that contains 
verbal follow-up questions. P+ sort builds on the simplicity of pile sorting as well as 
draws from a more structured Q sort technique to help guide the sorting exercise. Because 
the method is simple, user-friendly and intuitive, it offers additional benefits of being able 
to accommodate a greater number of items (i.e., the values and principles) than standard 
ranking or rating procedures, and of inducing implicit comparisons among these items. As 
illustrated in Chapter 4, the resulting sorting pattern is analyzed with frequency statistics 
and non-parametric tests, and it acquires a deeper meaning through an examination of the 
qualitative information obtained during the sorting exercise. This instrument contributes 
to the call in literature for wider methodological options for value elicitation, which can 
supplement the well-established contingent valuation and other more conventional survey 
exercises.  
Understanding images from the governance perspective, as this dissertation 
research has done and which Chapter 5 focuses on, is a relatively recent theoretical 
initiative. Similar to the study of values and principles, it requires a methodological 
exploration, which involves, in this case, rapid-appraisal style questions, developed as 
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part of the survey package to elicit the images fisheries stakeholders have about the 
fishery and fishing life. The questions are designed to seek out pressing ideas that lay in 
the sub-conscious realms of the respondents, organized around four governance sub-
schemes (i.e., natural system, social system, governing system, and governing 
interactions). ‘Thematic analysis’ procedures are used to systematically interpret their 
responses and inductively derive salient categories and themes. 
 
Case study application: South Korean coastal fisheries  
Generally speaking, fisheries of South Korea have not been as widely studied as those in 
neighboring countries in the region, such as Japan. Yet, South Korean fisheries and the 
coastal communities could provide a fertile ground for fisheries research given the 
complex and dynamic narratives enmeshed in the place. Within the country, fisheries 
remain in the periphery of social, economic and industrial policy, but at the same time a 
strong and persistent government mandate on supporting coastal fishery (perhaps 
rhetorically) is being maintained. Externally, macro-influences such as regional climate 
changes, a growing influx of imported seafood, shrinking fishing grounds due to an 
establishment of Economic Exclusive Zones in the neighbouring seas, tense maritime 
border disputes with North Korea, and illegal intrusion of Chinese fishing fleets in 
Korean waters, all place the South Korean fishery in a vulnerable, but a lively position. 
The appeal of the South Korean fishery as a research context is further stimulated by the 
exceptional significance of fish and fisheries to national psyche in terms of food culture 
and recreation.  
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The new co-management-style program, ‘Jayul Fisheries Community 
Management,’ is part of the change that the coastal fishery must recognize and adapt to. 
Implemented since 2001, it was designed to help alleviate the socio-economic and 
resource challenges faced in the fishery and coastal villages through greater community 
participation in management. Initiated by the central government and being supported by 
the various levels of governmental and non-governmental fisheries organizations, this 
governance effort has grown in size with nearly half of about 2,000 fishing communities 
nationwide registered in the program in 2011. Amid this expansion, however, the 
sustainability of the program in each participating community is being put into question 
with lingering doubts about the financial and motivational capacity of the communities. 
The situation raises a question as to whether stakeholder’s mindsets (i.e., values, images, 
and principles), and/or structural hindrances (i.e., institutions) are configured in such a 
way that impedes its progress. In addition, change of mindset of fishers and resource-
dependent community members towards the visions of the Jayul program is claimed to be 
an integral factor in facilitating this governance shift. Findings from the main chapters of 
this dissertation (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) are discussed in the context of the Jayul by 
considering features influencing people’s mindset in terms of their contribution to making 
the program and its implementation more or less governable.    
In this backdrop, the survey was crafted to elicit the values and principles of two 
main stakeholder groups, resource-dependent fishing community members and formal 
managers/researchers. This was carried out to understand what they consider to be more 
important and whether they are different or similar between the groups. In this study, 
ecosystem values and socio-economic values (such as wealth and secure livelihoods) are 
216 
 
frequently expressed as the most important ones. Virtuous trait of honesty/integrity is 
another highly desired value shared across the fishery stakeholders. Few group 
differences are observed in the values, likely implying that both the governors and those-
being-governed hold a similar conception of what are ultimately desired for the fishery 
and fishing life. In other words, it can be concluded that they share a basic value system, 
providing thus a firm platform for the implementation of the Jayul (Chapter 4). 
The principles regarded as very important by the respondents include equity, 
adjacency, and ecosystem integrity. But in the context of governance transition, two 
principles that arguably hold grave implications to local-level management and 
community empowerment display significant group disparity. Adjacency is a highly 
important principle to fishers and other resource-dependent community members, while 
the government managers/academic researchers do not find it as important. Conversely, 
participation in fishery management is a principle regarded as very important by the 
manager/researcher group, while the same degree of importance is not evident in the 
community group. These key differences represent a likely source of underlying 
disagreement in how the fisheries governance is to be conducted (Chapter 4). The 
implementation of the Jayul may suffer as a consequence. 
With respect to images, the study reveals the diversity and complexity of aspirations 
and concerns that fishery stakeholders have about the fishery and fishing life. Solicited 
under the rubric of four governance sub-systems, the inductively derived image categories 
and themes include environmental degradation, fish as resources, cultural-political 
marginalization of the sector, livelihood demands, and ineffectiveness of governing 
authorities, among others. Composite images that reach into multiple themes such as 
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“healthy lifestyle from clean coastal environment” and “socio-economic assistance as 
government policy” are also observed. Other general characteristics of images are 
elucidated. For example, images are shown to be imbued with negative, neutral, or 
positive overtones, or indicate past events, current states or future activities. Collectively, 
a set of dominant images underpin stakeholders’ primary depiction of realities, as shown 
in Chapter 5. How well the governance effort in question (i.e., the Jayul program) 
meshes into the main currents of stakeholders’ images would, thus, present an inquiry of 
practical significance.  
Lastly, from the broad view of institutions, the Jayul program may be understood as 
a governance strategy aimed at instituting self-reliance and self-initiative in fishing 
communities. It also emphasizes community cohesion and group activities through the 
drafting of local fishery rules and the application of social norms to implement them. 
Hence, the resulting locus of the governance change is envisioned to reside at the local 
fishing communities. Yet, the long-held, and still prevalent, culture of reliance of fishers 
on government assistance and policy direction acts as a counter-institutional force that 
could impede a wide establishment of the Jayul program. Additionally in the regulative 
dimension, the subordinate legal position of local fishery rules to national fishery 
regulations can work to render community initiatives ineffective, negating the visions of 
the Jayul program. As discussed in Chapter 6, such misalignments between these 
components could hinder the promotion of the Jayul program, and further the progress of 
governance transition. Overall, the findings demonstrate the care needed in attuning 
institutions to people’s underlying ideas, and suggest pathways for an incorporation of 
multiple, contextualized institutional possibilities. 
218 
 
 
Practical governance insights 
Approached from the unique angle that combines the novel theoretical visions with the 
methodological innovations summarized above, the analyses taken in this dissertation 
research generate several practical insights that hold implications for the governance 
situation of South Korean coastal fisheries. First, the convergence of the highly regarded 
ecosystem values, economic and livelihood values, and integrity in fishery matters 
between the key stakeholder groups deserves major attention, as the endorsement of these 
values could serve as the normative foundation of all governance activities and policy 
direction. With stakeholders holding a similar set of values, a common ground could be 
forged, and governance effort could be directed based on these values. It would also need 
to visibly promote these shared values, if it is to garner the long-term support of 
stakeholders (both governors and community members) and to produce intended 
outcomes. The current emphasis of the Jayul program on the ecosystem and socio-
economic values through various coastal clean-up and income enhancement activities is 
to be continuously supported. A missing link lies, however, in the promotion of the 
‘honesty/integrity’ in the governance system, which is shown in the study (Chapter 4) to 
hold high importance. The Jayul program should consider ways to integrate this value in 
its implementation, e.g., through a document or budget transparency scheme, or a seafood 
traceability system.  
Next, as gathered from the findings of principle importance, user-participation in 
rule-making is not widely considered very important among the surveyed resource 
community members. Hence, despite the many positive developments of the Jayul 
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program in the last decade, the participatory mindset may be slow in taking root across 
the communities, substantiating the concerns about the communities’ cursory 
involvement. In the case of the adjacency principle, the managers/researchers appear 
wary of strengthening local priority access and use rights to nearby fishing grounds for 
the fear that fishing communities may not always effectively manage a given coastal 
environment. Yet, adjacency is conceptualized as a key enabling factor towards a more 
community-empowered approach to fisheries management by providing a legal as well as 
a geographical basis for coastal communities to maintain fishing livelihoods (Davis and 
Wagner 2006). At the same time, it may also help guard against the vulnerability of local 
fishery collapse arising from outside influences, such as large-scale industrial fishers or 
corporations being dispensed with nearshore fishing privileges. Hence, the government 
and other promoters of the Jayul program should carefully assess the validity of the 
adjacency demand and whether creating or strengthening priority access to a fishing 
ground to nearby fisher communities can further enhance the efficacy of governance 
change in South Korea.  
The prevailing images of fishery stakeholders produce three main policy-relevant 
insights, as discussed in Chapter 5. Aligning with the images of environmental 
degradation and aspirations for clean, productive natural surroundings, the Jayul program 
should intensify the promotion of environmental stewardship at the community level. 
However, it is also understood that the local-level effectiveness may prove futile if not 
accompanied by an effort to engage with wider environmental/industrial policy. This is 
because the large-scale impacts of coastal development and extensive industrial pollution 
can reach deep into the consciousness of the coastal community members, nullifying thus 
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local stewardship. Secondly, the focus on income enhancement as part of the Jayul 
activities appears consistent with a widespread image stakeholders have about the socio-
economic facet of the fishery. However, fishers and community members also hold strong 
images of government assistance and intervention as being integral to their fishing life. 
Heavy dependence on government support reaffirms the doubts raised about the self-
directedness of the Jayul communities and eventually about the sustainability of the 
program. Thirdly, a prevailing image indicates a perceived lack of cordiality and 
relevance in the government’s approach towards fishers. At a more superficial level, a re-
portrayal of government’s self-images would be useful in dispelling the negative and 
hostile representation of the governing authority and branding themselves as working 
partners. More fundamentally, however, a rigid power differential that leads an 
unproductive relationship between managers/researchers and fishers would need to be 
addressed to help foster a more horizontal mode of fisheries governance consistent with 
the aims of the Jayul program.  
Finally, assessing the aims of the Jayul program and juxtaposing them with the 
mindset of fishery stakeholders, as studied through the meta-governance concepts of 
values, images, and principles (Chapters 4 and 5), shows that the challenge of mindset 
change is indeed a complex proposition. The result suggests that the successful 
implementation of the Jayul may be delayed unless there is a way to address the 
mismatches between the two parts. In light of this analysis, it is not surprising that 
sweeping changes in the mindset of fishers has not fully materialized at the national scale. 
There are, however, several communities who have experienced improvements, 
demonstrating a closer alignment of the mindset with the Jayul institutions occurring at a 
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local level. One possible way to move forward is a ‘contextualized’ approach to the Jayul 
aims. Signalling a departure from adhering to one set of overarching objectives, as 
currently is the case, a range of aims can be provided instead, or alternately formulated 
through a collaborative consultation process. Various degrees of self-reliance may be 
specified, for instance, from very little to very high, recognizing that different 
communities could flourish under a different setup. This exploration would allow a 
continuum of governance mode to exist, spanning between hierarchical-, co-, and self-
governance. While a sustained promotion of the Jayul program should be encouraged in 
most communities, it is also suggested (Chapter 6) that a re-consideration of the 
institutional aims to include a range of governance mode is a worthy venture that could 
raise the quality of fishery management in those communities shown to be greatly 
distanced from what the Jayul hopes to achieve.  
 
Future research directions 
 
Drawing from the insights gained in the study, four areas of research interests can be 
further explored to improve the current approaches and gain new meanings.  
 
How values, images, and principles are linked and influence each other  
This research proposed values, images, and principles as three overlapping but unique 
parts of what constitutes one’s mindset. Each element was mainly approached separately: 
they were introduced and empirically studied on its own although the insights can be 
juxtaposed and combined at a later stage. This individual approach was a necessary one 
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given the exploratory nature of the study, in which the validity of each element would 
need to be first explained and demonstrated. Here, it was shown that they have distinct 
roles and occupy different thematic niches in one’s mindset. Therefore, a consideration of 
all three elements would make an analysis of meta-governance a more complete one. The 
next research step, however, would call for a more holistic stance. What is most 
meaningful may not be the separate accounts of the values, images and principles, but 
how they work together to influence governance processes and outcomes. How are they 
related to each other? Can we delineate how values affect images and vice versa? Is there 
perhaps a supra-concept that lends itself to analyzing these elements in a more blended 
manner? An in-depth study into their internal dynamics remains a key topic for future 
governance research.  
 
‘Change in mindset’ and governmentality  
A shift of people’s values, images, and principles may be approached and seen through 
another theoretical viewpoint that is more sensitive to the dynamics of power. In the 
governance and policy context, manipulation of citizens’ or the public’s mindset is a 
governing strategy many see necessary and even commonsensical (see Kinzig et al. 
2013). Yet, as with any governing activities, this represents an exercise of power, and one 
that tends to take place in a unidirectional manner from governors to those-being-
governed. In this respect, a Foucauldian concept of ‘governmentality’ appears to be a 
useful optic to further explicate the claims of mindset change (see Chapter 2 for an 
introduction). Governmentality embodies that governing (gouverner) is most effective 
when it colonizes modes of thought (mentalité) of citizens (Sawyer and Gomez 2008). It 
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opens up an inquiry into governor’s calculated thoughts and actions that seek to shape and 
regulate the way people conduct themselves according to specific ideas or ideals (Dean 
1999; Agrawal 2005). Therefore, using governmentality as an analytical frame to 
examine how techniques of changing the values, images, or principles of stakeholders 
play out empirically and theoretically is a worthwhile effort. Interactions between 
stakeholders and their power relations that lead to governmentality is, of course, one form 
of governing interaction, which can be explored using the interactive governance 
perspective as a condition of governability.   
The case of South Korean coastal fisheries also illustrates this possibility. While 
various government-sponsored measures including financial incentives, expert 
advice/guidance, study trips are in place to encourage communities to join the Jayul 
program and to exercise self-regulatory practices, what is identified as vital in facilitating 
a long-standing establishment is for fishers themselves to embrace the mindset of being 
the owners and the self-managers of their local fishery. To this effect, government 
officials and academic researchers claim that only this ‘persuasion’ will truly enable 
effective community-regulation, and that an emphasis on changing the mindset of fishing 
community members is ultimately what the central government strives to govern in 
reality. A focused study of which and how governing instruments use power to their 
advantage to propagate this rationality, therefore, signifies another branch of extended 
governance research. Drawing on governmentality and actors’ values, images, and 
principles, such inquiries are also expected to provide a way to make power issues more 
explicit in the interactive governance theory (Jentoft 2007). 
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Methodological improvement 
Operationalizing the meta-order governance concepts necessitated a certain degree of 
methodological tinkering. Elicitation of values and principles involved a questionnaire 
survey method that utilizes a semi-structured sorting technique and simple statistical 
analyses. The image study also relied on the development of a set of open, succinctly-
phrased questions. While they were adequate for the research objectives set out in this 
study, they represent early attempts, with limitations that invite further development. 
They were effectively geared towards scoping out a general collection of values, images, 
and principles to help draw out their conceptual boundaries, rather than facilitating an in-
depth study of certain specific elements. As future studies may examine a focused set of 
salient values, images, or principles, additional methodological adjustment can be 
reasonably expected. This could take an extensive qualitative route through lengthened 
interview processes and dedicated ethnographic research. On the other hand, it is also 
possible to imagine a large sample-size questionnaire survey aided by sophisticated 
statistical analyses with the aim of generalizing the result over a large population. Above 
all, a continuing research attention would be required to further explore a mixed approach 
that relies on both qualitative and quantitative contribution. Finally, because this research 
was cross-sectional, it was unable to examine how responses changed over time. Such a 
line of inquiry could provide clearer insights into the dynamic forces that shape people’s 
responses that construct their underlying notions. It may also allow estimating the actual 
degree of changes made with regard to mindset. Thus, future research would benefit from 
a longitudinal design to improve the understanding of the processes involved in the 
formation and evolution of people’s values, images, and principles. 
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Application to other governance efforts 
The normative approach advanced in this research, especially combined with the 
institutional analysis, can be extended to examine other popular fisheries instruments, 
such as marine protected areas (MPAs) and individual transferable quotas (ITQs), and 
other governance efforts directed at aquaculture expansion, post-harvest process 
modernization, and consumption policy. How do these governance initiatives align with 
what stakeholders conceive to be important and desirable? And how does the particular 
setup of institutions works to regulate the course of these initiatives? Such inquiries 
would serve a useful way of predicting and understanding their standings and prospects. 
Future applications would also provide a litmus test for gauging the robustness of this 
approach. In the process, new insights may surface, challenging and improving the core 
ideas raised in this research – overall providing a valuable addition to the way we 
understand fisheries governance. 
 
Final reflection – governability 
 
Governability concept offers a new way of approaching governance problems. Focusing 
on the holistic quality of governance systems to deal with various problems that may 
arise, it asks different types of questions than the more conventional governance analyses 
which may be performance-, task-, or outcome-oriented. Its primary focus is not in 
knowing the most direct way to reach an outcome per se, but instead it examines whether 
a governance system in question is more or less conducive to dealing with the complexity 
226 
 
and diversity of a problem that is in flux and interacting. The task is then to understand 
the level of governability of a system (e.g., a coastal fishery) in the context of a particular 
problem (e.g., community sustainability), and seek ways to inform action that will 
enhance governability. 
This research focuses on two aspects of the governance system that influence 
governability. The meta-order elements are qualities of the system-to-be-governed and of 
the governing system, which are mostly inherent but may also be constructed, through 
interventions such as the implementation of a Jayul. The second aspect is institutions. 
Institutions pose certain structural constraints that bestow rigidity, orthodoxy and 
consistency into a governance system, such that the system (and actors within) is 
encouraged to perform in certain ways but restricted in another ways. In this sense, 
institutions would serve to increase the governability of the system or lower it. 
Furthermore, in the process of institutional change, interactions that take place between 
institutional elements (e.g., rules, norms, and customs) being promoted and the typically 
entrenched, slow-changing people’s mindset may create mismatches resulting in 
conflicting and unstable conditions. Thus, attentive consideration towards the institutional 
design and implementation would be an important undertaking for ensuring a more 
governable system. 
Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (2013) offer an analytical framework useful for gaining 
insights about governability, starting with an examination into the degree of ‘wickedness’ 
of societal problems. The wicked nature may arise from the value conflicts, trade-offs and 
hard choices of various actors involved,  who may have different and even contradictory 
and incompatible ideas of what they want and how things should be. Governability 
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assessment would help reveal how and why their ideas differ (or agree for that matter) 
and point to where the intervention should lie. 
In improving governability, then, changes made to the system may result to benefit 
certain groups of people while disadvantaging others depending on what the system is 
made governable for. A system may be viewed highly governable by some, but not-so-
governable from the perspective of others. Examples of dictatorship or mafia ruling over 
a neighborhood can represent a highly governable system in terms of economic growth or 
social unity, but not from the yardstick of social justice or human rights. Chuenpagdee 
and Jentoft (2013, p.340) also submit that considering a myriad of features that give rise 
to the wickedness of governance, “an industrialized aquaculture system to be more 
governable than, for instance, the more “chaotic” system of small-scale fisheries in Lake 
Victoria”. When taken at face value, such statements can create a danger of leaving small-
scale fishery proponents in dismay and questioning whether high governability is in fact 
something to be strived for. 
As this research has investigated the crucial role of governance actors’ normative 
stance and the need to articulate it more clearly, governability as an analytical tool must 
be grounded in an explicit normative base. A recent exchange among the thinkers of 
governability reminds us that governability is not a goal in itself, but rather a means to an 
end. Hence, while the overall goal of governance is to enhance governability, any 
discussion of governability, including its assessment and application, must be made in the 
context of normative goals. Understanding stakeholders’ values, images, and principles is 
expected to help highlight this often overlooked, but essential, aspect of governance. 
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Interactive governance theory and the governability concept is an evolving entity. 
Using interactions as a heuristic to understand societal governance, interactions are to be 
found at every level. Values, images and principles stand to compete or co-exist among 
themselves representing the meta-order of governance. Institutional elements operate vis-
à-vis each other forming the second order. Governing instruments, fishers’ actions, and 
fish stocks also engage in more concrete transactions representing the first order of 
governance. Therefore, the interaction-based thinking could contribute to finding 
appropriate ways of thinking about, making sense of, and improving our world, and the 
fish and humans in it. Overall, this perspective has grown to be one part of a larger effort 
to alleviate widespread challenges occurring in fisheries and natural resource sectors in 
general. To continue on this difficult but hopeful journey, an ongoing exploration and 
refinement of the ideas elaborated in this research is thus widely encouraged. 
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Appendix I Survey instrument (for resource-dependent community members) 
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Appendix II Survey instrument (for managers/researchers) 
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